NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News

Foreign doctors, employees of international organizations, Red Cross specialists, and the European mission at Rafah are working in the Gaza Strip. Personnel rotations are coordinated across the border. However, foreign journalists cannot independently enter the sector, diplomats face restrictions, UNRWA international staff are not allowed, and UN investigators demand access to all areas of Gaza. How is this simultaneously possible — and who actually decides which foreigner to let in?

Author — NAnews — Nikk.Agency Israel News

On September 15, 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk demanded that international investigators be granted access to all necessary areas of the Gaza Strip to collect and preserve evidence of possible war crimes. The reason was “human remains that continue to be extracted from under destroyed buildings.” Türk stated that among the “discovered remains, according to UN information,” there are presumably “entire families.” He emphasized: the circumstances of “their deaths must be investigated, and evidence at the sites of destruction must be preserved.”

From this news, it is easy to draw the wrong conclusion: if the UN demands access, it means there are no foreigners in Gaza at all and Israel does not let anyone in.

This is not the case.

There are foreigners in Gaza. And not just a few. International medics regularly enter and exit, humanitarian workers are active, a field hospital of the International Committee of the Red Cross operates, and the European EUBAM mission is at the Rafah crossing. Israel officially lists dozens of international organizations whose activities are coordinated with COGAT.

COGAT (Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories; Hebrew מתפ״ש — מתאם פעולות הממשלה בשטחים) is an Israeli Ministry of Defense structure that coordinates humanitarian supplies, movement of people, and the work of international organizations in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria (West Bank).

But there is a huge difference between the phrases “foreigners are in Gaza” and “foreigners have access to Gaza”.

And it is in this difference that the entire dispute around the UN’s demand currently lies.

Foreign doctors: the most noticeable group

The presence of foreigners inside Gaza is best documented in the medical field.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — OCHA, as of July 20, 2026, there were 73 foreign staff of international Emergency Medical Teams, or EMT, working in the sector. Sixteen organizations supported 31 medical programs. About 70% of these programs consisted of specialized groups of doctors embedded directly in local hospitals.

The number changes from week to week. As of June 7, OCHA counted 74 international medical specialists, on June 21 — 65, at the beginning of July — about 60, and then after another rotation, their number rose again to 73. This is not a permanent colony of foreigners: people come to replace other specialists and then leave Gaza.

The scale of rotation is also well visible in WHO statistics. Throughout 2025, 726 entries of international medical personnel and 724 exits were organized through the EMT system. From January to mid-April 2026, another 281 foreign medical team members entered Gaza, and 265 exited.

So these are not rare exceptions. There is a functioning, albeit limited, mechanism for admitting foreign medical personnel.

But it is not enough for a doctor to arrive in Egypt or Israel, show a surgeon’s ID, and ask to open the gate. They must be sent by a recognized organization, included in the rotation, submit data, undergo approvals, and receive permission for specific movement.

There have been periods when this mechanism was completely halted. In early March 2026, after the crossings were closed, international rotations were temporarily suspended. They were later resumed.

Red Cross: international structure inside the sector

In Rafah, the field hospital of the International Committee of the Red Cross continues to operate. It was opened in May 2024 as a joint project of the ICRC, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies from 16 countries.

Among the countries supporting the hospital, the ICRC names Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Care is needed here. This list does not mean that citizens of all sixteen states are necessarily simultaneously inside Gaza today. National societies provide personnel, equipment, funding, and other assistance, and team compositions change. But the hospital itself is a real example of sustainable international infrastructure operating inside the sector.

Europeans at Rafah

There is another unusual category of foreigners — employees of EUBAM Rafah, the European Union’s civilian border mission.

After Rafah resumed operations, the European mission returned to the crossing, where its staff observe procedures, support Palestinian border guards, and interact with all parties.

On August 26, EUBAM reported the arrival of new staff from Sweden, Finland, Hungary, France, Italy, and Spain. Among them are representatives of the French Gendarmerie Nationale, Italian Carabinieri, and Spanish Guardia Civil. Some of the new staff, according to the mission itself, were immediately deployed directly to the Rafah Crossing Point.

These are not European troops controlling Gaza. EUBAM is an EU civilian mission with a limited mandate specifically at the border point. Its staff do not have the right to freely travel around Khan Yunis, Gaza City, or Jabalia.

