- July 24, 2026
- 1:26 pm
- Ukraine, World News
Ukraine is not just holding back Russian aggression, but is changing the balance of power in the confrontation of democratic countries with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. However, Kyiv’s success still needs to be turned into a political and military victory — and this is where the West continues to hesitate.
The American publication The Hill published a column on July 23, 2026, with a provocative but far from unfounded conclusion: Ukraine may already be winning World War III for the West, which has not yet realized that it has begun.
The authors of the material are national security experts Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet. The latter served for 30 years in the US Army military intelligence and headed the US European Command’s intelligence interaction unit from 2012 to 2014. Mark Toth specializes in foreign policy, military strategy, and national security. Their publication is an author’s column, not the official position of the US government or an editorial statement by The Hill.
The main idea of the authors is that what is happening in Ukraine has long ceased to be a local European war. Russian aggression has become the central open front of a much broader confrontation, in which Moscow receives help from China, Iran, and North Korea, while the opponents of this coalition are Western democracies and their partners.
World War III has already begun — but it looks different
Toth and Sweet wrote back in July 2022 that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became part of a global clash between the democratic world and a new authoritarian bloc.
However, this is not World War III in the classical sense — with an official declaration of war, stable fronts between great powers, and direct battles between the armies of the US, Russia, or China.
The modern global confrontation is conducted simultaneously by several methods:
- conventional weapons and drones;
- cyberattacks and sabotage;
- economic pressure;
- arms supplies through intermediary states;
- information operations;
- use of dependent armed groups;
- struggle for technology, sea routes, and energy resources.
That is why Western capitals often perceive Russian aggression against Ukraine, Chinese pressure on Taiwan, Iran’s nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s actions, and wars in the Middle East as separate crises.
The authors of The Hill suggest looking at them as interconnected elements of the struggle for a new world order.
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are indeed acting together
Cooperation between these states can no longer be called merely diplomatic.
NATO officially states that North Korea directly supports Russia with military personnel, weapons, and ammunition. Iran helps Moscow with drones and missiles. The alliance also points to the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, as well as the expansion of defense-industrial cooperation between Moscow, Iran, and North Korea.
At the same time, the forms of participation vary.
North Korea provides Russia with ammunition, weapons, and manpower. Iran has transferred strike drone technologies and supports Moscow with weapons. China has not openly entered the war but provides the Russian economy with a market, supplies dual-use goods and components, and helps Russia mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.
This is not yet a formal military alliance like NATO. However, the West is already facing a united system of states that help each other resist sanctions, maintain military production, and stretch US and European resources across multiple regions.
Why the authors say Ukraine is winning
It’s not about Russian troops already being expelled from Ukrainian territory.
Russia still occupies about 20% of Ukraine, including Crimea and areas of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Russian missiles and drones continue to attack Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and civilians daily.
But the strategic goals with which Putin launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022 have not been achieved.
Moscow failed to:
- capture Kyiv;
- destroy the Ukrainian state;
- change the legitimate government;
- subjugate the entire country;
- eliminate the Ukrainian army;
- impose a Russian foreign policy orientation on Ukraine;
- split NATO.
Instead, Ukraine maintained statehood, gained candidate status for EU membership, deeply integrated into the Western security system, and created one of the most technologically advanced armies in the world.
Even after several years of Russian offensives, territorial changes remain incomparable to the losses incurred. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, in 2025, Russia captured approximately 5,000 square kilometers, or less than 1% of Ukraine’s territory.
In July 2026, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian forces had reclaimed about 700 square kilometers. Data from independent analytical projects also show that recent Russian advances were measured in tens of square kilometers, not large-scale operational breakthroughs.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that in the first half of 2026, the loss ratio could have been nearly eight Russian servicemen to one Ukrainian. This is an analytical assessment that cannot be fully verified in wartime conditions, but it shows the scale of the price Moscow pays for extremely limited territorial results.
Ukrainian strikes have moved the war into the Russian rear
One of the main signs of the changing situation was the Ukrainian campaign of long-range strikes.
