There are only a few days left until the parliamentary elections in Hungary on April 12, 2026, and the country is approaching them in a state that seemed almost impossible not long ago: Viktor Orban, who for many years appeared to be an almost unchangeable leader, is no longer perceived as the unconditional favorite. This time, the question is not only about the future of Budapest but also whether Europe will retain one of the main symbols of illiberal populism in power.
For the Israeli audience, this story is important not as a distant domestic political drama in Central Europe. Hungary has long become a noticeable player in the EU’s internal debates about Russia’s war against Ukraine, sanctions, energy, migration, and relations with nationalist right-wing forces on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, the outcome of these elections in Budapest may affect the overall atmosphere in Europe, the EU’s line on Ukraine, and the balance of power among Israel’s allies.
Why Orban looks vulnerable for the first time
Not so long ago, it seemed that Orban completely controlled the political field. After 2010, he built a system in which the Fidesz party not only won but set the very framework of public discourse: who is considered a patriot, who is an enemy, who speaks on behalf of the ‘real Hungary,’ and who allegedly works for foreign interests.
But now the situation has changed.
According to polls, the opposition party ‘Tisa’ and its leader Peter Magyar have moved ahead, and most importantly, a new psychological attitude has emerged in society: change no longer seems impossible. For any long-standing power, this is a dangerous moment. As soon as a significant part of the electorate begins to believe that the ruling force can be displaced, the political inertia itself starts to work against the power.
Orban remains a strong, experienced, and extremely dangerous opponent. He knows how to run campaigns, senses the fears of the provinces, understands how to talk to conservative voters, and maintains a powerful influence infrastructure. But the very need to urgently mobilize supporters, travel around the country, and extinguish political fires shows that the calm era for him is over.
Fatigue from ‘eternal power’
Perhaps the main shift in Hungary is not even related to programs but to the feeling of accumulated fatigue. Orban and his entourage are increasingly perceived not as defenders of the country from chaos but as the very elite they once opposed.
It’s not just about political rhetoric but also about long-standing accusations that state resources, contracts, infrastructure projects, and large sums of money are concentrated around a narrow circle of people close to power. Inside Hungary, this looks like a system where the state and the ruling party have almost merged.
This is where Orban faces a strategic problem. The anti-system anger that once helped right-wing populists in Europe is now beginning to hit him in Hungary itself.
Why the young and urban no longer believe in the old scheme
This is especially noticeable among young voters and those who do not live in a closed information environment. For them, Orban is no longer a rebel against Brussels bureaucracy but a person who has been in power for too long, surrounded himself with loyalists, and turned the state mechanism into a machine of self-preservation.
Even where Fidesz remains strong, there is a growing sense that the country is stuck. And when society feels stagnation, slogans about stability stop sounding like an advantage and start being perceived as a verdict.
Ukraine, Russia, and the fear of war as the main campaign tool
One of the central plots of the Hungarian campaign has become Ukraine. Orban is once again trying to convince voters that only he can keep Hungary from being drawn into a big war, and his opponents will allegedly lead the country to a dangerous confrontation with Russia.
For Israel, this moment is especially indicative. We see familiar political mechanics: the topic of security is used not to explain real risks but as an emotional lever that should paralyze society with fear of change.
In the Hungarian version of this campaign, everything is built on a simple formula: Orban is ‘peace,’ the opposition is ‘war.’ Ukraine is presented not as a victim of Russian aggression but as a source of threat, inconvenience, and energy problems. Such rhetoric is beneficial not only to Orban himself but also to the Kremlin because it blurs the basic moral principle: Russia started a full-scale war, and Ukraine is defending itself.
Why the anti-Ukrainian line no longer works as before
An important signal for all of Europe is that this scheme, apparently, is beginning to fail. Even in Hungary, where Orban has been building a convenient political language for Moscow for years, more and more people do not accept the thesis that Russia allegedly acts ‘legally’ or ‘out of necessity.’
This means not just the weakening of one pre-election message. It means that the Hungarian society, despite the most powerful propaganda processing, has not completely lost the ability to distinguish between aggressor and victim.
For readers in Israel, this is an important lesson. When a state explains an external threat exclusively through the prism of its own political benefit for too long, sooner or later, the opposite effect arises: people begin to suspect that they are being manipulated.
What is especially important here for Israel
The Israeli audience has the right to look at the Hungarian elections also through a broader geopolitical angle. Orban is one of the few EU leaders who consistently slowed down pan-European toughness towards Moscow while simultaneously building the image of a politician close to both Trump and Putin.
This makes the Hungarian vote not just national elections but a test of the resilience of the entire right-wing populist model, where anti-European rhetoric, energy dependence on Russia, attacks on Ukraine, and the cult of a ‘strong leader’ are combined into one ideological construct.
That is why НАновости — Новости Израиля | Nikk.Agency views the Hungarian campaign not as a local episode but as part of a larger process on which the future architecture of Europe depends: whether the continent will continue to slide towards a model of cynical national egoism or will still try to regain its political center of gravity.
Peter Magyar and the main question: is he really capable of breaking the system
The main surprise of the campaign was Peter Magyar — a man who emerged from the very Orban environment but turned into its most dangerous opponent. His strength lies precisely in the fact that he does not look like a classic old oppositionist whom the authorities easily declare ‘alien.’
He knows the system from the inside, understands how it works, and offers not a revolutionary breakdown of the state but a return to a more normal and functional model of governance. For many voters, this sounds more convincing than abstract slogans about democracy.
At the same time, Magyar has weaknesses. He looks like a man of the city, the legal environment, the metropolitan political culture. For rural Hungary, where Fidesz has long built networks of dependency, patronage, and control, this may not be enough. It is there that the outcome of the elections will be decided.
Rural Hungary as the field of the last battle
In small towns and villages, Fidesz remains very strong. There, politics is intertwined with everyday survival: work, social assistance, access to local resources, the attitude of the mayor, the opportunity to get firewood, benefits, or a place in a public works program.
When such a system exists for many years, voting becomes not only a political choice but also a matter of personal dependency. Therefore, the main intrigue of the campaign is whether Magyar will be able to break through where the ruling party is used to considering the territory its own.
If so, it will not just be about Orban’s defeat but about the collapse of the entire model that has been presented as invincible for many years.
What will happen after the elections
A victory for Fidesz will mean further tightening of the course, even greater concentration of power, and strengthening of the line in which Hungary remains an internal saboteur of European unity on key issues, including Ukraine.
A victory for ‘Tisa,’ on the contrary, will not automatically solve all problems. It will open a long and difficult stage of dismantling the system of political control over the courts, media, audit, prosecution, and state apparatus. But the very fact of such a result will send a signal far beyond Hungary: even very strong populist constructions are not eternal.
This is the main meaning of the current campaign. Hungary is choosing not only between Orban and Magyar. It is choosing between a model of a state captured by one political machine and a chance to regain normal power turnover.
For Europe, this is a referendum on the future of illiberal populism.
For Ukraine, it is a question of whether one of the loudest brakes on support for Kyiv in the EU will weaken.
And for Israel, it is another reminder that allies loudly speaking about sovereignty and national interests do not always stand on the side of freedom when it comes to real war, real aggression, and a real choice between principle and convenience.
