- May 28, 2026
- 8:18 pm
- Israel, Ukraine
“Conscious systematic actions aimed at inciting interethnic and interstate discord between Israel and Ukraine”, – quote.
After the reburial in Ukraine of Andriy Melnyk and his wife Sofia Fedak-Melnyk with state honors, the debate around historical memory went far beyond a single ceremony.
Initially, “Yad Vashem” and the Israeli Foreign Ministry reacted sharply to the very fact of state honoring of the OUN leader. The Israeli side pointed to the painful topic for Jewish memory of “cooperation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement with Nazi Germany” during World War II and the context of “persecution and murder of Jews”.
Then came a response that made the situation even more complicated.
On the “Myrotvorets” website, a card appeared for Dani Dayan (known on May 28, 2026) — the chairman of the Israeli state national memorial complex of Holocaust history “Yad Vashem”. He was accused of actions “aimed against Ukraine”, in “humanitarian aggression”, spreading “Russian-fascist propaganda” and “informational provocations”.
here it is – https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/daian-dany/
Thus, the dispute over Melnyk turned into a new crisis in the Ukrainian-Israeli conversation about memory.
And here it is important not to fall into a simple scheme: “some are right, others are guilty”. It doesn’t work.
“Yad Vashem” had grounds to speak about the Holocaust and painful pages of history for the Jewish people. It is its mission. But the Ukrainian side also had grounds to painfully perceive the tone of the statement, especially at a time of war, when Russia daily uses the theme of “Nazism” as a weapon against Ukraine.
The problem is that both sides spoke from their own trauma — and almost did not hear the context of the other.
Ukraine defended the right to its own historical memory.
Israel defended the memory of the Holocaust.
And as a result, a conflict arose, which Russian propaganda immediately took advantage of.
What happened after the reburial of Andriy Melnyk
Andriy Melnyk is one of the complex figures of Ukrainian history of the 20th century.
In the Ukrainian context, he is often viewed through the theme of the OUN, the anti-Soviet movement, political emigration, the struggle for statehood, and the return of the national pantheon. For Ukraine, which is fighting against Russia today, such reburials become part of a broader memory policy: to return names, to tear them out of Soviet-Russian schemes, to show the historical continuity of the Ukrainian state.
For Israel and the Jewish world, the same figure is read through a different historical lens.
There, the focus is not on Soviet propaganda or the Ukrainian national pantheon. The focus is on the Holocaust, the fate of the Jews of Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism, and the question of which movements, leaders, and structures were associated with the tragedy of the Jewish people during World War II.
These are two different memories.
They do not have to fully coincide.
But if Ukraine and Israel want to maintain a serious dialogue, these memories must at least try to hear each other.
After the reburial of Melnyk, “Yad Vashem” stated that the state honoring of a leader of a movement that, according to the Israeli position, “supported and collaborated with Nazi Germany” during the “persecution and murder of millions of Jews”, undermines the moral foundation of Holocaust memory. The Israeli Foreign Ministry also expressed regret over the decision to hold a state ceremony for the OUN leader.
For the Israeli audience, such a reaction is understandable. “Yad Vashem” cannot remain silent when it comes to a figure it associates with the heavy historical context of World War II and the fate of the Jews.
But for the Ukrainian audience, it sounded different.
In Ukraine, such a statement is perceived not only as a memorial assessment but also as external criticism of Ukrainian memory policy. Especially now, when Russia every day tries to present Ukrainian statehood as a “Nazi project”, and any attempt to talk about the national movement of the 20th century as “rehabilitation of fascism”.
This is where the main failure began.
Mistake of “Yad Vashem”: the right topic, but not precise enough language
“Yad Vashem” has every right to speak about the Holocaust. Moreover, it is obliged to do so.
For Israel and the Jewish people, the memory of the Holocaust is not an ordinary historical topic, not a diplomatic tool, and not a reason for political play. It is a central trauma around which a significant part of national memory is built.
