Moscow may help Iran attack CIA facilities: why Israel should change its attitude towards Putin and Russia – Reuters

American intelligence agencies are investigating whether Russia could have helped Iran carry out precise strikes on secret CIA facilities in the Middle East. At the center of the investigation are attacks by modified Iranian Shahed drones, allegedly equipped with the Russian protected navigation system ‘Kometa-M’.

At least two CIA-related facilities were hit in March 2026. One was located on the grounds of the US embassy in Riyadh, the other in eastern Iraq. One of the Western intelligence documents, the contents of which were reviewed by Reuters, concludes that Russia ‘likely’ played a certain role in providing data used for targeting the strikes. The US intelligence has not yet reached a final conclusion, but the precision of the attacks is prompting Washington to consider the most dangerous scenario.

Information specifically about possible Russian assistance to Iran in targeting CIA facilities became public on July 22, 2026. The Reuters exclusive was published at 18:31 UTC, which is approximately 21:31 Israeli time. Reuters emphasized that the investigation into possible Russian involvement in the attacks on CIA facilities had not been publicly disclosed before.

However, certain parts of this story were known earlier:

• On March 3, 2026, Reuters reported that a suspected Iranian drone hit a CIA station located at the US embassy in Riyadh. At that time, a source claimed that there were no signs of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA unit.
• Also in March 2026, reports emerged that Russia had transferred the protected satellite navigation system ‘Kometa-M’ to Iran and was providing Tehran with other technical and intelligence support.
• Only on July 22 were all the elements first linked together: strikes on several CIA facilities, Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa-M’, and the possible transfer of targeting data by Moscow.

If these suspicions are confirmed, this is no longer a typical Russian-Iranian partnership or another arms exchange deal. It would mean Moscow’s deliberate assistance in targeting American intelligence facilities — that is, the actual complicity of two regimes in direct attacks on US infrastructure.

For Israel, this story has direct military and political significance.

If Russia is indeed helping Iran not only to improve drones but also to obtain precise coordinates of closed American facilities, the same technologies and intelligence capabilities could be used against Israeli military bases, command centers, intelligence facilities, energy infrastructure, and defense industry enterprises.

Therefore, Jerusalem needs more than just to strengthen air defense: it is necessary to reconsider the political attitude towards Moscow. A state that supplies Iran with military technologies and possibly helps choose targets for strikes cannot continue to be perceived as a neutral mediator, with whom previous caution should be maintained at all costs.

Two drones and one breached wall

The strike on the American embassy in the capital of Saudi Arabia occurred on March 3, 2026. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense reported that the diplomatic complex was attacked by two drones. A limited fire broke out, the buildings sustained material damage, but there were no casualties or injuries. Immediately after the attack, a Reuters source emphasized that there was no evidence of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA station at that time.

However, later, additional information became available to Western intelligence structures.

According to Reuters sources, the attack might have been constructed in an unusual scheme: the first drone breached the outer structure of the building, after which the second drone entered through the resulting opening and exploded inside. Such a sequence requires not just approximate coordinates of a large diplomatic complex, but high precision, stable navigation, and an understanding of the target’s structure.

This episode raised a question among intelligence analysts: did Iran have precise data on where within the embassy complex the CIA unit was located?

Theoretically, the station could have been hit accidentally during an attack on the embassy as a whole. But when information simultaneously emerges about another CIA facility being hit in Iraq, the version of a simple coincidence begins to look significantly weaker.

Russia possesses satellite observation means, extensive electronic intelligence capabilities, and years of experience studying American military infrastructure. Moscow also has an obvious interest in weakening the US presence both in Europe and the Middle East.

American intelligence agencies now have to determine whether the Russian side limited itself to supplying equipment or transferred specific coordinates, satellite images, and other target information to Iran.

What is the Russian ‘Kometa-M’

At the center of the technical part of the investigation is the Russian satellite navigation system of the ‘Kometa-M’ family.

This is not a device that independently searches for a target or recognizes a CIA building. ‘Kometa-M’ is a protected navigation module that allows a drone to continue moving along pre-loaded coordinates under conditions of active satellite signal jamming.

The main advantage of such a system is increased resistance to electronic warfare. A regular Shahed may deviate from the route if the GPS signal or another satellite system is jammed or spoofed. The Russian module helps filter out interference and maintain accuracy on the final flight segment.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine documented various versions of Russian systems of the ‘Kometa’ family found in guided munitions and other types of Russian weapons. The Ukrainian component database, in particular, features the interference-resistant system ‘Kometa-M12’, manufactured by the Russian enterprise VNIIR-‘Progress’.