In the early years of the full-scale war, Ukraine primarily defended its own territory and depended on partners’ decisions that limited the use of transferred weapons against targets inside Russia.
By 2026, Kyiv had created its own long-range drone systems capable of striking Russian oil refineries, military airfields, ammunition depots, ports, railway hubs, and defense industry enterprises thousands of kilometers from Ukraine.
On July 6, 2026, Ukrainian drones attacked the Omsk oil refinery — the largest in Russia. The enterprise is located approximately 2,700 kilometers from territory controlled by Ukraine and can process about 460,000 barrels of oil per day.
After the strike, the plant halted processing, exacerbating the fuel shortage within Russia. Moscow was also forced to limit diesel fuel exports.
Long-range strikes solve several tasks at once.
They reduce Russia’s energy revenues, disrupt army fuel supplies, force Moscow to redeploy scarce air defense resources deep into the rear, and demonstrate to Russian society that the war started by Putin is no longer confined to Ukraine’s territory.
In July, Kyiv also formed a separate command for long-range strikes, responsible for systematic operations against Russian energy, military industry, and logistics.
Ukraine is depriving Russia of its advantage in the Black Sea
Equally important changes are occurring at sea.
Ukraine practically did not have a large military fleet capable of competing with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. However, the use of maritime and aerial drones allowed the destruction of ships, attacks on port infrastructure, and pushing Russian forces away from the Ukrainian coast.
By July 2026, Ukrainian units began a large-scale operation to disrupt maritime supply to occupied Crimea.
Units of the Unmanned Systems Forces reported hitting more than 180 maritime objects in three weeks, including cargo ships, port cranes, ferries, and energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian strategy aims to gradually isolate Crimea from Russian transport routes through the Azov and Black Seas.
This fundamentally changes the perception of modern warfare.
A state without a traditional large fleet can, with relatively inexpensive drones, limit the actions of a naval force that has been considered dominant in the region for decades.
The West is already buying Ukrainian military experience
Ukraine is gradually transforming from a recipient of aid into a supplier of technology and combat experience.
In July 2026, Kyiv allowed six Ukrainian companies to export about 100 drones each to the US to participate in the Pentagon’s Drone Dominance program.
The first stage of the American competition was already won by a device jointly created by the Ukrainian company Skyfall and the British Skycutter. The program’s goal is to test small strike drones in conditions as close as possible to the real battlefield.
This is an important change.
In 2022, Western countries taught Ukrainian servicemen to use artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. In 2026, NATO and American military are studying Ukrainian methods of drone production, data transmission, electronic warfare, and rapid technology implementation.
A Reuters commentary directly notes that Ukraine has become the world’s largest producer of military drones by quantity and can help NATO adapt extremely slow procurement systems to the pace of modern warfare.
At the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8, allies officially recognized that Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security. Alliance countries promised to provide Kyiv with military aid, equipment, and training worth about 70 billion euros in 2026 and to maintain a comparable level of support in 2027.
Russian influence is weakening beyond Ukraine
Toth and Sweet believe that Russia’s losses are already affecting its capabilities in other regions.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Moscow began discussing with the new Syrian authorities the change in the format of its bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. Russian representatives allow for the retention of only a reduced military presence.
In Africa, the situation has also become less favorable for Moscow. In April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense-controlled ‘African Corps’ confirmed the withdrawal of its units from Kidal in northern Mali after heavy fighting.
Subsequent attacks by armed groups demonstrated the inability of Moscow-supported authorities to guarantee security even in strategically important areas. This dealt a blow to Russia’s reputation as an alternative ‘security provider’ for African military regimes.
But it is too early to talk about a complete withdrawal of Russia from the Middle East or Africa.
Moscow retains bases, supplies oil to Syria, supports the governments of Sahel countries, and continues to seek access to natural resources. It is more accurate to speak not of the disappearance of Russian influence, but of the increase in its cost and the reduction of opportunities to simultaneously maintain positions in several regions.
