There is still no deal between the US and Iran: why the logic of concessions is dangerous for Israel

Trump has not yet said the last word

The deal between the US and Iran has not yet been signed at the time of publication. Formally, the decisive word remains with Donald Trump: it was he, according to Axios, who demanded additional amendments to the draft agreements that his negotiators discussed with the Iranian side. The main dispute concerns Iran’s nuclear materials, the timing of their transfer or destruction, as well as formulations regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

This is an important detail. In the public sphere, there is already a sense of an ‘almost ready deal,’ but legally and politically it is not yet there. Iranian state media talk about the proximity of the agreement, the American side about finalizing the text, and regional players are trying to understand whether it is about a real limitation of Tehran or a new diplomatic packaging of old concessions.

According to Axios, the discussed memorandum may open a 60-day window for further negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions. Among the first questions are the fate of Iranian enriched uranium and restrictions on further enrichment.

For Israel, this is not abstract diplomacy. Any formula in which Iran retains a technological base, money, political face, and room for maneuver will be viewed in Jerusalem not as a peaceful resolution but as a postponement of the next crisis.

What is being discussed around the possible deal

Several schemes are emerging in the negotiation corridors and international media. One of them is a large investment fund for the post-war reconstruction of Iran. Ynet, citing agencies, writes about a possible fund of up to $300 billion, phased lifting of sanctions, and unfreezing of Iranian assets as part of a broader agreement project.

A similar amount was mentioned by Iranian parliament member Hossein Zohurian: according to him, the memorandum project provides for a $300 billion Iran reconstruction program subject to a final agreement, as well as a schedule for lifting primary and secondary US sanctions. Iran International separately clarifies that this is precisely the exposition of the Iranian politician, not a confirmed final text of the deal.

Another idea is also being voiced — a regional uranium enrichment consortium involving Iran and possibly Gulf countries. This option allows formally speaking about international control, but at the same time leaves Tehran with a political argument: the ‘right to enrichment’ does not disappear but is simply transferred to a more complex construction. CSIS indicates that such a consortium is considered a possible starting point but simultaneously acknowledges: Israel is most likely not to accept any level of Iranian enrichment as safe.

This is where the main problem begins. From the outside, it can be presented as a compromise, and inside the Middle East region — as a signal: Iran has brought the situation to military and energy blackmail, and then received not capitulation but negotiations about money, status, and the future of its nuclear program.

Hormuz as a tool of pressure

The Strait of Hormuz has become not just a geographical point but part of a big deal. If a critically important flow of world oil passes through this route, then any threat to shipping automatically becomes a lever of pressure on the US, Europe, China, India, and Gulf countries.

Iran understands this. Therefore, the topic of Hormuz is next to the topic of sanctions, assets, and the nuclear program. In fact, Tehran is trying to sell the world not peace but the cessation of the threat it created itself.

For Israel, such logic is especially dangerous. If a country or regime benefits from the ability to blackmail the region with missiles, proxy networks, sea routes, and a nuclear threshold, then this lesson is quickly learned by other Middle Eastern players.

Why it looks like a reward for blackmail

Iran has been making maximalist demands from the very beginning. This is an old and well-known negotiation tactic of Tehran: first raise the price to the limit, then turn part of the other side’s concessions into a ‘reasonable compromise.’

But now the situation looks more alarming. The impression is that Iran has managed to convince part of the international system not only of the necessity to talk but also of Tehran’s right to demand compensation for its own escalation.

Reuters writes that Iran’s main card in the negotiations remains highly enriched uranium. According to the IAEA, before the June strikes, Iran had 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60%; this, with further enrichment, could be enough for about 10 nuclear warheads. After the strikes, the exact fate of the reserves is unclear, but IAEA head Rafael Grossi said that more than 200 kg of such material likely remains in the tunnel complex in Isfahan.

So the subject of bargaining is not symbolic. It is about material that has been a central threat to Israel and the entire region for many years.

Our view: this is not appeasement, but a dangerous purchase of silence

The US and the international community are now essentially looking for a scheme that will simultaneously give Iran money for reconstruction, maintain the negotiation framework on the nuclear program, and not bring the region to a new explosion.

The problem is that such logic almost always works against future security. If a regime receives billions, international status, and the ability to argue about its ‘right’ to a nuclear program after missile pressure, proxy wars, and Hormuz threats, then this is no longer diplomacy from a position of strength.

This is buying a pause.

In the middle of this story, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main question for the Israeli audience: what exactly will be considered a success? If success is a few weeks of silence and a beautiful formula for a press conference, then the agreement can be declared a victory. But if success is the real elimination of the Iranian nuclear threat, the cessation of blackmail, and the weakening of the terrorist infrastructure around Israel, then the current outlines look too soft.

Why Israel cannot look at this as a bystander

For Washington, the deal may be a way to reduce the cost of conflict, stabilize the oil market, and show a diplomatic result. For Europe, a chance to avoid a new energy crisis. For Gulf countries, an opportunity to relieve pressure on sea routes and return predictability to business.

For Israel, the stakes are different. Iran is not only a nuclear program. It is Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Houthis, Shiite militias, missile chains, intelligence networks, and the ideology of destroying the Jewish state.

Therefore, any deal that leaves Tehran with money, time, and influence infrastructure will be perceived as a risk. Not because Israel is against diplomacy as such, but because bad diplomacy in the Middle East often turns into a respite before the next war.

The main test is not the signature, but control

The real question is not whether Trump will sign the document. The main question is what will happen the day after the signature.

Who will check the uranium? Where will it be located? Will Iran have the right to continue enrichment even in a consortium form? How quickly will sanctions be lifted? Who guarantees that the money will not go to restore the military machine, missile programs, and proxy networks?

If there are no strict answers to these questions, the agreement will become not a solution but a postponement. Tehran will get resources, Washington — a headline about diplomatic success, and Israel and the region will remain with the same threat, only in a more expensive and more legitimized form.

That is why the current proposals look not like a peaceful architecture but like a very dangerous signal: blackmail works if it is large enough.