Russia is assembling a ‘Ukrainian brigade’ from former AFU: where proven facts end and propaganda begins

Elena Gunko writes for NANews about Ukraine, Israel, the Ukrainian-Israeli agenda, and how war events are turned into messages for an international audience. In this material, the editorial interest is precisely this: not to retell another statement from Russia about ‘Ukrainians who have switched to its side,’ but to verify the origin of this story and understand what can be independently confirmed.

For this material, NANews compared the message from August 6, 2026, with reports from the Institute for the Study of War, an investigation by ‘Suspilne’ about specific Ukrainian servicemen who were in Russian captivity, documents from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, and the current commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the Third Geneva Convention.

Elena Gunko is not a military lawyer or a specialist in international humanitarian law. Therefore, we do not independently derive legal qualifications but separate them from editorial analysis and rely directly on the text of the Geneva Convention and the ICRC commentary. This distinction turned out to be important: the loud formula ‘Russia uses prisoners — therefore automatically commits this specific war crime’ legally requires clarification.

NANews — News of Israel separately checked where the established fact ends today. We did not find independent data allowing us to assert that Russia has indeed formed a full-fledged brigade numbering several thousand people, that all its participants are former prisoners of war, or that each of them was forced to switch to the Russian side.

And that is why this story deserves a more detailed analysis than the headline about ‘brigades from Ukrainian prisoners.’

What Russia announced on August 6, 2026

A volunteer corps associated with the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the creation of the so-called ‘Ukrainian Special Purpose Volunteer Brigade.’

According to the Russian version, the new formation appeared after the unification of five previously existing units:

• the separate battalion named after Maksym Kryvonos;
• the Ukrainian volunteer battalion named after Oleksiy Berest;
• the detachment named after Oleksandr Matrosov;
• the separate detachment named after Martyn Pushkar;
• the special Sloboda detachment named after Voyin Selifontov.

The Russian side presents their participants as former Ukrainian servicemen who voluntarily switched to fight for Russia. Russian reports mention, among others, people who were previously captured. The Institute for the Study of War noted a statement by one of the Russian military bloggers who directly linked the new brigade with Ukrainian prisoners of war.

But the first limitation must be set immediately.

The name ‘brigade’ does not yet confirm its real scale.

There is no open independent data on the number of the new formation, the number of active companies and battalions, armament, staff structure, and its actual deployment on a specific front section.

In other words, the creation of a new organizational and propaganda brand has been proven. It is much less proven how much this brand corresponds to a full-fledged brigade in the military sense.

This story did not begin in August 2026

Attempts by Russia to create units from Ukrainian prisoners of war were documented much earlier.

In the fall of 2023, Russian state media reported on the battalion named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky. According to the Russian version, about 70 Ukrainian prisoners of war were recruited there, who were in Russian correctional facilities.

On November 7, 2023, ISW recorded a report by RIA Novosti that the participants of the unit had already taken the Russian oath and were to be sent to Ukraine. They were promised conditions, salaries, and benefits similar to those of Russian servicemen. ISW then characterized the alleged use of such a unit as clearly raising questions about compliance with the Geneva Convention.

In December, Russian media claimed that the Khmelnytsky battalion had already entered combat in the area of Urozhayne in western Donetsk region. ISW recorded this report, reminding that Russian sources had previously spoken about recruiting approximately 70 Ukrainian prisoners.

But here the boundary of proof is important: the statement about the battalion’s participation in a specific battle primarily came from the Russian side.

Therefore, it is more correct to say not ‘in December 2023, a battalion of 70 prisoners definitely fought,’ but:

Russia already publicly demonstrated in 2023 a model in which Ukrainian servicemen were turned into Russian military after captivity and then declared to be sent against Ukraine.

Today, this model, judging by the Russian announcement, is trying to move to the next organizational level.

Kryvonos Battalion: here the evidence is significantly greater

The key source for understanding what is happening is the investigation by the Ukrainian ‘Suspilne,’ published in August 2025.

Journalists did not limit themselves to Russian videos or Telegram.

They identified more than 30 people who appeared in the materials of the battalion named after Maksym Kryvonos.

All the people identified by journalists were previously Ukrainian servicemen and were captured by Russia in 2023–2024. In Ukrainian state data, they officially continued to be listed as missing.

This is one of the most important facts of the whole story.

It independently confirms the chain itself:

service in the Ukrainian army → Russian captivity → appearance of a person in a Russian armed formation.

But the next transition — ‘therefore, each of them was forced’ — cannot be proven in this way.

‘Suspilne’ specifically refused to publish the names of most of the identified people precisely because journalists did not have evidence of voluntariness or coercion for each specific case.

And there are cases where Ukrainian law enforcement agencies consider the transition to be conscious.

