The Kremlin passed around the hats: why did Putin gather oligarchs on March 26 after the RSPP congress and why does it smell like a lack of money for the war

On March 26, 2026, the XXXV Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs was held in Moscow. The public part took place at the National Center ‘Russia’, where Putin addressed big business. The Kremlin had previously announced a separate closed meeting after the congress — with members of the RSPP bureau and invited entrepreneurs. It was around this closed part that the main political noise arose.

According to The Bell, at this closed meeting, the Kremlin’s host made it clear that he intends to continue the war against Ukraine, and then suggested that big business make ‘voluntary’ contributions to the budget. Two interlocutors of the publication recounted a harsher formula: it was about continuing the war at least until full control over Donbass. The next day, Reuters reported that the Kremlin interprets this differently: Dmitry Peskov denied that Putin directly asked business to finance the war, but at the same time acknowledged that one of the participants did indeed offer a large sum, and The Bell and Financial Times wrote about voluntary contributions and the willingness to continue the military campaign.

For the Israeli audience, in this story, it is important not only the Kremlin’s humiliation itself, when a state with a nuclear arsenal begins to practically go around its own billionaires with a hat. More importantly, it looks like a fairly transparent signal of financial tension within the system. If even with the number one military budget and with the formal growth of oil prices, the Kremlin begins to separately shake the super-rich, then the question is no longer about propaganda, but about the cash register.

The closed meeting after the RSPP congress became more important than the congress itself

Publicly at the congress, Putin spoke about the business climate, investments, and ‘moderate conservatism’ in spending. Everything as usual: language that should calm the elites. But it was the closed conversation after the public scene that turned out to be politically more substantial. The Bell wrote that at it, the Kremlin leader essentially voiced two things: the war continues, and business will have to participate in filling the budget separately, beyond the usual tax burden. Reuters then conveyed another important detail: among those who reportedly responded was Suleiman Kerimov, allegedly promising 100 billion rubles. The Kremlin, I repeat, did not confirm exactly this interpretation, but the very fact of urgent justification is already indicative.

This is the nerve of the whole story. In its normal logic, the Russian system does not ask. It seizes. Through taxes, through ‘voluntary’ collections, through political pressure, through redistribution of flows. Therefore, when it comes to a personal conversation with oligarchs after the RSPP congress, the meaning is quickly read: the issue is so sensitive that it had to be resolved manually.

Here, it is not a gesture of strength that is visible, but the smell of deficit

The economic background in Moscow is unpleasant. Reuters wrote that Russia is simultaneously facing a budget deficit and economic slowdown, and The Guardian, citing the same events, reminded: the federal budget deficit for the first two months of 2026 has already exceeded 90% of the entire planned annual level. At the same time, defense spending increased by 42% compared to the previous year. Formally, the system is still holding on. But it is holding on more and more expensively.

Hence the whole logic of this new extortion rhetoric. When the war becomes not a short expedition, but a permanent model of the regime’s existence, there is always not enough money. Especially if spending on the army and war becomes the main priority, and everything else has to be squeezed or shifted to business. Reuters separately wrote that the Russian government is already considering a 10% cut in non-urgent spending if the oil market does not provide the expected relief.

The rise in oil helps Moscow, but Ukraine hits the very way to earn on this war

Here begins an especially important part. Yes, the war around Iran gave Moscow a gift in the form of higher oil prices. But the problem for the Kremlin is that the rise in prices does not work in a vacuum. It gives results only when you can calmly process, load, and export raw materials. And with this, Russia is noticeably worse.

On March 25-27, Reuters reported several related things. After Ukrainian strikes on the Baltic ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk, oil and oil product loadings were stopped; Novatek stopped the operation of the complex in Ust-Luga after a fire and damage; and Reuters calculations showed that at that time at least 40% of Russian export oil capacity was stopped — due to attacks, pipeline damage, and tanker problems. That is, Ukraine is cutting not headlines, but oil logistics. And this is already very painful for Moscow.

That is why the request to the oligarchs does not look like an eccentric whim of an aging autocrat, but as a symptom. The rise in oil did not give the relaxation that the Kremlin probably hoped for. Ukraine is knocking out Western export routes, and the Asian direction, although it remains open, does not automatically turn into a gold mine. Reuters separately wrote about Russia’s structural limitations when redirecting LNG and other energy flows to Asia: high logistics costs, ship shortages, contractual restrictions, and the need to give discounts to the same Chinese buyers. That is, ‘we will transfer everything to Asia’ sounds beautiful only on propaganda paper.

That is why the oligarchs are being shaken right now

If simplified to the limit, Putin found himself in a rather unpleasant fork. He does not want to fold the war. On the contrary, according to The Bell, he told business that he intends to go further. But money for a long war is no longer just oil, not just taxes, and not just the printing press. It is also manual squeezing of the elites, who are made to understand: the state has come for you again.

The oligarchs, of course, will chip in. In the Russian vertical, the word ‘voluntarily’ has long meant not at all what is written in the dictionary. But such collections have their unpleasant side effect for the Kremlin. Business, which is used to pulling money from the budget and state orders, does not like it when the budget begins to pull money from it too demonstratively. It is not necessary to wait for a rebellion. But the irritation within the elites from this definitely does not decrease.

For Israel, this is not a Russian internal gossip, but part of the overall war of attrition

It is important for the Israeli reader to see a broader picture here. Russia today is not an abstract external player. It is a state that strategically benefits from Middle Eastern upheavals, politically stays closer to Tehran, and is technologically connected with the Iranian military machine. Therefore, any news that the Kremlin’s military cash register does not add up is not foreign to Israel. It concerns the entire anti-Western axis at once.

That is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in such plots are important not as a platform for gloating, but as a place where the real mechanics of the regime are visible. Not the mythical ‘invincible Russian economy’, but a system that simultaneously raises military spending, cuts civilian articles, hopes for oil, loses part of export logistics under Ukrainian strikes, and ultimately comes to a familiar finale: bring more, gentlemen billionaires.

What remains in the dry residue

In the dry residue, the picture looks like this. On March 26, 2026, after the XXXV RSPP congress in Moscow, Putin held a closed meeting with the largest businessmen. According to The Bell, it was there that he made it clear that the war would continue and that business was offered to additionally ‘chip in’ to the budget. The Kremlin then began to smooth out the wording, but the very appearance of these justifications only reinforced the impression that the topic hit the target.

And most importantly, this story smells very bad for the Kremlin itself. Because a strong power usually does not explain to its oligarchs why it is necessary to urgently help the budget. It simply does not bring the situation to such a moment. When it does reach it, it is no longer a joke about the new Ostap Bender. It is a marker that the war is becoming more expensive for the regime than it would like to admit aloud.