Failed Spies: How Agents of the Secret Russian ‘Center-795’ Translated Their Own Plot for the FBI

Russia has created a secret unit for sabotage, kidnappings, and political assassinations abroad. However, one of the first known plots of ‘Center-795’ failed because the handler and the agent did not understand each other’s languages and translated secret correspondence through an American online service.

Russian intelligence agencies created a separate secret unit, gathered experienced FSB, GRU, and special forces personnel, developed a system of pseudonyms and secure communication channels. It was assumed that the new structure would be able to conduct full-cycle operations abroad — from intelligence gathering and surveillance to kidnappings, sabotage, and assassinations.

But the entire carefully constructed system failed due to one detail: the Russian handler Denis Alimov and the agent he recruited, Darko Durovic, could not communicate properly with each other.

To discuss surveillance, weapons, addresses, and future kidnappings they began using Google Translate. As a result, messages that were later sent through an encrypted messenger were first processed on the servers of an American company.

The story was revealed on March 13, 2026, after the arrest of Denis Alimov allowed the American prosecution to declassify part of the criminal case, and journalists from The Insider and Der Spiegel to publish the collected information without jeopardizing the operation. The investigation gained a new wave of attention a few months later thanks to the story with Google Translate.

According to a joint investigation by The Insider and Der Spiegel, the FBI obtained a court order to access translation logs. While the alleged conspirators believed their correspondence was protected by end-to-end encryption, American investigators could read translated instructions and reports in unencrypted form.

Millions of dollars for kidnapping or murder

The key figure in the operation, according to the American prosecution, is a 42-year-old Russian citizen Denis Alimov. He also used the names and pseudonyms Denis Nevskiy, Dionis Nevskiy, Denis Klimenkov, and Denis Nazarovich Klimenkov.

On February 24, 2026, Alimov was detained in Bogota based on an Interpol red notice. The Southern District of New York’s prosecution announced that the US intends to seek his extradition from Colombia. He is charged with conspiracy to kidnap or murder two well-known political opponents outside the country, as well as financing and materially supporting terrorist activities. The most serious charges could result in a life sentence.

The American investigation claims that the conspiracy developed at least from October 2024 to March 2025. The two alleged targets lived abroad and had previously faced persecution and assassination attempts. Their names and exact residences are not mentioned in open court documents.

On October 17, 2024, Alimov met with Darko Durovic in a restaurant near the headquarters of the counterintelligence service of an unnamed country. The context of the investigation suggests that the meeting took place in Moscow, near the FSB building on Lubyanka.

During this meeting, Alimov, according to the prosecution, handed his agent about 60 thousand dollars to prepare the operation. For the kidnapping or murder of each of the two targets, he promised to pay approximately 1.5 million dollars.

Durovic was supposed to locate the individuals, organize surveillance, and prepare the direct operation. The investigation claims that he received phone numbers and IP addresses related to one of the targets, studied weapons, searched for Glock pistol models, and tried to recruit additional operatives.

He also discussed creating a so-called ‘hunter group’ that could track down opponents of the Russian regime in European countries.

An agent without obvious ties to Russia

Darko Durovic was of interest to Russian intelligence precisely because he did not look like a traditional Russian spy. According to journalistic investigations, he lived in the US, was connected to Serbia and Montenegro, and could move relatively freely across Europe.

He had no publicly known past in Russian security structures. Such a person could visit European countries, communicate with representatives of the emigration, and conduct reconnaissance without arousing the suspicions that would accompany a holder of a Russian diplomatic or service passport.

In July and October 2024, Durovic, as investigators claim, flew through Turkey to Russia. After returning to the US, he allegedly denied the fact of these trips during conversations with FBI agents. In March 2025, Durovic was detained by American authorities.

NAnews — Israel News notes that official US prosecution documents do not yet name him as a Russian spy and do not disclose all the circumstances of possible cooperation. Legally, these are charges that still need to be proven in court.

However, the timeline published by the prosecution coincides with key elements of the investigation: the Moscow meeting, the transfer of 60 thousand dollars, the promise of one and a half million for each target, the search for weapons, trips across Europe, and attempts to recruit additional participants.

How Google Translate proved stronger than encryption

The organizers of the operation tried to follow the rules of conspiracy. They used pseudonyms, divided information among participants, and sent messages through encrypted applications.

