“I live here. But isn’t Ukraine mine too?”: why Ukraine might lose the children of Ukrainian refugees and what Israel teaches

Only 19% of Ukrainian refugees say they definitely plan to return, but the sentiments of their children are even more concerning for Ukraine. NAnews explores why Israel’s Birthright (Taglit) has interested the OECD as a potential model for Ukraine and why ‘not returned’ does not necessarily mean ‘lost.’

At the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression, the question seemed temporary: when will Ukrainian refugees return home? Four and a half years later, the question itself has to be changed. Millions of people are still outside Ukraine, but ‘temporary’ has turned into work, school, a new language, children’s friends, bank accounts, professional connections, and plans for several years ahead.

For NAnews author Victoria Katzman, this topic lies at the intersection of two stories to which she herself biographically belongs. Victoria is from Ukraine and is part of the Jewish diaspora, so comparing the Ukrainian situation with the Israeli one is not an external academic example. It is an attempt to understand what happens to national ties when a person physically lives in another country — and why Israel has been investing money for decades not only in those who make aliyah but also in those who may never move here.

In preparing this material, NAnews compared the latest wave of research from the Center for Economic Strategy, the OECD report on the return and reintegration of Ukrainians, current Ukrainian projects for citizens abroad, and Israeli mechanisms like Birthright, Masa, and Israeli Houses. And after such a comparison, the problem looks different: Ukraine may lose not only some of today’s refugees. The risk of losing their children is much more serious.

19% will definitely return. But that’s only half the story.

The Center for Economic Strategy estimates the number of Ukrainians abroad due to the full-scale war at about 5.6 million people by the end of 2025. Of these, about 4.3 million are in Western countries.

It’s important not to mix different numbers here. Ukrainian authorities also use broader estimates of the number of Ukrainians abroad — about eight million. NAnews has already explored where this figure comes from and why it differs from the statistics of war refugees. CES primarily considers war-related displacement, while the political concept of ‘Ukrainians abroad’ is much broader.

But the main figure in the CES study is not even 5.6 million.

In November 2022, 50% of surveyed Ukrainian refugees said they definitely plan to return. In May 2023, it was 41%, in January 2024 — 26%, in December 2024 — 20%, and in January 2026 — 19%.

This does not mean that ‘81% have already refused to return,’ as it would be easy to write for a sensational headline. Another 24% say they are more likely to plan to return. In total, 43% are considering returning today, 20% are undecided, and 36% are more likely or definitely not planning to return.

So the process is not over yet. But it has already ceased to be the mass expectation of return that it was in the spring and fall of 2022.

And time here works in a very material way.

A child who left at six years old is now ten.

You can talk about patriotism as much as you want, but four years for an adult and four years for a child are different segments of life.

A person who left Kyiv at 35 has lived almost their entire conscious biography in Ukraine. They remember university, work, their own neighborhood, family holidays, friends, familiar streets. Ukraine exists for them without additional government programs.

Now let’s take a child who was six in the spring of 2022.

Today they are ten. A German, Polish, or Czech school is no longer a ‘temporary school’ for them. Their childhood, friendships, language, and first independent relationships with the world take place there.

In 2032, they will be sixteen. If they live all this time in Germany, Poland, or the Czech Republic, most of their conscious life will have already passed outside Ukraine.

That’s why one figure in the CES study looks more alarming than adult statistics.

47% of parents of Ukrainian children abroad believe that their child is more likely or definitely not returning to Ukraine. According to parents, 32% will return. Another 21% do not know.

This is not a direct survey of children and not a prophecy. A parent can be wrong, the family’s decision can change, the war can end, circumstances can also change.

But there is another detail.

Among children who continue to study only in Ukrainian school, more than half, according to parents, are oriented towards returning. Among those who attend only a foreign secondary school and are no longer included in the Ukrainian educational system, already 57% are more likely or definitely staying abroad.

The connection between the country and the child here becomes not a beautiful cultural concept. It can already be seen in numbers.

A refugee gradually becomes an emigrant, and their child — a diaspora.

On August 11, 2026, the head of the Ukrainian Publishing Association, Artem Bidenko, raised this issue in an NV column. He compared the experiences of Poland, Canada, Armenia, Ireland, and Israel and reminded of an important thought by sociologist Rogers Brubaker: a diaspora does not exist by itself just because millions of people of the same origin ended up abroad. Its connection has to be reproduced.

It’s hard to argue with this starting point. But, in our opinion, the Ukrainian problem already requires another division.

A woman from Kharkiv who left for Warsaw in March 2022 and still hopes to return home is one state task.

Her son, who is finishing Polish school and choosing a university, is another.

And the child of this son, who will one day be born in Poland, is a third.

You cannot work with all three with one program ‘come back home.’

The first needs security, housing, work, a medical system, a school for children, and clear rules of life after returning. The second needs not to lose their own connection with Ukraine. And for the third generation, the state will have to create a classic diaspora infrastructure — language, culture, educational programs, trips, communities, professional networks, and a real presence of Ukraine in their life.

