The Moscow ROC chose the side of the ayatollahs — and maintains a network of property in Israel that can no longer be considered “neutral” – or can it?

While Israel lives in the logic of threat from Iran, the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) demonstrates a completely different political and moral perspective. On March 10, 2026, Patriarch Kirill officially congratulated Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei on his “election as Supreme Leader of Iran,” addressing him as “Dear Brother!” and specifically emphasized closeness on issues of “traditional moral values.” For the Israeli reader, this is no longer church diplomacy or ritual politeness. This is an open gesture towards a regime that has been building its regional strategy on confrontation with the Jewish state for decades.

Patriarch Kirill (real name Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyaev; born November 20, 1946, Leningrad, RSFSR) is a Russian religious figure, former KGB agent, bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church. Since February 1, 2009 — Patriarch of Moscow, head of the ROC. Promotes the ideology of the “Russian world” and is considered one of the initiators of the militarization of church rhetoric.

After the death of Patriarch Alexy II in 2008, he became the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne. Previously, he headed the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate for many years and was a permanent member of the Holy Synod. In the 1970s and early 1980s, he led the Leningrad Theological Academy and Seminary.

Known for his strong position against granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Considered a supporter of the Putin regime and openly supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He blessed the war and justified the actions of Russian troops, claiming that the invasion was supposedly “just.” During the war, church structures were effectively used to agitate parishioners to join the army. He also allowed for the justification of the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia.

Against this background, the question of the presence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Israel begins to sound different.

Not in an abstract sense, not as a historical legacy of the 19th century, but as an active infrastructure. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem itself writes on its official website that it is the “official and only representation” of the ROC Moscow Patriarchate on the canonical territory of the Jerusalem Orthodox Church, covering Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. Moreover, this Mission is named as the only state-registered legal entity, and all its metochions are directly subordinate to it and do not have their own separate status.

For Israeli society, this detail is important. It is not about scattered parishes or a few old buildings accidentally left from the times of the Ottoman Empire or the British mandate. It is about a centralized structure with management, legal registration, and a permanent presence in the country. The Mission’s administration, as stated on its website, is located in the main historical building in Jerusalem.

Where exactly the ROC is present in Israel

According to the official list of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission’s metochions, the Moscow Patriarchate has in Israel

• The Trinity Cathedral in Jerusalem,
• The Gornensky Convent in Ein Karem,
• The righteous Tabitha’s metochion in Jaffa on Herzl Street in Tel Aviv,
• The Prophet Elijah’s metochion in Haifa on Ha-Hursha Street and
• The Mary Magdalene’s metochion in Magdala north of Tiberias.

All these addresses, phone numbers, and geographical coordinates are published on the Mission’s official page.

So the question is no longer whether the ROC has something in Israel. It does. And quite a bit. It is a network of points of presence in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv—Jaffa, Haifa, and Galilee. For a country forced to view any external infrastructure through the prism of security, this is not a trifle or a formality. Especially when it comes to a structure whose leader, in a time of regional war, chooses the language of brotherhood with the leadership of Iran.

Here it is important to be honest and not substitute analysis with hysteria. The mere presence of churches, monasteries, and church property is not a violation. Israel is a democracy, not a theocratic regime of ayatollahs. Christian communities have the right to worship, pilgrimage, and maintain religious sites. But it is equally honest to say another thing: when such a network belongs not to an autonomous local community, but to a centralized structure directly subordinate to the patriarch in Moscow, it ceases to be only a religious topic. It is also a matter of influence, contacts, and symbolic presence. This conclusion is a political interpretation, but it directly relies on the structure of management declared by the Mission itself.

Why for Israel this is no longer an abstract church topic

In Israel, it has long been known: soft power rarely comes with a sign “foreign influence.” More often it comes through legal buildings, cultural ties, historical rights, pilgrimage routes, and religious rhetoric. And if at the head of this entire system is a church center that openly builds public closeness with the new Supreme Leader of Iran, it is no longer possible to ignore this.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees in this story not a dispute of theologians and not an interfaith skirmish, but a quite Israeli question: can the state allow a sprawling external church structure to maintain a large base in the country if its leadership effectively legitimizes a regime that remains an existential threat to Israel. This is not an argument for persecuting believers.

This is an argument for sobriety, transparency, and the right of society to ask uncomfortable questions.

Especially because it is not just about political cynicism, but about choosing a side against the backdrop of real repression within Iran itself. In the July Country Update for 2025, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom writes that Iranian authorities systematically persecute religious minorities, including Jews and Christians, and after the military escalation of June 2025, pressure on minorities only increased. The same review mentions arbitrary detentions, discrimination, and targeted pressure on religious communities.

Separately, the human rights organization Article 18 reported that in 2024, 96 Christians in Iran received a total of 263 years in prison, while in 2023, it was about 22 Christians and 43.5 years of imprisonment in total. This is not a background that can be bracketed out. When the head of the ROC speaks of a “fruitful dialogue” with the Iranian side and about closeness of values, he does so in relation to a regime that simultaneously increases pressure on religious minorities.

What exactly Israel should discuss

Israel does not need to fight Orthodoxy as such.

That would be a wrong, crude, and dangerous path.

But Israel must distinguish between local religious life and an external structure subordinate to a center that politically and morally takes the side of one of the country’s main enemies. This is no longer a matter of taste, not a matter of sympathies, and not a matter of the old diplomatic habit of “not touching the church.” It is a matter of how, in conditions of war and regional pressure, the state understands foreign institutional presence on its territory.

At the same time, it is important not to assert what has not yet been publicly proven.

Official sources allow us to confidently say that the Moscow Patriarchate’s structure has a formal legal presence and a network of objects in Israel. They also allow us to confidently say that Patriarch Kirill publicly supported the new Supreme Leader of Iran.

But there is no direct public evidence that the ROC’s property in Israel is used for illegal activities, according to these sources.

Here the boundary must be clear. However, such infrastructure itself already creates a platform for status, influence, contacts, and legitimacy — and this is in itself an important subject of control and public discussion for Israel.

That is why the conversation about the ROC’s property in Israel can no longer be conducted in the style of “these are just old church buildings.” No, these are not just buildings. This is a physical network of presence of a structure that at the highest level demonstratively chose the side of the ayatollahs. In normal times, this would look like a warning signal.

In wartime, for Israel, this already looks like a challenge that cannot be hidden behind the usual formula of “religious autonomy.”