The war with Iran opens a new Middle Eastern front for Ukraine against Russia

The US and Israel’s war against Iran, even amid a temporary lull, has already changed the political map of the Middle East. For Ukraine, this is not just a distant regional crisis, but a new zone of competition with Russia, where security, drones, energy, diplomacy, and Israel’s interests intersect.

Kyiv has long viewed Iran as one of its key adversaries. The reason is obvious: Tehran has been supporting Moscow in the war against Ukraine for years, including supplying Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones, which Russia uses to strike Ukrainian cities, power plants, ports, and civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly called Iran an enemy. Therefore, any events that weaken Tehran and its military cooperation with Moscow are perceived in Kyiv not as someone else’s war, but as a factor of its own security.

Why the Middle East has become important for Ukraine

In March, Iran threatened Ukraine, stating that due to its position, it could become a ‘legitimate target.’ Kyiv rejected these threats. The Ukrainian logic is simple: if Iran is already helping Russia kill Ukrainians, supplying technologies and strengthening the Kremlin’s military machine, then talking about Tehran’s ‘neutrality’ is impossible.

A high-ranking source in the Office of the President of Ukraine said back in early March to Kyiv Post that Ukraine considers Iran to be effectively involved in the war on Russia’s side.

This line was confirmed by the Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, David Aloyan. According to him, the cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to deepen: Russia shares intelligence, operational experience, targeting methods, and drone application practices with Iran.

For Israel, this topic is also not abstract.

Iran remains Israel’s main regional adversary, and the Russian-Iranian alliance poses threats not only to Ukraine but to the entire area from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Ukraine’s experience in combating Iranian drones becomes important not only on the front near Kharkiv, Odessa, or Dnipro but also in the security systems of Middle Eastern countries.

After Syria and the strike on Iran, a vacuum of influence emerged

The geopolitical changes of recent years have opened new opportunities for Kyiv. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria at the end of 2024 and the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the initial stage of the conflict, Russia’s influence in the region has noticeably weakened.

Ukraine is trying to use this moment not for a short diplomatic victory, but for a long-term role in the Middle East.

According to Aloyan, Kyiv views the region as a space for future partnerships, primarily with the Gulf countries. It’s not just about politics. Energy, diesel fuel supplies, logistics, maritime route security, and defense technologies are important for Ukraine.

If in the future Ukraine faces another energy crisis or attempts by Russia to destroy infrastructure, reliable ties with Gulf countries could become critically important.

Ukraine begins to export combat experience

One of the main conclusions of the war against Russia is that expensive air defense systems do not always effectively solve the problem of mass attacks by cheap drones. Patriot, NASAMS, and other complexes are important, but against hundreds of drones, a multi-layered system is needed: detection, electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, and rapid data exchange.

Ukraine gained this experience not in exercises, but in daily warfare.

Currently, according to data cited in the Kyiv Post article, about 200 Ukrainian specialists are working in the Middle East, helping partners in the field of air defense and drone interception. Aloyan claims that partners in the Gulf countries are satisfied with the results.

There is no official confirmation that Ukrainian systems are already being used against Iranian drones in the region. But Kyiv has already opened the possibility for the export of drones and related technologies within the framework of new legal mechanisms for defense exports.

For Israel, this is an important signal.

Jerusalem has been cautious about military cooperation with Ukraine for years, trying to consider the Russian factor in Syria and not go beyond limited assistance. But after the situation in the region changed and the threat from Iran grew, the issue looks different: Ukraine has practical experience that can be useful to the Israeli security system.

In the middle of this topic, it is especially important to see not slogans, but the real interests of the parties. For the Israeli audience, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the Ukrainian-Israeli context precisely through this prism: where threats coincide, where political constraints remain, and why the Russian-Iranian alliance becomes a common problem.

Not only drones: maritime routes and the Strait of Hormuz

Ukraine also offers partners experience in protecting trade routes. This is especially relevant against the backdrop of the situation around the Strait of Hormuz, which, after a brief opening, was closed again.

Kyiv relies on its own experience with the Black Sea grain corridor. Despite threats from the Russian fleet, Ukraine managed to restore export routes, adapt logistics, and show that even in wartime conditions, maritime trade can work if there is political will, military protection, and technological solutions.

For Middle Eastern countries, this is not a theoretical story. Any crisis in the Strait of Hormuz immediately affects global oil prices, ship insurance, fuel supplies, and market stability.

Balance between Israel and the Gulf countries

Ukraine’s activity in the Middle East inevitably requires diplomatic balance. Kyiv wants to develop relations with the Gulf countries, but at the same time cannot ignore Israel — a country that has provided Ukraine with limited but noticeable support since 2022.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the Gulf countries’ ties with Israel remain complex. For example, Doha has been criticized by Israel for alleged ties with Hamas. For Ukraine, this means the need for careful diplomacy: it cannot lose Israel, but it also cannot close doors to Arab capitals, which may be important for energy, finance, and security.

A separate painful topic was the incident with the unloading of Ukrainian grain in the port of Haifa, exported by Russia from occupied territories. For Kyiv, this is not just a trade episode, but a matter of evidence, international legal assistance, and attitude towards Russian looting.

Why the absence of Jerusalem in Zelensky’s route was noticed

Kyiv Post notes that it was not possible to confirm whether a conversation took place between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and whether it had specific results, including the possible resumption of discussions on air defense systems.

At the same time, Jerusalem was not included in Zelensky’s Middle Eastern trip route. In Israel, this could not go unnoticed.

Former Israeli Ambassador to Russia Arkady Milman and other Israeli analysts have previously pointed out that Israel has not fully utilized the opportunity to deepen cooperation with Ukraine and adopt its combat experience. Today, this issue sounds even sharper: Ukraine is fighting the Russian army, which closely interacts with Iran, and Israel is confronting the same Iranian threat center.

The main goal is to weaken the Russian-Iranian axis

For Moscow, the war around Iran has a dual effect.

On the one hand, rising global oil prices can bring Russia additional income. On the other hand, the weakening of Iran hits one of the Kremlin’s key partners, reduces Russian influence in the Middle East, and opens space for other players, including Ukraine.

Aloyan directly warns: Russia will likely continue to transfer its combat experience to Iran, including methods to increase the resilience of drones to countermeasures. This means that the Ukrainian war and the Middle Eastern conflict will increasingly exchange technologies, tactics, and threats.

Ukraine’s response is the creation of a multi-layered air defense system. In it, interceptor drones are only one element. Detection means, electronic warfare, mobile groups, analytics, and partner coordination should work alongside.

For Israel, there is an important conclusion here. The stronger Ukraine is in countering Iranian technologies, the more practical knowledge the entire anti-Iranian camp gains. And vice versa: the deeper Russia helps Iran, the more dangerous this alliance becomes for Ukraine, Israel, and Western allies.

Formally, these are different wars. But strategically, they are already connected.

Ukraine is trying to establish itself in the Middle East not as an observer, but as a country with real combat experience, technologies, and an understanding of the Russian-Iranian threat. For Israel, this could be a chance to reconsider previous caution and see Ukraine not only as a country in need of help but as a partner that has already gone through attacks by Iranian drones on a scale that many states are only beginning to face.