And again, the same principle emerges: permission to be at a specific point does not mean permission to move throughout the sector.

Which international organizations are allowed at all

Israeli COGAT — Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories — itself publishes a list of international structures whose activities are coordinated with Israel.

As of April 2026, COGAT listed 44 international structures working in Gaza in coordination with Israel: 10 UN agencies and divisions and 34 international non-governmental organizations.

  • WFP — World Food Programme — food assistance, supply, and logistics.
  • UNICEF — United Nations Children’s Fund — assistance to children, water, sanitation, nutrition, and education.
  • UNDSS — United Nations Department of Safety and Security — security of UN staff and operations.
  • OCHA — United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — coordination of humanitarian activities and data collection on the situation.
  • WHO — World Health Organization — hospitals, medicines, medical equipment, and coordination of international medical teams.
  • UNFPA — United Nations Population Fund — assistance to pregnant women, mothers, and reproductive health programs.
  • UNDP — United Nations Development Programme — infrastructure restoration, utility systems, and basic services.
  • UNOPS — United Nations Office for Project Services — logistics, infrastructure, procurement, and technical projects.
  • ASU — UN Access Services Unit — helps coordinate the movement of humanitarian missions and access to operational areas.
  • UNMAS — United Nations Mine Action Service — mines, unexploded ordnance, and other explosive remnants of war.
  • Samaritan’s Purse — international Christian humanitarian organization; medicine, food, and emergency assistance.
  • Community of Reconciliation — GDV — international Christian organization working in humanitarian aid, reconciliation, and support for populations in conflict regions.
  • International Medical Corps (IMC) — medical teams, field medical facilities, and emergency assistance.
  • The HALO Trust — demining, territory surveys, and disposal of explosive items.
  • Global Empowerment Mission (GEM) — food, water, hygiene products, tents, and other emergency assistance; the organization has a warehouse inside Gaza.
  • Multifaith Alliance (MFA) — delivery of food, medical supplies, clothing, and hygiene kits through local partners.
  • Catholic Relief Services (CRS) — food, water, shelter, and other humanitarian assistance.
  • Solidarités International — water, sanitation, hygiene, and emergency assistance to the population.
  • The Sumner Foundation — humanitarian logistics, food, shelter, and medical assistance; the organization also claims to have established a field hospital and primary medical infrastructure in Gaza.
  • AMIDEAST — America-Mideast Educational and Training Services — education, professional training, and development programs.
  • All Hands and Hearts — emergency response, restoration of damaged infrastructure, and assistance to affected communities.
  • Project HOPE — medical assistance, medicines, medical equipment, and training of medical personnel.
  • UK-Med — British organization sending emergency medical teams to crisis zones.
  • INSO — International NGO Safety Organisation — threat analysis and security information for humanitarian organizations.
  • United Bible Societies — international association of Bible societies; in addition to religious activities, participates in humanitarian and social programs.
  • WCK — World Central Kitchen — preparation and distribution of ready meals.
  • GHF — Gaza Humanitarian Foundation — organization created to distribute humanitarian, primarily food, aid in Gaza.
  • ICDO — International Civil Defence Organization — civil protection, emergency response, and humanitarian assistance; in 2026, the organization reported an agreed project with Israel to assist Gaza.
  • Gaza Children’s Village — assistance programs for children, including psychosocial support, safe spaces, and help for displaced families.
  • Emergenza Sorrisi — Doctors for Smiling Children ETS — Italian medical organization specializing in surgical and medical assistance to children.
  • International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) — food, water, medicines, hygiene products, psychosocial and other humanitarian assistance; has been operating in the region since 1997.
  • People in Need (PIN) — food, water, shelter, cash, and other emergency assistance.
  • Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V. — German humanitarian organization specializing in food security and hunger relief.
  • Seeds of Hope — education, assistance to children and families, food, primary medical care, and programs for people with special needs.
  • ACTED — shelter, water, sanitation, infrastructure, and emergency assistance.
  • Peace Winds Japan — Japanese international humanitarian organization; medical, food, and emergency assistance.
  • Christian Aid Ministries (CAM) — food, drinking water, medical supplies, and housing assistance; the organization claims to work through local contacts in Gaza and Israel.
  • ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross — medical assistance, protection of civilians, work with prisoners, hostages, missing persons, and compliance with international humanitarian law.
  • AVSI — Italian international humanitarian organization; in Gaza, supports the delivery of food, medicines, hygiene products, and other essentials, including through the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem.
  • HEAL Palestine — medical assistance to children and families, field medical points, treatment of the wounded, evacuation of children for treatment abroad, education, and humanitarian assistance.
  • The MENTOR Initiative — combating infectious and waterborne or insect-transmitted diseases, sanitation, and provision of safe water; in 2026, the organization continued projects in Gaza.
  • Blumont Global Development — humanitarian assistance, water and sanitation, infrastructure, food security, and recovery of affected communities.
  • Lifegate Rehabilitation — rehabilitation, therapy, education, and support for children and adults with disabilities and their families.
  • World Class Scholars — international organization working in the humanitarian and educational field; led by former World Food Programme Executive Director David Beasley.