Intelligence sources cited by Reuters believe that Russia could have transferred more advanced navigation technology to Iran for upgrading Shahed. Such devices become significantly more dangerous: they do not turn into high-precision Western-level weapons but gain much more chances to reach the designated point directly.

This results in an extremely dangerous combination. Russia can provide coordinates and satellite information, Iran can prepare and launch drones, and the Russian navigation system can help them pass through jamming and approach the secret facility.

Each side can formally claim that it did not strike independently. But the result of such a division of roles remains the same explosion.

From Ukraine to the Persian Gulf

The connection between Russia’s war against Ukraine and current events in the Middle East is becoming increasingly evident.

Ukraine has become a huge testing ground for Russian developers, where Moscow has been testing Shahed for years, changing their design, improving navigation, complicating routes, and finding ways to bypass air defenses. Now, technologies created and tested on Ukrainian cities could allegedly have been transferred to Iran for attacks on American facilities.

This is the same technological conveyor of terror. Iran once transferred Shahed to Russia for strikes on Ukraine. Russia reworked these drones, improved individual systems, and gained combat experience in their mass use. Now, the upgraded solutions could return to Tehran — already with Russian intelligence capabilities.

European states warned Washington about this threat back in March 2026. According to Reuters, European ministers were planning to raise the issue of Russian support for Iran with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Intelligence sources reported that Moscow was transferring satellite images and technologies to Tehran, helping to select American and regional targets. Sergey Lavrov denied reports of intelligence transfers, although the Russian side did not hide the existence of military cooperation with Iran.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: the threat concerns not only the US and Ukraine. Any technology that increases the accuracy of Iranian drones automatically creates additional danger for Israel, American bases in the region, facilities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

Israel has already faced massive Iranian attacks. Therefore, the issue of Russian assistance to Tehran cannot be viewed as a distant episode of the Moscow-Washington confrontation. Russian navigation modules, satellite data, and experience in bypassing air defenses can ultimately be used against Israeli targets.

Americans are already dying

On July 17, 2026, two American servicemen were killed in Jordan while repelling an Iranian attack using ballistic missiles and drones. Another serviceman was initially considered missing. These data were officially confirmed by the US Central Command.

It is important to formulate the circumstances accurately: CENTCOM did not state that the military died solely from a direct hit by a ballistic missile. The official statement says they died during the defense against a combined missile-drone attack.

Nevertheless, after this episode, the question of Russia’s role became even sharper. Analysts are trying to understand whether Iran received Russian data only for the March attacks on CIA facilities or if Moscow could have helped Tehran in selecting American military targets in Jordan.

There is currently no public evidence of Russian involvement specifically in the July strike. But the very fact of such a question shows the depth of distrust that has arisen due to Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation.

This is no longer abstract geopolitics. American military personnel are dying, secret CIA facilities are being damaged, and drones created by Iran and improved with Russian technologies are becoming weapons of a common war against the West.

Washington talks to Moscow while intelligence checks its role

The ongoing diplomatic dialogue between the US and Russia makes the situation look particularly contradictory.

On July 23, 2026, Marco Rubio met with Sergey Lavrov in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The parties discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine, bilateral relations, and the possibility of resuming diplomatic efforts. At the same time, the American intelligence community continues to investigate whether Moscow helped Iran target CIA facilities.

Washington is trying to separate directions: talking to the Kremlin about Ukraine separately, fighting Iran separately, and investigating the transfer of intelligence data separately.

But Russia and Iran, apparently, have long not considered these conflicts separately.

For Moscow, the war in the Middle East can distract American resources from Ukraine, raise oil prices, create a rift between the US and allies, and increase the load on the Western air defense system. For Tehran, Russian assistance opens access to technologies that were improved during strikes on Ukrainian territory.

This creates a single front, even if its participants do not formalize an official military alliance.

What this threat means for Israel and how to respond

For Israel, the most dangerous aspect is not the mere fact that Iran has Russian navigation modules. The main threat arises when interference-protected navigation is combined with precise satellite images, intelligence data, and information about the internal structure of objects.

Iran has previously had coordinates of Israeli military bases, airfields, and enterprises. However, the ability to receive fresher data, refine the location of individual units, and program drones for sequential strikes significantly increases the danger. A scenario in which the first device damages the outer defense and the second is directed into the resulting gap is especially alarming for underground command posts, hangars, ammunition depots, radar stations, and protected communication facilities.

Israel needs to proceed from the fact that Russian-Iranian cooperation is no longer limited to the war against Ukraine. Technologies that Russia tested on Ukrainian cities can return to Iran in an improved form and then be used against Israel and American forces in the Middle East.

But technical measures alone are no longer sufficient. Israel must formulate a clear political position: assistance to Iran in increasing the accuracy of missile and drone strikes is a direct threat to Israel’s national security, regardless of which country these systems are used against today.

