What should Ukraine do to be perceived better in Israel: “Russia is an enemy of Israel” and “Ukraine is neither a friend nor an enemy of Israel” – Newsru.co.il survey in December 2025

On the website Newsru.co.il, a survey on the topic “Israel, its friends and enemies” has concluded. Similar studies were regularly conducted by the editorial team from 2011 to 2024, but the new survey was formed considering the events of recent years — the wars in Israel and Ukraine, Donald Trump’s second term and his peace initiatives, as well as changes in the international situation.

The survey was conducted on December 8–9 and included 30 questions. It was attended by 3045 respondents, of whom 98% reside in Israel. This is an active audience of the site, which is important to consider when interpreting the data. The results were published on December 10, 2025.

Among the participants, 63% identified themselves as “right-wing”, 27% as “centrists”, 3% as “left-wing”, and 7% found it difficult to self-identify. Meanwhile, 89% called themselves “patriots of Israel”.

Editor’s note: This distribution reflects the structure of the resource’s audience, not the actual ratio of political camps in society, where the share of the right is closer to 50–55%, and the left camp is significantly wider than the 3% that appeared in the survey.

Russia — confidently in the group of Israel’s enemies

One of the main conclusions of the survey was the assessment of attitudes towards Russia.
55% of respondents called Russia an enemy of Israel.
Only 6% consider it a friend, the rest chose a neutral option.

Reasons for this perception include:

• strategic rapprochement between Russia and Iran;
• military coordination of Moscow with Iranian proxies in the Middle East;
• anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Kremlin after October 7;
• regular reception of delegations of Israel’s enemies in Moscow;
• lack of actions that could restrain Iran at Israel’s borders.

This is one of the highest indicators of negative attitudes in all years of such studies: Russia has effectively moved out of the “pragmatic partner” zone and firmly entered the category of countries perceived as a source of threat.

Ukraine — “neither friend nor foe”

For Ukraine, the results look different.
68% of respondents considered Ukraine “neither a friend nor an enemy”.
About 20% called it a friend of Israel, and approximately 8–10% — an enemy.

Such a neutral perception is explained by the absence of direct conflicts, Ukraine’s weak involvement in Middle Eastern politics, and the fact that it is not perceived as a source of threat to Israel. At the same time, Ukraine is not associated with stable alliance by the majority of respondents: the image of the country remains intermediate and devoid of the emotional involvement observed, for example, in relation to the USA.

Reaction on social networks: debate about symbols, votes, and double standards

After the publication of the survey, heated discussions immediately began on social networks. The focus of the discussion was not so much on the relations between Israel and Ukraine, but on the symbolic significance of international votes, primarily in the UN.

Some users emphasized that the survey is perceived not as dry statistics, but as an emotional indicator scale:

“For us, this is a symbol: who is a friend and who is not.”

Others noted that the picture is characteristic specifically for repatriates, not for the entire Israeli society:

“This reflects the situation, but among repatriates, not in society as a whole.”

Disputes also flared up around the assessment of Azerbaijan:

“Azerbaijan is a co-author of anti-Israeli resolutions, always votes for them.”

They were countered:

“Close cooperation outweighs the votes.”

The topic of Ukraine’s votes in the UN became particularly acute. Some commentators argued that such decisions alienate even those who initially actively supported Ukraine:

“People stop supporting after unfriendly votes — even those who helped Ukraine from day one.”

Others insisted that the problem lies in the misunderstanding of diplomacy:

“People just don’t understand how Israel’s foreign policy works.”

There were also accusations of double standards:

“When Israel acts pragmatically — it’s normal. When Ukraine does the same — it’s already betrayal.”

Ukrainian participants in the discussion reminded of numerous gestures in support of Israel — statements by politicians, proposals for military experience exchange, diplomatic initiatives, appeals by Ukrainian military. To this, objections were made:

“What proves the pro-Israeli position if the votes go along with Iran and Russia?”

In the end, the dispute boiled down to the fact that both countries are guided by pragmatic interests, but it is precisely symbols — votes, formulations, public gestures — that influence public perception much more than real diplomatic mechanisms.

Other survey findings

Allies

• USA — 60% consider a friend of Israel (less than 1% — an enemy).
• Azerbaijan — 55%.
• Next: Germany (46%), Argentina (46%), Czech Republic (44%).

Opponents

• Iran — 56%,
• Turkey — 44%,
• Yemen, Qatar, Iraq — about 40%.

What is expected from foreign policy

• 86% believe that Israel should strengthen its alliance with the USA.
• 56% — develop relations with the EU.
• 55% — cooperate with moderate regional states.
• 92% — are confident that Israel needs broad international support.

Final conclusions: Russia and Ukraine in the perception of respondents

1. Russia is finally defined as an enemy of Israel

The survey records a significant shift:
55% of respondents call Russia an enemy of Israel, and this is one of the highest levels of negative attitudes in the history of such studies.