Thus, 34 organizations after the first ten points are precisely international NGOs from the official COGAT list, and the first ten are UN system structures. In total, this list includes 44 organizations and divisions.

But even here, it is easy to make a mistake. The presence of an organization in Gaza does not mean that all its staff are foreign. On the contrary, a huge part of the humanitarian system relies on Palestinian staff.

There is no open daily register like “today there are 143 citizens of such-and-such countries in Gaza.” Therefore, it is impossible to honestly name the total number of all foreigners inside the sector. Only dozens of people are known to be in medical teams at the same time, plus there are international staff from other organizations and the border mission.

Therefore, the statement “there are no foreigners in Gaza” does not correspond to the facts.

But there is UNRWA — and here everything is the opposite

The example of UNRWA is particularly indicative.

UNRWA — United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East — is a special case. The agency continues to operate inside Gaza with the help of approximately 11,000 Palestinian staff, but it is not included in the current list of organizations working through the usual COGAT coordination mechanism.

After Israeli legislation came into effect on January 30, 2025, Israeli government agencies are prohibited from contacting UNRWA. International staff of the agency have not been granted entry permits to Gaza since the end of January 2025.

This is an important example of why it is impossible to simply say “the UN is allowed” or “the UN is not allowed.”

WHO — one situation. OCHA — another. An international doctor included in EMT — a third. UNRWA — a fourth. OHCHR investigator — already a fifth.

Previously, NAnews thoroughly examined the other side of the UN story in the sector — the conclusions of the international commission on Hamas crimes against the residents of Gaza themselves.

Doctors Without Borders: work exists, no new international shift

MSF — Médecins Sans Frontières, “Doctors Without Borders,” stands separately.

The organization stated that since January 1, 2026, the entry of its international staff into Gaza has not been coordinated, although MSF’s medical programs inside the sector continued to operate with the participation of local teams.

Israel, for its part, explains the new registration procedure for international humanitarian organizations as necessary to know who exactly is working in the sector and to prevent the use of humanitarian infrastructure by Hamas. The Israeli Foreign Ministry claims that registration and verification requirements apply to all organizations and are a security tool, not a way to stop humanitarian aid.

MSF considers these requirements excessive and claims they hinder independent humanitarian work.

This is already a political and legal dispute. But the fact itself shows: the status of admission is determined not only by a person’s profession. The organization, its registration, relations with Israeli authorities, and the specific approval procedure matter.

Can an ordinary French or American just come through Egypt?

Practically — no.

Rafah is indeed working again. On February 2, 2026, the crossing opened for limited movement of people after a long closure. Work was then interrupted due to regional escalation, and in March, movement resumed.

But this is not a regular international border where you can come with a suitcase and a passport.

By August 4, EUBAM registered 10,128 Rafah crossings after its opening: 4,929 entries into Gaza and 5,199 exits to Egypt. Among those who passed through the crossing were 1,858 people in need of medical assistance.

It mainly concerns agreed categories: returning residents, patients, escorts, and other persons included in preliminary lists.

EUBAM directly explains the mechanism. For entry, people register through the Palestinian side. Lists of patients for exit are compiled by Gaza health authorities and submitted to WHO. Then the lists are also coordinated with Egypt and Israel. Even the potential number of people who can pass through Rafah the next day is agreed upon in advance by the parties.

