In its May 2026 report titled “Ukraine Endgame: The Path to an Imperfect Peace,” the American bank JPMorganChase’s Center for Geopolitics described one of the most sensitive options for ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to analysts, the most likely model is not a quick victory or complete capitulation, but the so-called “Finnish scenario”: Ukraine retains its sovereignty and Western course but is forced to live with the consequences of territorial losses and incomplete security guarantees.
This does not look like peace in the usual sense.
Rather, it is a heavy pause after a major war, where the front may freeze, but the threat itself does not disappear. For Israel, this logic is especially understandable: the security of the state is determined not only by signed documents but by whether it has an army, allies, an economy, technologies, and the right to independently respond to future threats.
Why JPMorgan talks specifically about the “Finnish” model
The JPMorganChase report states that Ukraine’s position has improved compared to the beginning of 2025 due to stronger European support and the advancement of Western security guarantees. However, analysts emphasize: these improvements remain fragile, and the most likely end state of the war they call an agreement similar to the Finnish model, with painful territorial concessions but with the preservation of Ukrainian statehood and integration into the West.
The meaning of this formula is unpleasant for Kyiv.
Ukraine does not return to the Russian orbit, does not become a vassal of Moscow, and does not lose political subjectivity. But it also does not immediately receive the level of security that would definitively close the risk of a new war.
That is why the title of the report — “The Path to an Imperfect Peace” — sounds not like a diplomatic metaphor but as a warning. Peace may stop some hostilities but does not necessarily resolve the issue of occupied territories, the future of the Ukrainian army, Western guarantees, and long-term containment of Russia.
Finland as a historical analogy, not a ready-made recipe
The comparison with Finland refers to the post-war situation when the country, after conflicts with the USSR, lost part of its territory but retained independence, a democratic system, a market economy, and ties with the West.
However, Ukraine is not Finland of the mid-20th century.
It has already gone through a full-scale invasion, massive strikes on cities, infrastructure destruction, millions of refugees, and a daily struggle for the right to remain an independent state. Therefore, for Ukrainian society, any option where Russia retains control over part of the captured territory will be perceived not as a neat compromise but as a heavy and dangerous price.
At the same time, JPMorgan describes not a desired scenario but the most likely trajectory from the perspective of geopolitical risks. This is the main nerve of the report: analysts record not moral justice but the balance of forces, money, weapons, diplomacy, and the political will of allies.
The war rests not only on the front but also on negotiating power
JPMorganChase assumes that the war is increasingly entering a state of protracted confrontation, where the front line does not change radically, and the future outcome will be determined not only on the battlefield. Several “theaters” become decisive: diplomatic, military, financial, and political.
This does not mean that the front has ceased to matter.
On the contrary, every city, every air defense system, every ammunition package, and every strike on Russian military infrastructure affects Ukraine’s negotiating position. But if the war drags on, another question arises: who will be able to hold allies, funding, defense production, and internal resilience longer.
For Russia, it is important to declare any compromise as its victory. For Ukraine, it is crucial not to let a ceasefire become a frozen trap after which Moscow will regain strength and try again.
That is why in such a scenario, the issue of security guarantees becomes central. Without them, an “imperfect peace” may turn out to be not the end of the war but an intermediate station before the next escalation.
What Israel should see here
For the Israeli audience, this plot is not distant European analytics.
Israel knows well that the formal absence of a major war does not always mean real security. A state can live under constant threat, strengthen its army, develop technologies, depend on ally support, and at the same time understand: if deterrence weakens, the enemy will test the boundaries again.
That is why the JPMorgan report separately features an “Israeli scenario” for Ukraine. This model implies a strong, armed, sustainably supported state without the direct extension of full NATO protection and without a large foreign military presence. But the likelihood of this scenario, according to analysts, is significantly lower than the “Finnish” one.
In the middle of this discussion, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main question not only for Kyiv but also for Jerusalem: can a country under constant threat maintain freedom of action if international guarantees remain incomplete and the enemy perceives compromise as weakness?
The answer to this question will be important not only for Ukraine.
It concerns the entire security system in which small and medium-sized states live next to aggressive regimes.
Five scenarios: from South Korean to Belarusian
JPMorganChase considers several possible models for Ukraine’s future. In the published assessment, the “Finnish scenario” received the highest probability — 50%. The “Georgian scenario” is estimated at 30%, the “Israeli” at 10%, and options like South Korea and Belarus at 5% each.
The strongest option for Ukraine is the South Korean one.
It implies strict security guarantees, an actual Western military umbrella, and a defense architecture where a new Russian attack would be too risky. But JPMorgan assesses this path as unlikely because it requires a much more decisive position from the US and Europe.
The “Israeli scenario” looks closer to the reality of a strong armed state living in a dangerous environment but receiving long-term support, modernizing its army, and creating its own deterrence.
The “Georgian scenario” is more dangerous. It means not immediate capitulation but gradual weakening: a gray zone, ally fatigue, stalled recovery, internal instability, and the risk of Ukraine returning to the orbit of Russian influence.
The bleakest option is the Belarusian one.
This is no longer a compromise but an actual loss of subjectivity. Ukraine in such a model becomes a territory dependent on Moscow, and the West acknowledges its inability to maintain the security system after the largest war in Europe since World War II.
Why the “Finnish scenario” should not be confused with a peace plan
The JPMorgan report is not a proposal for Ukraine to agree to territorial losses and not a diplomatic document already on the negotiating table. It is an analytical risk map written to assess the possible end of the war and its consequences for Europe, the US, and global security.
Kyiv still speaks of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Moscow tries to consolidate the results of aggression and present any concession by Ukraine as proof of its own strength. Europe, judging by JPMorgan’s conclusions, has strengthened support for Kyiv but has not yet created a system of guarantees that would turn a ceasefire into a truly sustainable peace.
This is the main problem.
If the aggressor receives part of what it wants, even without achieving a complete victory, other regimes closely study this experience. They watch how far they can go, how much the West can endure, where the boundary of support lies, and what concessions can be extracted under the threat of further war.
For Israel, this sounds especially acute. Regional security is always built not on the hope that the enemy will change its mind but on the ability to convince it that a new attack will be too costly.
Therefore, the debate about the “Finnish scenario” is not only a conversation about Ukraine’s future. It is a question of what the world order will be like after this war: a system that stops the aggressor or a system that teaches the victim to live with the consequences of aggression, calling it an “imperfect peace.”