Jerusalem must officially demand explanations from Moscow regarding the transfer of navigation technologies, satellite information, and other means to Iran that can be used for target selection. If the American investigation confirms the transfer of CIA facility coordinates, Israel must publicly declare that Russia has ceased to be a neutral participant in the Middle Eastern confrontation and has effectively joined in strengthening Iran’s strike potential.

It is also necessary to abandon the policy where maintaining working relations with the Kremlin is automatically considered more important than publicly defending Israeli interests. Caution may have had an explanation while Russia posed a threat primarily through its presence in Syria. But if Moscow helps Iran improve weapons capable of striking secret facilities with increased accuracy, the previous model of relations becomes dangerous for Israel itself.

This does not mean that Israel is obliged to immediately sever diplomatic relations with Russia.

However, contacts with Moscow should depend on its actual behavior. Military-technical assistance to Iran should have a political price: reducing sensitive cooperation, restrictions on Russian structures associated with Iranian defense programs, and joining targeted sanctions against enterprises and specialists involved in the development of such systems.

The first practical task should be obtaining full intelligence information from the US about the March attacks on CIA facilities. It is important for Israel to know which versions of Shahed were used, which components were found in the wreckage, how accurately the devices maintained the route, and whether there are signs of coordinate loading with the participation of Russian specialists.

The second direction is the modernization of electronic protection. If ‘Kometa-M’ indeed increases the resistance of drones to conventional jamming, Israel will have to develop not only satellite signal suppression but also methods of navigation deception, control interception, physical destruction of drones at long ranges, and detection of devices before they enter Israeli airspace.

The third task is to revise the protection of strategic facilities. It is not enough to simply cover a base with an air defense system. It is necessary to consider the possibility of repeated strikes on one point, the use of several drones with different tasks, and attempts to hit an already damaged section of the building. Critical centers should have dispersed command posts, backup communication systems, and the ability to continue operating after a direct hit.

Israel should also significantly expand the exchange of experience with Ukraine. Ukrainian specialists have unique information about Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa’ family modules, changes in drone design, and practical ways to counter them. Political distance from Kyiv in this area no longer looks like caution — it can turn into a refusal of information necessary for the protection of Israeli cities.

Cooperation with Ukraine should include regular exchange of technical data, joint analysis of wreckage, study of Russian navigation modules, and coordination of actions against companies supplying components for drone production. Israel should not wait until weapons tested against Ukraine are massively used against it.

At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen political coordination with the US and European states. If Moscow is indeed helping Tehran target American facilities, this creates a basis for a common sanctions and diplomatic response. Israel should participate in forming such a response, rather than trying to maintain separate relations with Russia in the hope that Moscow and Iran’s cooperation will not be directed against Israeli targets.

It is impossible to simultaneously consider Iran the main strategic adversary of Israel and turn a blind eye to the actions of a state that transfers technologies, intelligence capabilities, and combat experience to it. Such duality no longer protects Israel — it limits its ability to respond to the threat in advance.

If the investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Israel will have to reconsider its attitude towards Russia. A state that helps Iran increase the accuracy of strikes and choose secret targets becomes part of a hostile infrastructure, even if it does not formally launch missiles and drones independently.

The political conclusion must be crystal clear: relations with Moscow cannot be built as if Russian support for Iran does not concern Israel. It does — directly. Therefore, Israel needs to act before Russian intelligence data and navigation technologies are used for a strike on an Israeli facility, not after.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers it fundamentally important not to substitute the investigation with a ready-made verdict. American intelligence agencies have not yet presented public evidence that Russia transferred coordinates of the CIA station to Iran. It has not been established whether Russian specialists participated in programming routes or selecting targets.

But the already known circumstances look extremely alarming.

Two CIA facilities were hit. Iran used drones with unusually high precision. Russia provided Tehran with military technologies and, according to Western sources, satellite information. One of the intelligence documents concluded a likely Russian role in targeting the strikes.

If further investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Moscow will cross a qualitatively new line.

This will mean that Russia is not just selling or transferring weapons to Iran. It helps choose American targets, provides means for their destruction, and uses Tehran as an executor of attacks, retaining the ability to deny its own involvement.

And then the expression ‘Russian-Iranian partnership’ will become too mild.

It will be about the complicity of two terrorist regimes that have combined intelligence, technologies, and combat experience to strike Ukraine, Israel, American military personnel, and Western intelligence facilities.

The consequences of such a policy are already visible far beyond the European front. While some Western politicians continue to treat aid to Ukraine as an issue that can be postponed or used in negotiations, the technologies of the Russian war are spreading across the Middle East.

The war that was not stopped in Ukraine did not remain in Ukraine.