For example, the investigation describes former servicemen who have already been informed by the SBU or other Ukrainian bodies of suspicion of treason or collaboration. In some investigation materials, it is directly stated that a specific person voluntarily accepted the offer from the Russian side.

This cannot be discarded from the text just because it makes the picture more complicated.

The model ‘everyone was exclusively forced into the Russian battalion by torture’ is not supported by evidence today.

But the Russian model ‘everyone freely saw the truth and voluntarily chose Russia’ is even less supported by evidence.

Behind the word ‘prisoner’ there is another story — family

The investigation by ‘Suspilne’ discovered a detail that military statistics almost completely hide.

The sister of one of the former Ukrainian servicemen told journalists that in 2023 the family lost contact with the man who served in the Donetsk region. For relatives, he remained missing.

The family continued to live in uncertainty and receive payments provided by Ukrainian legislation.

She said she did not know that her brother was already appearing as part of the Russian Kryvonos battalion.

And here the story ceases to be only a question of staffing the Russian army.

For relatives, between the moment of capture and the moment of a person’s appearance in Russian propaganda, there may be months when they do not know at all whether their son, brother, or husband is alive.

At this stage, it is especially difficult to talk about the word ‘voluntarily’ as if the person made a decision under normal conditions.

What is known about the conditions of Russian captivity

Here a second array of evidence appears — not journalistic, but international.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported in February 2026 that it interviewed 725 released Ukrainian prisoners of war.

Of them, 697 people — 96% — reported torture or other forms of cruel treatment in Russian captivity.

The UN also recorded serious restrictions on contacts of Ukrainian prisoners of war with relatives and access of independent observers to their places of detention.

It is important to understand what this figure does not prove.

It does not prove that one specific participant of the Kryvonos battalion was tortured to force him to sign a Russian contract.

It does not prove that 96% of participants in Russian formations were recruited by force.

But it shows the environment in which Russia offers the prisoner a ‘choice.’

And in June 2026, the UN again reported: almost all released Ukrainian prisoners of war interviewed for the latest report spoke of torture or cruel treatment — including severe beatings, electric shocks, and denial of necessary medical care.

Therefore, Russian interviews in which a person immediately after captivity talks about a completely free decision to switch to the side of the state that captured him cannot be regarded as independent confirmation of voluntariness.

This is not an accusation of a specific prisoner. This is a requirement for the quality of evidence.

And what the Geneva Convention actually says

Here there is a fundamental legal nuance.

Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention classifies as grave breaches the coercion of a prisoner of war to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power.

That is, if a prisoner is forced through violence, threats, or other coercion to join Russian forces and fight against Ukraine, it is indeed a grave breach of the Geneva Convention.

However, the 2020 commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross clarifies a point that often disappears from news retellings.

The ICRC writes that voluntary enlistment of a prisoner in enemy forces does not automatically constitute this specific violation.

The problem is different — establishing the real voluntariness of a person in captivity is extremely difficult.

The ICRC separately notes that a prisoner may agree for better conditions of detention, and certain forms of pressure and propaganda may acquire the character of coercion. Therefore, parties are advised to exercise particular caution when assessing statements about allegedly voluntary enlistment of prisoners in the enemy’s army.

This clarification is crucial for NANews.

We cannot honestly write that a war crime has already been proven against each participant of the new Russian ‘Ukrainian brigade.’

We can write something else:

there are confirmed cases of Ukrainian servicemen transitioning from Russian captivity to Russian military formations; there are systematic UN data on torture and cruel treatment in places of Russian captivity; and coercion of a prisoner to serve in the enemy’s army is directly classified as a grave breach by international law.

The investigation of each specific case should establish where there was a conscious transition and where there was pressure, threat, or violence.

Why Russia needs precisely a ‘Ukrainian’ brigade

Now begins the editorial analysis of NANews, not an established legal fact.

Russia could simply distribute recruited former Ukrainian servicemen among its regular units.

But instead, Moscow consistently creates demonstratively Ukrainian formations.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

Maksym Kryvonos.

Martyn Pushkar.

Oleksiy Berest.

That is, names are chosen that Russian propaganda can integrate into its own version of Ukrainian history.

The investigation by ‘Suspilne’ showed that the Kryvonos battalion openly promotes the concept of a ‘triune Russian people,’ portrays Ukraine as a country that needs to be liberated from Western influence, and simultaneously emphasizes the Ukrainian origin of its participants.

A very convenient construction for the Kremlin arises.

It is not Russia that invaded a neighboring state and captured part of its servicemen.

On the screen, a different picture emerges:

‘some Ukrainians together with Russia are liberating other Ukrainians.’

That is why the informational value of such units for Russia may be much higher than their actual numbers on the battlefield.