What this means:

• In the mass perception of the Russian-speaking audience, Russia has ceased to be a “complex partner” or “a country with mixed positions”.
• Its alliance with Iran, role in Syria, and rhetoric after October 7 make Russia a systemic source of threat.
• Only 6% consider it a friend — an extremely low indicator, indicating a complete loss of trust.

Conclusion:
For a significant part of the respondents today, Russia is a country standing alongside the main opponents of Israel. This is the culmination of a long process of disillusionment, accelerated by the HAMAS-Israel war and Kremlin policy.

2. Ukraine remains neutral: neither an enemy nor a friend

68% called Ukraine “neither a friend nor an enemy”.
This indicates the following:

• Ukraine is not perceived as a threat to Israel.
• But it is also not perceived as a reliable ally.
• There is no emotional connection between the societies, the image of Ukraine remains blurred.

Negative reactions to Ukrainian votes in the UN show that:

• some Israelis emotionally tie friendship/enmity to symbolic gestures;
• despite explanations from Ukrainian diplomacy, symbolic steps are perceived as unfriendly;
• support for Ukraine among Russian-speaking Israelis is declining due to such symbolic factors.

Conclusion:
For respondents, Ukraine is a distant partner that does not evoke either sympathy or fear. Neutrality is the dominant image, which can change in any direction depending on symbolic and political steps.

What Ukraine should do to be perceived better in Israel

📌 1. Stop symbolic irritants — votes in the UN

This is the main cause of irritation among some Israelis.

Yes, Ukraine votes within the framework of the EU.
Yes, this is logical from Kyiv’s point of view.

But public opinion is arranged differently — people see:

• “voted together with Iran”
• “supported a formulation that looks anti-Israeli”
• “did not abstain”

And this instantly destroys the emotional connection.

What can be done:

• more often abstain when UN formulations are deliberately politicized;
• make public explanations immediately after the vote: why so, what obligations;
• convey the logic of decisions in advance through diplomats.

Effect: symbolic tension is removed.

📌 2. Strengthen direct communication with the Israeli audience

Israel is a country where public opinion plays a role comparable to that of parliament.

Ukraine lacks:

• clear explanations of its decisions;
• regular appeals to Israeli society;
• communication in Russian, Hebrew, and English.

What is needed:

• short explanatory videos from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine;
• regular interviews of Ukrainian ministers with Israeli media;
• clear messages: how cooperation between Kyiv and Jerusalem is beneficial.

Effect: forming the image of a transparent partner, not a distant state.

📌 3. Work separately with repatriates — this is the most active group

The indicators of the Newsru survey are not Israel as a whole, but a very important part of society:

• repatriates actively vote;
• form the information agenda;
• have influence on social networks.

What Ukraine can do:

• hold meetings and briefings for the Russian-speaking community in Israel;
• invite repatriates to Ukrainian cultural and diplomatic events;
• create volunteer and informational bridges.

Effect: reducing distance and strengthening trust.

📌 4. Show that Ukraine sees Israel as a strategic partner, not “just another country”

The problem of Ukraine’s perception in Israel is the lack of a clear signal about the strategic importance of relations.

What can be done:

• offer direct experience exchange programs between the IDF and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as was announced but not implemented);
• activate cooperation in IT, medicine, security;
• strengthen Ukraine’s communication in the Israeli media space — not so much through personalities, but through the constant presence of Ukrainian official speakers.

Effect: the image of Ukraine as a state that seeks allies, not just votes in the UN.

📌 5. Strengthen the cultural-humanitarian bridge

Ukrainians and Israelis are historically, religiously, and emotionally connected, but these ties are presented very weakly.

What Ukraine can do:

• regular events for the Jewish community;
• culture, music, cinema, emphasizing common values;
• work with rabbis, educational centers, journalists.

Effect: emotional sympathy → political sympathy.

📌 6. Dispel myths about “contradictions” between Ukraine and Israel

Some Israelis sincerely believe that:

• Ukraine votes “against Israel”
• Ukraine “supports Iran” (absurd, but these narratives live)
• Ukraine “does nothing in response to support”

Ukraine could:

• create short educational explanations once a month:
  “What Ukraine has done for Israel”,
  “Why the UN vote happened”,
  “What Kyiv and Jerusalem cooperate on”.

Effect: destruction of toxic myths.

🎯 Main strategic conclusion

Israelis evaluate countries not only by real politics but also by symbols.

Russia gave Israel many negative symbols — and the image of an enemy was fixed.
Ukraine gave too few symbols of friendship — and remained in the neutral zone.

To change this, Ukraine must:

1. reduce irritating symbols (UN),
2. increase positive symbols (communication, initiatives, partnership).

Conclusion

The Newsru.co.il survey reflects not only the attitude of its audience towards Russia, Ukraine, and other countries but also how foreign policy has turned into an emotional factor influencing public perception. Votes in international structures, leaders’ rhetoric, and diplomatic decisions are increasingly perceived as symbols of real relations of countries with Israel. For a complete picture, it is important to consider the difference between the structure of the survey audience and the general demographic and political map of Israel. We will continue to monitor and analyze these processes and their impact on the perception of Israelis in НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, recording how the perception of allies and opponents of the state changes.