Therefore, the reaction to state honors for a controversial figure from World War II was predictable.
But the right to speak does not cancel the responsibility for the tone.
It’s one thing to say: the figure of Andriy Melnyk remains painful for Jewish memory, requires an accurate historical conversation, and cannot be separated from the context of the OUN, Nazi Germany, and the fate of the Jews of Eastern Europe.
It’s another thing to formulate a position in such a way that in Ukraine it sounds like a public condemnation of its internal state decision.
This is where “Yad Vashem” could have acted more cautiously.
It could have emphasized: Israel does not interfere with Ukraine’s right to form a national pantheon but considers it necessary to remind of the painful pages associated with Holocaust memory. It could have offered not political condemnation but a professional historical dialogue between Ukrainian and Israeli researchers.
Such language would have been tough but respectful.
It would have maintained the position of “Yad Vashem” but would not have created the impression that Israel is telling Ukraine how exactly to build its own historical memory.
This is especially important because Ukraine is at war with Russia. In this war, history has long become a weapon. Any statement about “Nazism”, “collaborationism” or “honors to the OUN leader” is almost automatically picked up by Russian media and used against Kyiv.
This does not mean that Israel should remain silent.
But it means that in such a situation, every word must be surgically precise.
Ukraine’s mistake in response: instead of explanation, an accusatory label appeared
The response of “Myrotvorets” did not correct the situation.
It made it heavier.
“Myrotvorets” is not an official state registry of Ukraine. It is a non-governmental website that describes itself as a center for researching signs of crimes against the national security of Ukraine, peace, the security of humanity, and international law and order. The site states that it provides information for law enforcement agencies and special services about pro-Russian terrorists, separatists, mercenaries, war criminals, and murderers.
The site’s header also uses English-language formulations about collecting information for law enforcement and special services about “pro-Russian terrorists, separatists, mercenaries, war criminals, and murderers”. Locations listed are Langley, VA, USA, and Warszawa, Polska.
Formally, it is not a state structure.
But the external audience rarely delves into such nuances.
For an Israeli, American, or European reader, the phrase “head of Yad Vashem ended up in the Ukrainian database” does not sound like a technical detail about a non-governmental project. It sounds like a political signal.
And this signal turned out to be extremely unfortunate for Ukraine.
On Dayan’s page, according to the published text, he is attributed with “conscious systematic actions aimed at inciting interethnic and interstate discord between Israel and Ukraine”, “participation in acts of humanitarian aggression against Ukraine”, “spreading narratives of Russian-fascist propaganda” and “informational provocations against Ukraine”.
The card also states that, “under the guise of actions commemorating the victims of fascist invaders and occupiers”, Dayan allegedly engages in spreading “falsified information about historical figures of Ukraine”.
This is very harsh language.
And it poorly serves the Ukrainian position.
If the goal was to explain to Israel why Ukrainian memory of Melnyk is not reduced to a Soviet-Russian scheme, then facts, documents, context, the work of historians, and respectful debate are needed for this. But accusations of “humanitarian aggression” against the head of the main Israeli Holocaust memorial close the conversation before it even begins.
Ukraine could have objected to “Yad Vashem” more strongly.
It could have explained why the reburial of Melnyk is perceived in Ukraine as part of the return of historical figures to the national pantheon. It could have shown how Soviet and Russian propaganda for decades turned the Ukrainian struggle for statehood into an accusatory myth. It could have pointed out that Ukrainian history of the 20th century does not fit into one phrase and requires a complex conversation.
But the language of “Myrotvorets” worked differently.
It did not explain the Ukrainian position.
It gave the external audience a picture: a Ukrainian resource accuses the head of “Yad Vashem” almost as a hostile figure to Ukraine.
For Israel, this looks not like the defense of Ukrainian memory but as an attack on the symbol of memory of the Shoah.