This is where the Israeli experience becomes especially interesting.

Israel does not require every Jew abroad to immediately make aliyah.

When talking about the Israeli experience in Ukraine, the conversation quickly turns to repatriation: the Law of Return, the Jewish Agency, the absorption basket, ulpan, assistance to new immigrants.

This is an important part of the system, and NAnews has already detailed why Ukraine is studying the Israeli experience of citizen unification and repatriation.

But there is another half of the Israeli model that may be even more useful for modern Ukraine.

Israel works with a person before they decide to repatriate. Sometimes — long before such a decision. Sometimes — fully understanding that no aliyah may happen at all.

Here emerges a principle on which a significant part of Israel’s relations with the Jewish diaspora is actually built:

living outside Israel and being lost to Israel are not the same thing.

This is a fundamental difference.

Why does Israel pay for ten days of a young American in the country?

Birthright Israel, also known as ‘Taglit,’ appeared in 1999. The program organizes approximately ten-day trips to Israel for young Jews of the diaspora, mainly aged 18 to 26.

Participants get acquainted with the country, history, and culture, and communicate with Israeli peers. According to Birthright itself, more than 900,000 young people have already participated in the program.

But the main thing for our conversation is not the number.

A participant after these ten days is not obliged to make aliyah. They can return to New York, Toronto, Lviv, or Paris and live there all their life.

If the program is evaluated only by the number of new residents of Israel, a reasonable question arises: why should the state, philanthropists, and Jewish organizations invest in their trip at all?

The answer appears if you count not only the repatriates.

After the trip, Israel for this person ceases to be an abstract state from family stories. They have specific places, people, acquaintances, personal memories. Their own experience of the country arises — not with their grandfather, parents, or rabbi, but with themselves.

Birthright creates the first step.

Masa Israel Journey offers the next: months of study, internships, volunteering, and professional programs in Israel.

Israeli Houses in cities with large Israeli and Jewish communities support another type of connection — language, holidays, cultural life, meetings, and simultaneously consultations for those who may still want to return someday.

It turns out not a button ‘repatriate / not repatriate,’ but a ladder.

This detail is often missed when advising Ukraine to ‘take the Israeli experience.’

The OECD has actually proposed its own version of Birthright for Ukraine.

The most interesting is found in the OECD report Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis: Return, Reintegrate, Reconnect, published in March 2026.

The organization separately analyzed Israeli tools — Israeli Houses, Birthright, Masa, the absorption basket, and integration centers.

And after describing Birthright, it made a direct conclusion for Ukraine.

According to the OECD, a Ukrainian adaptation of such a model could work with young people displaced abroad: offering them short subsidized trips that combine culture, education, and acquaintance with professional opportunities in Ukraine. The goal is to maintain a connection with the country during forced emigration and preserve the possibility of returning later when circumstances allow.

So the question ‘does Ukraine need its own Taglit?’ has already ceased to be a journalistic fantasy.

At the international expert level, such a model has been practically proposed.

And here, in our opinion, begins the most interesting part of the conversation for Ukraine.

What could a Ukrainian Birthright look like — and what should not be in it?

Copying the ten-day Israeli trip literally would be pointless.

Ukraine needs its own product and its own logic.

It definitely should not be a patriotic camp where a teenager from Berlin is explained for ten days why they must return to their historical homeland. Such a program would likely achieve the opposite effect.

Nor should it be an ordinary tourist excursion: Kyiv, Lviv, a restaurant, an embroidered shirt, a photo, and a plane home.

If we take the Israeli principle, a young person needs to be given their own Ukraine, not their parents’ memories of it.

Family history and modern Kyiv. Universities and tech companies. Maidan and Russian aggression. Holodomor and Babyn Yar. Ukrainian music and contemporary art. Volunteer projects. Startups. Meetings with peers, entrepreneurs, veterans, researchers.

When safety allows — not only Kyiv and Lviv. Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and other cities are needed precisely because Ukraine should not turn into a museum of family origin for the second generation.

For young adults, the next level could be monthly and semester internships in Ukrainian companies, universities, public projects.

And most importantly — the state does not need to demand a promise to move from the participant.

The task is much more realistic:

so that for a twenty-year-old resident of Berlin, Ukraine does not remain a country from where their mother once came.

Ukraine has already begun to build a connection. Therefore, the question is now more complex.

It would be easy to write that Ukraine does nothing and must urgently learn from Israel. But this is no longer true.

On April 15, 2026, the first European Unity Hub opened in Berlin. By mid-June, more than two thousand visitors had passed through it. Then such a center appeared in Stockholm.

Ukrainian authorities initially laid two functions into this network. The first is to provide a person with reliable information about the possibility of returning. The second is to maintain their connection with Ukraine while they are abroad.

In June, another part of this infrastructure appeared — the digital platform ‘Dodomu.’ NAnews detailed how the ‘Dodomu’ project is structured and why its logic is already closer to Israel’s work with the diaspora than to a simple ‘come back’ campaign.