But Alimov spoke Russian, and Durovic spoke Serbian. They had no common language on which they could discuss surveillance, routes, addresses, and the preparation of kidnappings in detail.

The solution seemed simple. Durovic translated his reports from Serbian to Russian, then sent the finished text to the handler. Alimov translated instructions from Russian to Serbian and sent them back.

The messenger itself might indeed have used reliable end-to-end encryption. However, it only protected the text that was already inserted into the application.

Before that, secret information passed through Google Translate. According to The Insider and Der Spiegel, American investigators obtained a court order allowing them to request translation logs from the service provider. This gave the FBI the ability to see the content of operational messages even before they reached the secure messenger.

Thus, Russian agents effectively prepared a readable version of their secret correspondence for the FBI themselves.

The investigation materials mention translations related to the search for Glock 17, Glock 21, and Glock 22, the acquisition of weapons in Podgorica, the inspection of the alleged residences of the targets, and the discussion of the reward size.

From a technical standpoint, the failure did not occur due to encryption being hacked. Investigators did not need to decrypt protected messages because the open text was already processed by a third-party service.

What ‘Center-795’ represents

Alimov’s connection with the new Russian structure is not disclosed in the public statement of the US Department of Justice. This part of the story was established by journalists from The Insider and Der Spiegel based on obtained documents, closed materials, and information from sources.

According to them, ‘Center-795’ was created by order of the Russian General Staff in December 2022. Its official designation became military unit No. 75127. By the summer of 2023, the unit was almost fully formed.

The new structure appeared after a series of failures of Russian military intelligence in Europe. Employees of the GRU-related unit No. 29155 were exposed by journalists and Western intelligence agencies. This unit was linked to the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK, an attempted coup in Montenegro, explosions, and other covert operations.

‘Center-795’ was supposed to become a more autonomous and protected system. According to the investigation, it was not part of the usual GRU hierarchy and could report directly to the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.

The tasks of the unit allegedly included:

• creating foreign agent networks;
• surveillance of selected individuals;
• radio-electronic and satellite reconnaissance;
• organizing sabotage;
• kidnapping opponents of the Russian regime;
• conducting political assassinations outside Russia.

The cover for the employees, it is claimed, was provided by the structures of the Kalashnikov concern. Officers could formally be listed among the employees of enterprises, and training and shooting were arranged as activities of the arms concern.

One of the features of the unit was supposed to be the strict division of information. Separate groups did not know all the details of operations and did not have a complete picture of the actions of other participants.

But such a system did not help when two key participants in a specific operation could not communicate without a publicly available translator.

Who they planned to kidnap

The American prosecution describes the alleged targets as two well-known dissidents from one of the republics of an unnamed country. Both lived abroad and had previously been persecuted.

The Insider and Der Spiegel believe that it was about Chechen opponents of Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime, including people connected to the family of Akhmed Zakayev — the head of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile.

However, open court documents do not allow for the reliable naming of specific names. Therefore, it cannot yet be claimed that Zakayev himself was the main target.

The investigation also mentions a possible third target. For its capture or murder, they allegedly could offer more than 10 million dollars. This episode does not appear in the open prosecution message and should be considered as information from journalistic sources, not as a fact established by the court.

Chronology of the failed operation

The chronology is based on the US prosecution’s statement and a joint investigation by journalists.

Not just a curious story

The story with Google Translate sounds like a spy comedy script, but behind it lies a real and dangerous mechanism of transnational repression.

It was not about amateur surveillance or an attempt to steal documents. The investigation describes the preparation of kidnapping or murder of people outside Russia, multimillion-dollar rewards, the search for weapons, and the formation of a group of operatives.

NAnews — Israel News points out: this case shows that Russian structures continue to look for people without formal ties to Russia, capable of moving across the US and Europe and carrying out tasks under the guise of ordinary residents, entrepreneurs, or political emigrants.

At the same time, the failure of the operation demonstrates that even the most expensive conspiracy systems can be useless due to elementary mistakes by the operatives.

Russian intelligence agencies created an autonomous unit, hid it behind the structures of a defense concern, recruited personnel from elite units, introduced pseudonyms and secure messengers.

But they forgot to check if the handler and the agent could communicate with each other.

As a result, the alleged conspirators not only left digital traces. They translated secret instructions with their own hands in the service of an American company — and thereby effectively helped the FBI read correspondence about the planned kidnappings and murders.