- April 24, 2026
- 4:23 pm
- World News
On April 24, 2026, a comparison was made on Ukrainian airwaves that is sure to attract attention in Israel as well. Retired Lieutenant General Igor Romanenko stated that the effectiveness of intercepting aerial targets in Ukraine and Israel is approximately at the same level — about 90%. This is not a political gesture, but an attempt to soberly assess the capabilities of modern air defense under constant attack conditions.
According to Romanenko, the very idea of building a defense modeled after Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ cannot be considered a universal solution for any country. He emphasized that this system was created for a specific type of threat: primarily missiles, shells, and primitive explosive charges launched from short distances, including by the principle of massive bombardment. That is why the direct mechanical copying of the Israeli model without considering other threats is considered a mistake by the expert.
Why ‘Iron Dome’ is not all of Israel’s defense
In the Israeli context, this thesis is especially important. Abroad, Israeli air defense is often reduced to one well-known name, although in practice it is a multi-layered defense system. Romanenko specifically noted that Israel relies not only on interceptors but also on a comprehensive architecture: aviation, unmanned platforms, various types of anti-missile solutions, and an overall connected response system.
That is why the conversation about comparing Ukraine and Israel cannot be simplified to the formula ‘who has a better single system.’ Israel protects a small territory but faces overload scenarios when a large number of targets fly into one zone simultaneously. Ukraine, on the other hand, is forced to repel attacks over a vast territory, and not only drones and reactive means of destruction are used against it, but also heavy Russian ballistic missiles.
Why 90% is a high figure but not the ultimate dream
Romanenko directly stated that even a figure of about 90% does not mean complete safety. Moreover, he reminded that systems that guarantee 100% target interception do not exist in the world today. This is a key conclusion that is especially important for the Israeli audience, accustomed to regular discussions about the effectiveness of missile and air defense after each major bombardment.
Such an assessment sounds harsh but realistic. War and massive attacks show the same pattern: even the most advanced systems can miss some targets, especially if the enemy combines different means of attack, overloads detection channels, and launches strikes in waves.
Against this background, the comparison between Ukraine and Israel looks not like a dispute about superiority, but as an acknowledgment of the common limitation of modern military technology. Accuracy, reaction speed, and coverage density can be improved, but the breakthrough factor cannot yet be completely eliminated by anyone.
What threats are the hardest to intercept
The expert specifically pointed out one of the most difficult problems for Ukrainian air defense — ballistic missiles. In particular, he named ‘Iskander,’ ‘Kinzhal,’ and ‘Zircon,’ with which Russia attacks Ukrainian territory. Such targets are considered especially difficult to intercept due to speed, trajectory, and reaction time.
In addition, strike drones like Shahed continue to pose a serious threat. Their danger is associated not only with the strikes themselves but also with the exhausting nature of the attacks, when drones are used regularly, serially, and in combination with other means of destruction. For Israel, this aspect is also understandable: the cheaper and more massive the means of attack, the higher the load on defense and the more acute the question of interception cost becomes.
In such scenarios, professional, rather than slogan-based analysis is especially important, and NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this point not by chance. For the Israeli reader, not only the Ukrainian assessment of its war is important here, but also a broader conclusion: even high-tech protection operates within real physical and tactical limitations.
What Ukraine is doing against drones and what this experience can teach
Romanenko also said that in Ukraine, a contour of the so-called small air defense at the brigade level has already been formed. These are regular units that work against enemy drones using mobile groups and interceptor drones. Essentially, it is about finding a more flexible and cheaper response to the massive drone threat.
Currently, according to him, the model remains quite limited: one operator controls one drone. The next stage is the transition to a scheme where one operator can coordinate a swarm of interceptor drones. This direction remains a matter of the near future rather than a fully implemented practice, but the vector itself shows where modern warfare is heading.
For Israel, this comparison is especially sensitive. The country has long been in a mode of constant search for the optimal balance between the quality of protection, the cost of interception, and the speed of adaptation to new threats. Ukrainian experience, in turn, is formed under the continuous pressure of Russian attacks, where drones and missiles are used systematically and with the aim of exhausting the defense.
That is why the main conclusion from Romanenko’s words is crystal clear: neither the Ukrainian nor the Israeli air defense model is a miracle without weaknesses. But both show that even in the conditions of a severe war, an interception level of about 90% is a very high result, achieved not by one ‘magic’ system, but by a combination of different technologies, levels of protection, and constant adaptation to changing threats.