Important detail: how “Myrotvorets” describes Melnyk
On the “Myrotvorets” page, it is separately stated that Andriy Melnyk during World War II “protected Jews from fascists and pogroms”.
This phrase is important.
It shows that the dispute is not only about today’s reburial ceremony but also about the very historical interpretation of Melnyk’s figure.
For the authors of the card, Melnyk is presented as a Ukrainian figure unjustly demonized through the Russian-Soviet lens. In such logic, the criticism of “Yad Vashem” is perceived by them not as the defense of Holocaust memory but as a repetition of a foreign, hostile to Ukraine historical scheme.
But for “Yad Vashem”, the central question remains different: the connection of the OUN with Nazi Germany, the political context of World War II, and the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust.
This is where two historical logics clash directly.
The Ukrainian logic says: you cannot give your memory to Soviet and Russian propaganda.
The Israeli logic says: you cannot exclude the Holocaust and the responsibility of movements that operated during the Nazi Germany era.
Both logics have their grounds.
The problem begins where one side demands that the other fully accept its framework.
Another detail: appeal to law enforcement agencies
At the end of the “Myrotvorets” card, it asks law enforcement agencies to consider the publication as a statement about the commission of conscious acts against the national security of Ukraine, peace, the security of humanity, and international law and order, as well as other offenses.
This makes the publication not just an emotional comment.
It takes the form of an appeal to legal and power structures.
That is why the effect becomes harsher.
When it comes to the head of “Yad Vashem”, such wording is perceived outside Ukraine not as an ordinary dispute over Melnyk, but as an attempt to present the head of the main Israeli Holocaust memorial as a person committing actions against the security of Ukraine.
For the Ukrainian-Israeli dialogue, this is a serious blow.
For Russian propaganda — almost ready material.
Who is Dani Dayan and why the topic of “Russian narratives” looks controversial
Dani Dayan is not a random commentator from social networks.
He was born on November 29, 1955, in Buenos Aires, then repatriated to Israel. He was an entrepreneur associated with the IT sector, headed Elad Software Systems, and later became a prominent figure in the Israeli right-wing camp.
A separate political stroke: Dayan was the chairman of the YESHA Council — the Council of Settlements of Judea and Samaria. This makes him a person from the right, settlement, and diplomatic context of Israel.
He also had a connection with Benjamin Netanyahu.
In 2015, Netanyahu promoted Dayan for the post of Israeli ambassador to Brazil. Brazil did not approve the appointment due to his settlement past. After that, Dayan became the Consul General of Israel in New York and held this position from 2016 to 2020.
Since 2021, he has headed “Yad Vashem”.
So Dayan’s connection with Netanyahu is a real political-diplomatic fact. But it is a connection with Israeli right-wing politics, not proof of a connection with Russia.
That is why the accusation of “Russian narratives” looks weak.
If a person from the Israeli right-wing camp, a former diplomat, and the head of the main Holocaust memorial speaks about the painful topic of cooperation with Nazi Germany, it is not necessarily a Russian narrative. Most often, it is an Israeli historical perspective.
It may be unpleasant for Ukraine.
It may be incomplete.
It may not sufficiently take into account Ukrainian anti-Soviet memory, political emigration, the struggle for statehood, and the current war against Russia.
But it does not automatically become Kremlin-like just because Moscow also tries to use the OUN topic against Ukraine.
Coincidence of the topic does not equal coincidence of motive.
This difference is almost invisible in the reaction of “Myrotvorets”.
Where both sides went wrong
The main mistake of “Yad Vashem” is not that it spoke about the Holocaust.
It had to speak.
The mistake was that the Ukrainian context sounded too weak. At a time when Ukraine is at war with Russia and trying to free its own history from the Soviet-Russian framework, any external statements about its national pantheon require especially cautious language.
The main mistake of ‘Peacemaker’ is not that it disagreed with ‘Yad Vashem’.
It is possible and necessary to argue.