One former Ukrainian serviceman in front of the camera can produce dozens of videos, interviews, and messages: about the ‘futility of resistance,’ the ‘right side of history,’ the ‘betrayal of the West,’ and the need to lay down arms.

This allows using one person simultaneously as a serviceman, agitator, and proof of a pre-prepared Russian narrative.

‘Brigade’ may turn out to be more of a media project than a military force

As of August 7, 2026, we have no grounds to write that Russia has received a new large strike brigade of thousands of former Ukrainian servicemen.

Such a fact does not exist yet.

But there is evidence of another process.

First, separate units appear.

Then Russia creates its own Telegram channels, interviews, and video projects around them.

After that, former Ukrainian servicemen are used as public speakers.

Now several such projects are united under the single banner of the ‘Ukrainian Special Purpose Volunteer Brigade.’

That is, at least an organizational and informational transition from separate groups to a single brand has occurred.

Whether there will be a corresponding military structure is a separate question.

It is here that NANovosti considers it important not to repeat the Russian term ‘brigade’ as proof of its scale.

Why this material matters for Israel

For the Israeli reader, this story is important not because the Ukrainian ‘brigade’ will appear in the Middle East tomorrow. There is no evidence of this.

The significance lies elsewhere.

The Israeli society, especially after October 7, understands particularly well how complex a source of information a person speaking in front of a camera is when they are in the hands of the enemy.

At the same time, the legal statuses of Ukrainian prisoners of war and people captured by terrorist organizations cannot be mechanically mixed. The comparison here is not legal but informational: the very fact of a prisoner appearing on video says nothing about the freedom of the circumstances in which they speak or make decisions.

For Israel, the second direction is also significant — Russian informational activity.

NANovosti previously detailed Russian influence campaigns in the Israeli information space, including attempts to spread the thesis that Ukraine and Ukrainians are enemies of Israel, while Russia is its natural ally.

The new ‘Ukrainian brigade’ creates very convenient material for such propaganda.

Now the statement ‘Ukrainians themselves do not want to fight for Ukraine’ can be accompanied not by a Russian expert in the studio, but by a person with a Ukrainian past, a Ukrainian accent, and a former Ukrainian military biography.

For an audience that does not know the circumstances of his capture, this may be enough.

Therefore, NANovosti — News of Israel considers this story primarily as an intersection of three themes: war, prisoners’ rights, and the production of propaganda from human vulnerability.

What is proven today and what is not

After checking open sources, NANovosti considers it proven that Russia announced the creation of a single ‘Ukrainian’ formation by merging several previously existing units.

It is also proven that at least in one of such key units — the Kryvonos battalion — there were dozens of former Ukrainian servicemen who had previously been captured by Russia. Journalists from ‘Suspilne’ identified more than 30 such people.

The history of such units can be traced back to at least 2023, when Russian sources reported the recruitment of about 70 prisoners into the battalion named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

It is not proven that today’s ‘brigade’ has the usual brigade size.

It is not proven that all five formations included in it are predominantly staffed with prisoners.

It is not proven that every former Ukrainian serviceman ended up there under duress.

The full combat use of the new unified formation as a single brigade is also not confirmed by independent sources.

And the statements of Russian military and propaganda resources about a ‘completely voluntary choice’ cannot be considered an independent verification of the circumstances of the recruitment of a person who was previously in Russian captivity.

What has changed right now

The most important news of August 6–7, 2026, is therefore not that Russia suddenly began to fight with former Ukrainian military personnel for the first time.

This practice is significantly older.

Something else has changed.

Over several years, Russia has gone from separate reports about several dozen prisoners in the Khmelnytsky battalion to the existence of several specially branded ‘Ukrainian’ formations, and now — to the announcement of their unification into a common structure.

This is not yet proof of the emergence of a multi-thousand combat-ready brigade.

But it is evidence that the project has ceased to look like a single experiment.

Russia is trying to institutionalize a mechanism in which a former Ukrainian serviceman after captivity can simultaneously become a fighter on the Russian side and a public proof of the Russian thesis about a supposedly ‘internal Ukrainian war’.

And so far, the propaganda component of this construction is confirmed much better than its declared military scale.

How the material was verified

The material was verified by the NANovosti editorial team on August 7, 2026.

It is based on: the announcement of the creation of a new structure and the ISW report from August 6, 2026; ISW materials from 2023 about the Khmelnytsky battalion; the ‘Suspilne’ investigation identifying more than 30 former Ukrainian servicemen; documents from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission; Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention and the official commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The editorial team separately checked whether the declared size of the new ‘brigade’, the participation of all listed units in battles, and the coercion of each former prisoner could be confirmed. In the independent sources available at the time of publication, there is insufficient evidence for such categorical statements.