Israel, when deciding to open Rafah in January, emphasized that it is about limited pedestrian movement with a full Israeli verification mechanism.

Therefore, there is no tourist regime in the usual sense here.

You can’t fly to Sharm El-Sheikh, take a car to Rafah, and decide in the morning: “Today I want to see Gaza.”

What about from the Israeli side?

Kerem Shalom today is primarily a cargo crossing.

As of September 11, after the closure of Zikim on May 24, Kerem Shalom remained the only operational cargo crossing in the sector. Humanitarian and commercial supplies pass through it.

At various times, medical evacuations and rotations of humanitarian personnel were also conducted through Israeli-controlled crossings. But these are separate coordinated operations, not free passenger traffic.

COGAT has procedures for exceptional requests related to foreigners, and international organizations work through pre-coordination systems. Israel officially describes joint mechanisms with the UN, the US, Egypt, and humanitarian structures through which operations in Gaza are coordinated.

For an Israeli reader here, it is perhaps easiest to draw an analogy with a military facility: the presence of foreign specialists inside does not mean that any holder of a foreign passport has the right to enter.

Only in Gaza, everything is much more complicated — because permission is required not only for entry itself.

Getting inside is only half the task.

Even a foreigner who is already in Gaza may not necessarily be able to travel wherever they want.

In the summer, OCHA estimated the area of regions with enhanced access restrictions at approximately 64.9% of the sector’s territory. For humanitarian organizations, movement in such zones requires separate coordination. OCHA also reported shootings and other security threats in areas near the demarcation lines.

For a doctor, this means an agreed route to the hospital. For a humanitarian worker, it means coordinating a trip to a warehouse, water intake, or displaced persons camp. For an investigator who must independently choose dozens of destruction sites and compare them with each other, such a model already presents a completely different problem.

That is why NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency here fundamentally separates entry into the sector and access to the sector’s territory. These are two different things, although in political statements they often sound like the same thing.

Even diplomats were not taken inside.

There is a very illustrative example.

On July 9, 2026, the UN humanitarian coordinator organized a visit for representatives of about twelve diplomatic missions to a displaced persons camp in Al-Mawasi.

But the visit turned out to be virtual.

Diplomats watched what was happening via video link, talked to residents and humanitarian workers remotely. OCHA directly explained that they could not come in person due to Israel’s strict restrictions on entry into Gaza.

That is, a foreign surgeon may, under certain conditions, receive permission for rotation, but a foreign diplomat — not necessarily.

And foreign journalists?

Here the restrictions are even more noticeable — and it is important to understand not only that foreign journalists cannot freely enter Gaza, but also who exactly in Israel prohibits this, by what mechanism, and on what grounds.

There is no separate Knesset law with the wording “foreign journalists are prohibited from entering the Gaza Strip.”

Moreover, until October 7, 2023, a completely different procedure was in effect: the official website of the Israeli Government Press Office — GPO, לשכת העיתונות הממשלתית — indicated that a foreign journalist with a valid GPO press card could enter Gaza through the Erez crossing following the established procedure.

After the Hamas attack on October 7, the destruction of Erez, and the start of the war, this usual regime was terminated.

Since then, foreign journalists have not had the right to independently enter the sector. The IDF periodically organizes special trips for foreign correspondents, but this is a completely different regime: the army determines the day, route, entry point, areas, duration of stay, and accompaniment.

A journalist cannot decide to go to another neighborhood, find the witnesses they need, check a hospital, or inspect the site of a specific airstrike after such an entry.

That is, entering Gaza with the IDF and working independently in Gaza are two completely different things.

Who exactly in Israel does not let the journalist through

The main mechanism is not a criminal prohibition and not a separate “law against journalists,” but a system of permits for crossing the border and military decisions on access.

This is clearly seen from the case BAGATZ 8884/23, which the Foreign Press Association, FPA, filed against the Israeli authorities.

The defendants in the case were:

  • COGAT — Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories / מתפ״ש, a structure of the Ministry of Defense that coordinates the movement of people between Israel and Gaza;
  • the commander of the Southern Military District of the IDF, responsible for operational security in the sector area;
  • the Minister of Defense of Israel, the political leader of the system under which the IDF and COGAT operate.

