NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News

On March 29, 2026, the Israeli publication NEWSru.co.il published an article citing a study by LS Group, and it is from this publication that we take the main material for analysis: the Russian language was among the top five leaders in spreading anti-Israeli narratives about the US and Israel’s war against Iran. For Israel, this is no longer just a media detail from the outside world, but an unpleasant signal that the Russian-speaking space is increasingly participating in the general flow of hostile information.

According to the data provided by NEWSru.co.il, five languages — Arabic, Farsi, English, Spanish, and Russian — form 89% of the global anti-Israeli information flow on the current war topic. This list is only partially predictable. Arabic and Farsi are not surprising. But the presence of the Russian language in this top five, and with such a share, sounds different to the Israeli audience. This means that the conversation is not about some narrow propagandistic corner of the internet, but about a large linguistic environment with which Israel is historically directly connected — through repatriation, media, families, business, politics, and public discourse.

What the map of the anti-Israeli information flow looks like

Five languages hold almost the entire volume

According to the publication, the Arabic language ranks first with a share of 31% and a growth of 24% compared to February. It is followed by Farsi — 26% and a growth of 37%. English accounts for 19% of the total volume, Spanish — 13%, Russian — 11%. The overall growth of anti-Israeli messages during the period under review was 31%. If you translate this from the dry language of monitoring into ordinary language, the picture looks like this: in a matter of weeks, the anti-Israeli information wave not only persisted but noticeably intensified, and the Russian segment found itself within this acceleration, not somewhere on the periphery.

The Russian language has a special role in this list. Formally, it closes the top five. But politically and informationally, the significance of this fact is broader than the mere figure of 11%. Russian is a language that continues to live within Israeli society. It is not external to the country. Therefore, each intensification of anti-Israeli rhetoric in Russian potentially affects not only international opinion but also the internal media environment of Israel itself.

Telegram has become the main accelerator

The publication separately emphasizes that 48% of anti-Israeli messages appear on Telegram. In second place is X with 18%. At the same time, Telegram dominates precisely in the Arabic, Farsi, and Russian segments, whereas X is stronger in English and Spanish. This is an important fork. It shows not only where hostile content is spreading but also how exactly it lives. Telegram is about speed, low moderation, high emotionality, dense communities, and almost instant radicalization of any topic.

For Israel, this is especially sensitive because Telegram has long become not just a news channel. It is a space where people get the primary explanation of events. Not a document. Not a check. Not a long analytical text. But precisely the first frame: who is to blame, who is the victim, who supposedly “pushes the world to catastrophe,” and who “defends.” And if such a frame is massively built against Israel, then it is no longer so important how the text is then formatted — as a rough post, as a supposedly expert analysis, or as a meme.

Why the Russian segment is a separate problem for Israel

It’s no longer about marginalia

The Russian-speaking space has long been perceived by many Israelis as a more or less pragmatic environment. Yes, with a heavy style, yes, with cynicism, yes, with political aggression. But still not as the main carrier of the anti-Israeli agenda. The data provided by LS Group shows that this perception is outdated. The Russian segment today is one of the major routes through which anti-Israeli interpretations of the war are spread. Moreover, it does so through platforms familiar to itself: Telegram, VK, YouTube.

It is important not to simplify here. The problem is not only reduced to the official Russian line, although its influence, of course, has not disappeared. The matter is broader.

The Russian language has long become a convenient shell for very different streams: anti-Western resentment, conspiracy theories, pseudo-realism, militant cynicism, and meme political hatred. Against this background, Israel easily becomes a convenient target. It can simultaneously be presented as both an “aggressor” and an “instrument of the US,” and as a “provocateur of world war,” and as a “hypocritical West in miniature.” For a disoriented audience, such constructions work surprisingly well.

The Russian language can no longer be considered a neutral background

This is perhaps the main conclusion for the Israeli audience. If the Russian language is among the top five carriers of anti-Israeli narratives, then the Russian-speaking information field should already be considered not as a secondary background, but as a direction of information security. Not only external but also internal. In the middle of this alarming picture, НАновости — Новости Израиля | Nikk.Agency sees a key thing: it is not about a dispute of opinions and not about the usual rough polemics on social networks, but about systemic pressure on the perception of Israel in one of the most sensitive linguistic environments for the country.

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That is why the reaction to such data should not be limited to indignation. Here, a more sober question is needed: who in Israel is generally working with the Russian-speaking space as a real front, and not as an archive of an old repatriate habit?

What narratives drive this wave

The main formula — Israel as an aggressor, Iran as supposedly defending

According to the data presented in the article, the most widespread narrative became the formula “The US and Israel are aggressors, Iran is defending” — 29%. Next is the thesis that “the destruction of the Zionist regime is near” — 22%, and then the version that “the American-Israeli alliance is provoking a world war” — 18%. Lower in the list are constructions about the “empire of evil,” “double standards of the West,” “deceptive Trump negotiations,” and conspiracy theories about nuclear strikes and regime change.

What is important here is not that all these formulas are already familiar. More important is another thing: they work simultaneously in several languages and for different audiences. Somewhere — through religious solidarity. Somewhere — through fear of global war. Somewhere — through anti-Americanism. And in the Russian segment, they are especially easily masked as a supposedly sober geopolitical conversation. Not a shout, but a smirk. Not a slogan, but “well, let’s honestly look.” Such packaging is often more dangerous than direct abuse.

From insults to pseudo-analytics — the entire spectrum is already in action

NEWSru.co.il writes that the analysis was built on the vocabulary, tonality, framing, and emotional coloring of the content. Among the recurring themes were attribution of responsibility, confessional solidarity, rationalization of war through oil, money, and logistics, invective vocabulary, emotional involvement, and geopolitical pessimism. This is a good slice of how modern anti-Israeli rhetoric works today: it has long not consisted only of direct hatred. It can look both like a rough street shout and like a seemingly calm calculated analysis.

For Israel, this means a simple but unpleasant thing. The fight is not only with lies but also with their stylizations. Not only with direct anti-Semitism but also with its “smart” packaging. Not only with radicals but also with those who create the appearance of a neutral comment, but in fact repeat all the same schemes: Israel is to blame, the West is hypocritical, Iran is cornered, the world is rolling into the abyss because of Zionists and Washington.

Hence the conclusion. The publication is important not because it contains one loud figure about the Russian language. It is important because it shows the architecture of the problem. The anti-Israeli flow is growing. It is multilingual. It feels platforms well. And the Russian language in this system is no longer an observer, but a full participant. For Israel, this is not a question of image and not even a question of one news cycle. It is a question of the stability of society during the war.