China and Taiwan are closely studying Ukraine
Ukrainian experience also affects the situation in the Indo-Pacific region.
Taiwan is developing maritime drones, territorial defense systems, reservist training, and decentralized infrastructure, taking into account Ukraine’s actions against a significantly larger Russian army.
Taiwanese developers view maritime drones as a relatively inexpensive means against Chinese landing ships and naval blockades. Chinese military analysts, on their part, study Russia’s difficulties and try to understand how to avoid a protracted war, logistical destruction, and international isolation.
It would be premature to claim that Ukraine has already forced Beijing to abandon a possible operation against Taiwan.
However, the cost of a potential invasion has become significantly clearer. Ukraine has shown that even a smaller country can thwart the plans of a more powerful state if it has a motivated society, a developed technological industry, and partner support.
Why what is happening concerns Israel
For the Israeli audience, the main conclusion is that the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East cannot be considered in complete isolation from each other.
Iranian drone technologies that Russia uses to strike Ukrainian cities were created in the same military system that threatens Israel. Russia, Iran, and North Korea exchange weapons, technologies, and experience in circumventing sanctions. China provides them with economic and diplomatic space.
On the pages of NANews — News of Israel, we have repeatedly noted that tolerance for Russian aggression strengthens not only Moscow. It increases Iran’s resilience, facilitates the development of its military industry, and creates an international environment where the use of force increasingly brings political dividends.
The authors of The Hill mention the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, as one of the events of the global confrontation that the West continued to view separately from Russia’s war against Ukraine.
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between confirmed facts and political assessment. There is no public evidence of a single command center managing Russian aggression, Iran’s actions, North Korea, China, and the Hamas attack simultaneously.
The point is different: each new crisis distracts attention, weapons, and financial resources of Western countries, facilitating the actions of other participants in the authoritarian bloc.
Therefore, Ukraine’s defeat would be a signal not only for Moscow. It would demonstrate to Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing that protracted aggression, nuclear blackmail, and reliance on the fatigue of democracies ultimately work.
Where the authors of The Hill may be exaggerating
The wording that Ukraine is already winning World War III is a strong political image, not an established fact.
Ukraine continues to suffer enormous human and economic losses. Millions of citizens remain abroad, a significant part of the territory is occupied, Russian strikes destroy cities and energy, and the Ukrainian army depends on stable supplies of air defense systems, missiles, ammunition, and financial assistance.
Russia has also not exhausted its ability to continue the war. Its economy is on a war footing, the state retains the ability to mobilize people, and China, Iran, and North Korea help compensate for the shortage of certain resources.
Therefore, Ukraine has not yet won the war in the usual military sense.
But it has already achieved a result that seemed almost impossible in February 2022: thwarted the plan to destroy the Ukrainian state, stopped the advance of the largest army in Europe, and turned Russian aggression into a protracted war of attrition, the consequences of which are felt from Siberia to Syria and Mali.
The West has gained an opportunity, but has not yet taken advantage of it
The main appeal of Toth and Sweet is not to Ukraine, but to Washington and Brussels.
Ukraine has already proven that it can resist, create its own weapons, strike at great depth, and change the rules of modern warfare.
Now the West faces a choice.
It can provide Ukraine with enough resources to consolidate success — strengthen air defense, expand joint arms production, completely block the export of Russian energy resources, and deprive Moscow of access to critical technologies.
Or continue to dose assistance, fearing ‘escalation,’ and give Russia time to recover.
As the authors of The Hill emphasize, World War III has not yet been won, but Ukraine has made victory possible for the West.
According to NANews — News of Israel, the key question is no longer whether Ukraine can stop Russia. It has proven this at the cost of enormous sacrifices.
The question is different: can the democratic world realize that Ukrainian soldiers are defending not only their own cities but also the world order, on which the security of Europe, the US, Israel, and other states directly depends.
If the West again tries to buy temporary peace with concessions to the aggressor, the next war may indeed cease to be a metaphor.