These bodies effectively form the access regime.

When the FPA approached the IDF press service with a request to allow foreign journalists to independently enter the sector, they were told that the authority to issue such permits belongs to not the army press service, but COGAT and Gaza CLA — the Coordination and Liaison Administration for Gaza.

In practice, this means the following.

A foreign correspondent may have a valid Israeli press card, work for Reuters, BBC, or CNN, and be legally in Israel. But if COGAT/Gaza CLA does not issue a crossing permit, this accreditation does not allow them to pass through the Israeli-controlled crossing into Gaza.

The GPO in this case cannot “open the gates.”

What does the GPO do

GPO — Government Press Office of Israel — accredits foreign correspondents, issues them press cards, and interacts with foreign editorial offices.

But by itself, it does not control the crossings into Gaza.

The court case materials show that the final decision on independent entry is not with the GPO, but in the Ministry of Defense system — primarily with COGAT and Gaza CLA.

That is, an Israeli press card today is not a pass into Gaza.

What does the Southern Command of the IDF do

Even if a person is allowed to physically cross the border, there remains a second question: where they can go once inside the sector.

The Southern Command and operational units of the IDF determine:

  • which areas are considered accessible;
  • when they can be entered;
  • which routes to use;
  • whether the army can ensure safety;
  • whether the presence of civilians will create a threat to the military operation.

That is why the IDF can allow foreign correspondents to enter the sector as part of an army group.

In this case, the army itself determines the route and stopping points. The court decision noted that the time and areas of such trips were determined by the IDF press service together with operational structures depending on the course of hostilities and safety assessment.

There are two regimes.

Independent entry — requires COGAT/Gaza CLA access, which foreign journalists are not currently given.

Entry with the IDF — the army can allow as a specially organized trip.

What did BAGATZ decide

The restrictions have been challenged several times in the Supreme Court of Israel.

In December 2023, the Foreign Press Association appealed to BAGATZ demanding that its members be allowed to independently enter the sector.

On January 8, 2024, the Supreme Court rejected the petition in the case BAGATZ 8884/23.

The court recognized the importance of press freedom but agreed with the state that under the conditions existing at the time, independent movement of foreign correspondents could create real operational risks.

Among the state’s arguments was that a journalist could inadvertently show:

  • the location of IDF units;
  • movement routes;
  • positions;
  • operation preparations;
  • other information that could be used by the enemy.

The court decided that under the specific circumstances of January 2024, the system of limited trips with the army was an acceptable balance between press freedom and security requirements.

But there is an important detail here.

BAGATZ itself did not impose a ban.

It merely refused to cancel the state’s existing policy.

And the court specifically noted that the decision was based on the circumstances of that moment. If the security situation changes, journalists can again demand a review of the regime.

Who made the political decision?

The court materials indicate that the cessation of the usual movement of foreign journalists after October 7 occurred in accordance with political decisions and security assessments, after which COGAT stopped issuing regular permits for independent crossing.

That is, the border guard at the checkpoint does not make an independent decision: “I won’t let this journalist in today.”

An established military-political policy operates from above.

It is implemented by the structures of the Ministry of Defense and the army:

Minister of Defense → COGAT/Gaza CLA → Southern Command and relevant IDF units.

Why did the dispute continue in 2026

The FPA later again appealed to the court, arguing that the temporary wartime restriction had turned into a de facto indefinite general ban.

On January 26, 2026, BAGATZ again considered the issue of access for foreign journalists.

By this time, the situation was significantly different from January 2024, and the judges began to demand more specific explanations from the state.

Judge Khaled Kabub asked state representatives: if a journalist wants to independently enter the sector, what specific danger does he pose to the IDF today?

Judge Ruth Ronen pointed out that after the change in the military situation, it was not enough for the state to simply repeat the words “security considerations.” The authorities must explain what specific conditions prevent independent access and what must change for the ban to be lifted. Part of the state’s arguments was presented to the judges in a closed session.

The state continued to insist that the situation in Gaza remains unstable, the IDF maintains operational activity there, and the free movement of foreign journalists could create risks.

How does Israel explain the restrictions

If you gather the state’s arguments, several main reasons emerge.