The mistake was that the response was constructed not as a historical argument, but as an accusatory label. In relation to the head of ‘Yad Vashem’, such language is almost inevitably perceived in Israel as an attack against the institution of Holocaust memory.
It resulted in a conflict of two traumas.
Ukraine speaks from the trauma of war, destroyed cities, Russian occupation, missile strikes, mass crimes, and Moscow’s long-standing attempt to portray Ukrainian statehood as a ‘Nazi project’.
Israel speaks from the trauma of the Holocaust, the memory of millions of murdered Jews, destroyed communities of Eastern Europe, and sensitivity to any state honors for figures associated with the era of Nazi Germany.
Both traumas are real.
But when one pain speaks as if the other does not exist, the conversation turns into a conflict.
This is exactly what happened here.
‘Yad Vashem’ spoke in such a way that Ukrainian historical subjectivity was not sufficiently heard.
‘Peacemaker’ responded in such a way that Israeli memory of the Holocaust was almost reduced to ‘Russian narratives’.
Both positions in this form are dangerous.
They do not open a dialogue.
They explode it.
In the middle of this story, it is especially important to maintain balance. News — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this episode not as a conflict ‘Ukraine versus Israel’ and not as a dispute about whose memory is more important. Both sides have the right to memory. The question is different: can Ukraine and Israel talk about the painful pages of the past in such a way as not to allow Russia to turn someone else’s pain into a weapon of today’s war.
How Russia uses it
Here is the main outcome of this story.
‘Yad Vashem’ gave Russian propaganda the first part of the picture: Israel condemns Ukraine for the state honoring of Andriy Melnyk.
‘Peacemaker’ gave the second part of the picture: the Ukrainian resource enters the head of ‘Yad Vashem’ into the database as a figure acting against Ukraine.
For Moscow, this is the perfect combination.
It can tell the external audience: look, Israel accuses Ukraine of honoring a Nazi collaborator, and Ukraine responds with an attack on the Holocaust memorial.
Further nuances are no longer needed.
The history of the OUN is not needed.
The context of Soviet repressions is not needed.
The war of Russia against Ukraine is not needed.
The difference between the state of Ukraine and the non-state website ‘Peacemaker’ is not needed.
The complex biography of Melnyk is not needed.
Israeli internal politics is not needed.
The picture is ready.
And that is why this episode is so dangerous. It not only spoils the tone of the Ukrainian-Israeli conversation. It gives the Kremlin material that can be quickly spread without explanations, without context, and without an honest history.
There is another weakness.
On the ‘Peacemaker’ page, judging by the provided text, among the sources are Russian media: ‘Vzglyad’, ‘Gazeta’, KP, URA, and other platforms.
It turns out to be an unfortunate construction: Dayan is accused of spreading Russian narratives, but the evidentiary block partially relies on Russian retellings of the same scandal.
This does not strengthen the Ukrainian position.
It makes it vulnerable.
How Ukraine could respond stronger
Ukraine does not need to remain silent.
And it does not need to abandon its history just because Russian propaganda has been trying for decades to steal its right to its own memory.
But responding to ‘Yad Vashem’ could have been different.
Ukraine could have said: we do not accept the Soviet and Russian scheme of evaluating the Ukrainian national movement.
It could have explained that the reburial of Melnyk is considered part of a broader policy of returning historical figures to the national pantheon.
It could have emphasized that Ukrainian memory of the 20th century is not reduced to Soviet labels.
It could have simultaneously acknowledged that for Israel and the Jewish world, the Holocaust remains a central trauma, and therefore any figure from the Second World War era requires especially precise language.
The best option would have been an expert conversation: Ukrainian historians, Israeli historians, archives, documents, different perspectives, without slogans and without mutual accusations.
This would have been a strong move.
Because an adult position is not afraid of difficult questions.
It does not break into labels.
It explains.
How Israel could speak more accurately
Israel could also choose a different language.
