The end of the Orban era: Hungary has chosen Magyar and is changing the balance in Europe

Hungary has undergone a political upheaval that seemed almost impossible not long ago. In the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the Tisza party led by Peter Magyar defeated Viktor Orban, ending his 16-year tenure in power. With nearly 80% turnout, a record for post-communist Hungary, Orban conceded defeat, and his opponent achieved a result sufficient for a constitutional majority.

For Europe, this is not just a change of name in the prime minister’s office. It is a blow to the model of ‘illiberal democracy’ that Orban had been selling for years as an alternative to Brussels Europe. For Ukraine, it is a chance for a more predictable Hungary within the EU and NATO. And for Israel, it is a reason to soberly assess who was truly a reliable partner and who merely skillfully combined demonstrative friendship with Jerusalem, close ties with Moscow, and, as revealed by The Washington Post, a willingness to assist Iran at a sensitive moment.

What happened in Hungary

Magyar received a mandate to dismantle Orban’s system

Peter Magyar’s victory was not symbolic but crushing. According to Reuters, AP, and other major Western media, his Tisza secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, which means the ability to change key laws and rewrite the rules on which Orban built his system of control over the state, courts, and public space. Some reports mention a result of 138 seats for Tisza in the 199-seat parliament — above the threshold needed for constitutional changes.

This is the real sensation. Orban not only lost another electoral cycle. He lost the architecture of untouchability that had kept him in the status of an almost irreplaceable leader for many years. Just yesterday, his model was considered stable, and today in Budapest, they are talking about dismantling the system, restoring the rule of law, and unfreezing European funds that were blocked due to EU concerns about the state of democracy in Hungary.

Why Hungarians opted for this change of power

The key role was played not by abstract debates about political theory but by very down-to-earth issues: economic stagnation, inflation, fatigue from corruption, degradation of public services, and general irritation that the government had been living in its own reality for too long. Reuters and AP note that it was everyday problems — healthcare, transport, prices, quality of governance — that became the language through which Magyar managed to reach the voter.

Hungarian society showed what many no longer expected from it: political maturity and the ability to mobilize without chaos. Orban conceded defeat on election night and stated that he would serve the country from the opposition. For a state that had been cited for years as a story of ‘creeping irreplaceability,’ this is indeed a significant event.

Why this is important for Europe and Ukraine

In Brussels, it’s not the tone that changes, but the balance

Orban was one of the most problematic EU partners on the Ukrainian front. Reuters directly calls him a key opponent of the European Union’s efforts to support Ukraine in the war against the Russian invasion. The Washington Post separately wrote about blocking a 90-billion-euro European loan for Kyiv. Against this backdrop, Magyar’s victory changes not only Hungarian domestic politics but also the balance of power within the European Union itself.

Magyar built his campaign as pro-European and anti-corruption, promised to restore relations with the EU and NATO, return Hungary’s frozen funds, and turn the country away from Orban’s conflict with Brussels to a more working format of cooperation. Among his first foreign policy priorities, Western media name Brussels and Warsaw. The signal is easily read: the new Hungary wants to be part of the European decision-making center again, not a constant internal saboteur.

That’s why НАновости — Israel News Hungary | Nikk.Agency view this vote not as an ordinary internal political reshuffle in Budapest, but as a turn that can affect both European aid to Ukraine and the overall climate within the EU, where Orban’s Hungary played the role of a convenient brake for decisions unpleasant to the Kremlin for too long.

For Kyiv, this is indeed good news

Volodymyr Zelensky has already congratulated the winner, and European leaders perceived the election outcome as a democratic breakthrough and a chance to reset Hungary’s relations with the European Union. For Ukraine, this is especially important because Budapest under Orban regularly turned into a source of blockages, scandals, and nervousness within the Western camp. Now Kyiv has a chance to work not with a politician who balanced between Brussels and Moscow for years, but with a leader promising a more transparent and European line.

Of course, an instant idyll should not be expected. Even a Ukraine-friendly Budapest will not solve all the EU’s problems with one move. But the disappearance within the union of such a strong and experienced lobbyist of Orban’s line is already a strategic relief for Europe and, indirectly, for Israel, which is also interested in a more stable and less pro-Russian contour of European policy.

What this means for Israel

Orban was convenient but not unconditionally reliable partner

The Israeli view of this story should not be superficial. Yes, Orban publicly supported Israel on a number of international issues and demonstrated closeness to Benjamin Netanyahu. The Washington Post writes that Netanyahu publicly supported Orban on the eve of the elections, and the Hungarian authorities in recent years have repeatedly met the Israeli position on the international stage. But the same material also reminds of another: after the pager attack, the Hungarian side, according to the publication, offered assistance to Iran — the main sponsor of Hezbollah.

And this is where the most important part begins. Orban’s Hungary tried to simultaneously befriend Israel, maintain special relations with Russia, remain a comfortable platform for national-conservative Europe, and not burn bridges with those working against Israeli security. Such multi-vectorism might have seemed convenient in short-term tactics, but in the long run, it made Budapest a partner with a double bottom.

Therefore, Orban’s defeat for Israel is not necessarily bad news. On the contrary, in the strategic perspective, Hungary, which returns to European institutions, the rule of law, and a more predictable foreign policy, looks much more worthy and reliable than Hungary, which tried to sit on several chairs at once — from Jerusalem to Moscow.

Magyar’s victory does not guarantee miracles and does not erase the entire Orban trace in courts, media, and state companies overnight. But it has already become a rare example of how a society, tired of the prolonged ‘strong hand,’ still finds the strength to peacefully change power. For Hungary, this is a chance to return to political Europe. For Ukraine, a chance for a less toxic Hungary within the EU. And for Israel, a reminder of a simple thing: the best ally is not the one who speaks the right words louder, but the one whose real connections and actions do not undermine regional security.