The first is the security of military operations. A journalist may accidentally reveal positions, routes, deployment locations, or preparation of IDF units.

The second is the safety of the journalists themselves. Gaza remains a territory of destroyed infrastructure, unexploded ordnance, armed groups, and areas where hostilities periodically continue.

The third is the presence of Hamas and other armed organizations. Israel claims that the free movement of foreigners could create additional risks and be used by the enemy.

The fourth is the burden on military structures. Safe movement of civilians in a military zone requires additional resources.

The Foreign Press Association and major global media respond differently: professional military correspondents work in armed conflicts worldwide and take on a significant part of the risk themselves. In their opinion, the presence of danger should not automatically give the state the right to close the territory to independent press for years.

So, are there no journalists in Gaza at all?

Foreign journalists are there.

But predominantly as part of organized IDF trips, that is, embedded access.

The army decides:

  • when the group enters;
  • where it goes;
  • what journalists will be able to see;
  • how much time they will spend there;
  • who they will be able to contact.

A correspondent cannot independently separate from the group and leave, for example, to another area of Gaza.

The Committee to Protect Journalists noted after such trips that the movement and contacts of foreign correspondents remained significantly restricted.

This is fundamentally different from independent journalistic work.

And through Egypt, is it not possible?

It is also not possible to independently bypass the Israeli system through Rafah.

Rafah, after opening in 2026, did not turn into a regular international crossing. Movement of people is conducted according to pre-agreed lists with the participation of the Palestinian side, Egypt, Israel, and the European EUBAM mission.

Therefore, a foreign correspondent cannot simply arrive at Egyptian Rafah with a passport and a press card and demand to be allowed into Gaza.

Why do global media continue to protest

In May 2026, the heads of more than two dozen major media outlets — including Associated Press, Reuters, BBC, CNN, The New York Times, and The Washington Post — again demanded that Israel open independent access for foreign journalists to Gaza.

Their argument is quite simple: if the foreign press cannot come to the site itself, it is forced to verify events through Palestinian journalists, local sources, Israeli military materials, humanitarian organizations, and remote data.

It is impossible to independently verify everything on site.

And here a noticeable contradiction arises.

Foreign surgeons, humanitarian organization employees, and other international specialists are allowed into Gaza.

But a foreign journalist from a major global agency does not receive a similar permit for independent work.

Therefore, the statement “there are foreigners in Gaza, so the foreign press can verify everything” is incorrect.

A foreign surgeon may be present.

An employee of an international humanitarian organization may work.

A correspondent may enter with a unit of the IDF.

But a foreign journalist who independently chooses where to go, whom to interview, and which strike site to check does not have such access as of September 2026.

And the current system is most accurately described as follows:

the military-political leadership of Israel maintains a regime of restricted access; COGAT and Gaza CLA do not issue permits for independent entry to foreign journalists; the Southern Command of the IDF determines operational access and can organize controlled trips with the army; the GPO issues press accreditation but does not have the authority to open entry to Gaza for journalists; the Supreme Court did not establish this ban and in 2024 refused to intervene in the existing policy, citing the then military situation.

And now — what exactly did the UN demand

On September 15, 2026, Volker Türk was not talking about doctors, food supplies, or diplomats.

OHCHR wants international investigators to gain access to all necessary areas of Gaza to collect and preserve evidence. At the UN briefing, the wording was extremely clear: international investigators should be allowed into all parts of Gaza where such work needs to be conducted.

The reason is “the ongoing extraction of human remains from destroyed buildings.”

According to data provided by the UN, citing Palestinian civil defense, from November 2025 to September 2026, the remains of more than 630 people were extracted. Palestinian structures believe that more than eight thousand missing persons may still be under the rubble. Reuters indicates that about 61 million tons of debris have formed in the sector. These estimates come from Palestinian and international structures and are not the result of an independent full survey of the entire territory.

Türk stated that among the discovered remains, presumably, “there are entire families who died in destroyed residential buildings.”

But here a legal boundary needs to be drawn.

The discovery of a deceased family under a destroyed house in itself does not yet prove the commission of a war crime.

The investigation needs to establish what the target of the specific strike was, whether there was a military object or militants there, what information the command had, what civilian damage was expected, what precautions were taken, and whether the strike met the requirements of international humanitarian law.