This is an important change in the state’s position.

Ukraine is gradually ceasing to treat a person abroad solely as a citizen who needs to be persuaded to buy a return ticket.

But so far, most tools are still built around the adult first generation: work, documents, housing, social services, return, reintegration.

And where is the tool for their ten-year-old child?

Here the system is still significantly weaker.

NAnews — Israel News: you need to count not only return tickets.

In Israel, this issue is well known.

The state and Jewish organizations have long measured the success of working with the diaspora not only by the number of people who landed at Ben Gurion Airport with new immigrant documents.

The connection can take dozens of forms.

A person lives in the USA but teaches their child Hebrew. Visits Israel. Studies here for a semester. Invests in an Israeli startup. Works with a university. Donates money to an organization. Participates in the political discussion around Israel. Sends their children here. Decides to make aliyah in ten years — or does not.

From the point of view of simple migration statistics, this person has not returned.

From the point of view of the national network, they are not lost.

NAnews — Israel News believes that this distinction is especially important to transfer to the Ukrainian conversation today.

Because if the only indicator of Kyiv’s success remains the number of people physically returning across the border, the state will preemptively record millions of potentially connected people with Ukraine as a demographic loss.

Ukraine can gain a global network instead of just a demographic defeat.

According to CES scenario calculations, approximately 2.1 to 3 million of today’s Ukrainian refugees may ultimately remain abroad. The average scenario is about 2.7 million.

For Ukrainian demography and economy, this is a heavy blow. The center estimates potential annual GDP losses due to the incomplete return of those forced to leave in a wide range from 2% to 9.5%, depending on the scenario and methodology.

This problem cannot be hidden under the beautiful phrase ‘the diaspora is also a resource.’ Ukraine indeed needs people inside the country: workers, entrepreneurs, doctors, engineers, teachers, parents of future children.

But between the two extremes — ‘everyone must return’ and ‘it’s okay, let them become a diaspora’ — there is a third model.

To return the maximum possible number of people.

And at the same time not to lose those who did not return.

A Ukrainian in Toronto can invest in a Ukrainian business. A researcher in Berlin can create joint projects with a Ukrainian university. An entrepreneur in Tel Aviv can connect two markets. A person with Ukrainian roots in Washington can influence attitudes towards Ukraine in the professional and political environment.

And their child may one day come to Ukraine not because their parents forced them, but because they already have their own connection to this country.

These are different forms of capital. And Ukraine needs both.

But Israel cannot simply be copied.

At this point, it is especially easy to fall into the trap of a beautiful analogy.

Ukraine is not Israel.

The Jewish diaspora existed for centuries before the creation of the modern State of Israel. The state itself was built around the idea of aliyah, and the Law of Return established special relations between Israel and Jews worldwide.

Today’s Ukrainian refugees are in a different situation.

Most were born and raised in Ukraine. Their parents, friends, apartments, documents, professional connections, family graves, schools, and streets remain there, which they remember themselves, not from the stories of their ancestors.

That is why mechanically transferring the Law of Return, Birthright, or the structures of the Jewish Agency is pointless.

But the principle can be transferred.

The connection cannot be started to be restored in twenty years. It needs to be maintained today, while it still exists.

The Israeli experience in this sense is not an instruction. It is proof that there is a vast territory of state policy between emigration and the final loss of a person.

Ukraine’s toughest competition is not with Germany, but with a normal life.

In the NV column, Artem Bidenko calls Ukrainians living abroad a kind of audit of the state.

We would formulate it a little differently.

Every family indeed compares two systems daily — but does so not as a political scientist.

How long to wait for a doctor. How the school administration speaks. Whether an issue can be resolved online. What happens after contacting the municipality. How much a person earns. How safe their area is. What will happen to the child in five years. Whether the court and state institution can be trusted.

And then they put all this into one decision: to go back or not.

CES research shows that war and security remain the main barrier. But alongside are already quite peaceful reasons: quality of life, work, children’s prospects, adaptation to the host country, rule of law, corruption.

Therefore, an advertising campaign will not bring Ukrainians back.

Ukraine, where it is reasonable to build a life again, will bring them back.

And what if they still don’t return?

Here the state will need a second answer.

Not to blame.

Not to erase.

Not to remember a person only when diaspora money, signatures on a petition, or political lobbying are needed.

To maintain the connection constantly — when nothing is needed from them.

And in this, the Ukrainian state indeed has something to learn from Israel.

Not in the ability to bring a person home one day.

In the ability to keep the door open for decades.

A child who left Ukraine at six years old in 2022 is already ten years old today. In six years, they will choose where to get a profession. In another ten years — where to work, where to create a family, and which language will become the first language of their own children.

The question, therefore, is not only how many millions of Ukrainians will return after the war.

A much more difficult one is:

can Ukraine ensure that a person who grew up in Berlin, Warsaw, Toronto, or Tel Aviv can still say in twenty years: “I live here. But Ukraine is also mine”?