It could have said: we do not interfere with Ukraine’s right to form a national pantheon, but we consider it important to remind about the painful pages associated with the memory of the Holocaust.
It could have acknowledged: Ukrainian history of the 20th century is not reduced to Soviet-Russian schemes.
It could have emphasized: today’s Ukraine is waging a defensive war against Russia, and this context cannot be ignored.
It could have offered not political condemnation, but historical dialogue.
This would not mean weakness.
On the contrary, it would look stronger.
Because ‘Yad Vashem’ as the main Holocaust memorial is obliged to maintain moral accuracy. But moral accuracy is not only the right to speak about the pain of the Jewish people. It is also the ability not to turn someone else’s national memory into an object of external instruction.
Ukraine should not dictate to Israel how to remember the Holocaust.
But Israel should not speak to Ukraine as if Ukrainian memory exists only within the limits of Israeli historical assessment.
Why both sides should see each other’s context
It is important for Israel not to fall into the Soviet-Russian trap.
Ukrainian history of the 20th century does not fit into a simple scheme of ‘hero or criminal’. There were empires, wars, occupations, the Holodomor, mass repressions, Soviet terror, Nazi occupation, anti-Semitic crimes, national movements, collaboration, resistance, emigration, and long decades of struggle for the right to speak on one’s own behalf.
Ukraine is now fighting against Russia not for the symbols of the past, but for the right to exist as a state.
This cannot be erased.
But Ukraine cannot demand from Israel that the memory of the Holocaust be put in brackets for the sake of Ukrainian political logic of today.
For Israel, the Holocaust is not a foreign policy position.
It is the foundation of national memory.
When it comes to state honors for figures associated with nationalist movements of the Second World War period, the Israeli reaction will almost inevitably be painful. And this needs to be understood in advance, not after the scandal.
Ukraine has the right to explain that Melnyk is not reduced to a Russian caricature.
But Israel has the right to ask how such a figure relates to the memory of Jews killed during the Nazi occupation.
These questions are unpleasant.
But they do not disappear because one side calls them interference and the other Russian narratives.
The main framework: not the victory of one side, but the failure of the language of memory
The story with Dani Dayan does not show the victory of one side over the other.
It is the failure of the language of memory.
‘Yad Vashem’ had grounds to remind about the painful side of the history of the OUN and Andriy Melnyk for the Jewish people. Ukraine had grounds to react painfully to formulations that, at the time of war, easily fit into the Russian propaganda scheme.
But then both sides took steps that did not bring the conversation closer, but turned it into a public conflict.
Ukraine is not obliged to abandon its own historical pantheon due to external criticism.
Israel is not obliged to remain silent when it comes to the memory of the Holocaust.
But if these two positions sound without respect for each other’s context, the dispute about the past turns not into a historical dialogue, but into a political crisis, which Russia immediately uses.
What remains after this scandal
‘Peacemaker’ is not official Ukraine. This needs to be repeated directly so as not to distort the picture.
But the external reputational cost still falls on Ukraine.
Especially in Israel.
Especially when it comes to ‘Yad Vashem’.
Especially when Russian media are already ready to spread any story that helps portray Kyiv as a country in conflict with the memory of the Holocaust.
But ‘Yad Vashem’ cannot consider that its words exist outside of politics. When the main Holocaust memorial in Israel speaks about a Ukrainian state decision, it is not only a historical comment. It is also a diplomatic signal.
And a diplomatic signal in wartime conditions can have consequences.
Ukraine has the right to its pantheon.
Israel has the right to its painful historical reaction.
But if this dispute proceeds in the language of mutual moral judgments, it will cease to be a historical dispute. It will become a gift to those who want to quarrel Ukraine and Israel.
And this is a completely different story.
Not only about Melnyk.
Not only about Dayan.
And not even only about ‘Peacemaker’.
This is a story about whether Ukraine and Israel can talk about the most difficult things in such a way as not to let Russia turn memory into another weapon of war.