It is precisely to clarify these circumstances that OHCHR speaks of the need to preserve strike sites, remains, identification materials, and other forensic information.

The UN claims that without investigator access, some evidence may disappear during the clearing of millions of tons of debris.

Why Israel does not simply agree to open everything

Israel has a different argument.

Throughout the war, Israeli authorities have stated that Hamas placed command posts, militants, weapons depots, and tunnel infrastructure inside or near civilian objects and that the free movement of foreigners in an active or recently active combat zone creates security risks.

Following Türk’s recent statement, Israel’s permanent representative to the UN, Danny Danon, accused the High Commissioner of drawing conclusions before a full investigation and not sufficiently considering Hamas’s use of the civilian environment. Israel generally rejects claims of intentional strikes on civilians and states that it acts in accordance with international law.

At the same time, on the specific new request for full investigator access, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not immediately provide a detailed response, Reuters reported.

Therefore, it cannot yet be written that the investigation has already taken place and established the guilty parties. Nor can it be written that there are no grounds for an investigation.

The lack of independent access to the sites themselves is part of the current dispute.

Why Israel checks humanitarian organizations

After October 7, the Israeli approach to international organizations became significantly stricter.

COGAT and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explain the registration of foreign NGOs as necessary to check organizations and employees so that humanitarian mechanisms are not used by Hamas. Israel cites cases of alleged connections between humanitarian staff and armed groups and claims that personnel control is a matter of national security.

International organizations argue that the system may effectively allow Israel to decide which independent humanitarian structures will gain access and which employees they can send.

It turns out to be quite a complex structure. Israel says: we do not close Gaza for humanitarian aid, but we must know who is entering. International structures respond: if the state, whose actions need to be documented, decides which observer to let in and where they can go, the independence of such control is limited.

This is one of the main nerves of the current story.

Rafah also does not mean “the border is open”

To an Israeli reader, the word “Rafah” sometimes creates a misleading picture: after all, it is the border of Gaza with Egypt, so Egypt can simply open the gates on its side.

In practice, after the resumption of movement in 2026, the system is built multilaterally.

The Palestinian side handles passenger registration, EUBAM monitors the crossing’s operation, Egypt controls its territory and access from its side, and the lists and permissible movement volumes are also coordinated with Israel.

Therefore, Rafah has not become a loophole through which a foreign journalist, activist, investigator, or simply curious traveler can bypass the Israeli control system.

The most important thing: “there are foreigners” and “there is free access” are not the same

If you put it all together, it results in a picture that is not very convenient for slogans but much more accurate.

Gaza is not a territory without foreigners.

Foreign medical professionals work there. There are international humanitarian teams. The International Red Cross operates. A European mission operates at Rafah. International personnel enter and exit through agreed rotations.

But Gaza simultaneously is not a territory with free foreign access.

You cannot simply cross the border with a foreign passport. There is no regular tourist entry. Independent foreign journalists cannot freely come. Diplomats do not always receive permission. Some international organization employees are not allowed at all. Even a humanitarian worker may need additional approvals after entry to access a significant part of the sector.

And international investigators from OHCHR now require not just the right to cross the border.

They need something else: the ability to independently choose sites of alleged violations, visit destroyed areas, document the position of remains, collect forensic materials, talk to witnesses, and preserve evidence without each such movement turning into a separate political bargaining.

Such full access to all necessary areas of Gaza, as Volker Türk mentions, is currently not available.

And therefore, the current dispute cannot be reduced to the phrase “Israel does not let anyone into Gaza at all,” nor to the opposite — “there are plenty of foreigners there, so the UN already has all the necessary access.”

Both are too simplistic.

It is possible to enter Gaza. But the question of who exactly, for what purpose, from which organization, through which crossing, after whose approval, and most importantly — where this person will be allowed to go after crossing the border — is decided each time separately.

And as long as this system remains, the dispute over international investigators will continue. For Israel, it is a matter of security and control over a territory where Hamas has been building military infrastructure among civilian buildings for years. For OHCHR, it is a matter of being able to independently verify what happened in the destroyed neighborhoods. And for any serious investigation, the answer should ultimately be given not by the slogan of one of the parties, but by preserved evidence from a specific place, specific strike, and specific day.

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