- April 3, 2026
- 4:24 pm
- Middle East
On April 3, 2026, Donald Trump wrote that if given a little more time, the US could open the Strait of Hormuz, take control of the oil, and “make a fortune.” This phrase sounded not like a diplomatic formula, but as an acknowledgment that the White House has not yet found a clear and safe way out of the crisis surrounding the planet’s main energy artery. About one-fifth of the world’s oil consumption passes through Hormuz, and therefore any attempt to “just open the strait” immediately turns not into a beautiful slogan, but into a question of war, fuel prices, and the stability of the entire global market.
For Israel, this story is not something abstract. The longer Iran keeps shipping under pressure in Hormuz, the higher the risk for the entire region—from energy prices to new strikes on the infrastructure of Western allies in the Middle East. And if Washington talks about a forceful option, and Europe responds with cautious consultations, then this is no longer just an international dispute, but an indicator of how limited the real capabilities of even the largest powers are when it comes to war on the Iranian coast.
Why Trump’s idea sounds loud but hits a dead end
Seizing the strait in words is easier than holding it in reality
The main problem for Trump is that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be “taken” by political will alone. Reuters directly writes that French President Emmanuel Macron called the military capture of the strait unrealistic: it would require an indefinitely long time and would expose ships to constant threats from the Iranian coast, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and ballistic missiles. In other words, the narrow waterway, the proximity of the Iranian coast, and the saturation of this area with means of destruction turn any beautiful militant rhetoric into an extremely risky scenario.
That is why Hormuz becomes a political trap for Trump.
On the one hand, he has already publicly raised expectations by promising a quick solution. On the other hand, Reuters notes that his rating is falling, gasoline is getting more expensive, and Republicans are heading into the November midterm elections against the backdrop of a war that many Americans want to end as soon as possible. According to Reuters/Ipsos, 60% of respondents do not approve of US strikes on Iran, and two-thirds want a quick end to the conflict, even if Washington’s goals are not fully achieved.
Even US allies are not yet ready to turn support into war
A virtual meeting organized by London on April 2 did indeed gather about 40 countries. But the important thing is this: the US did not participate in these negotiations, no specific decisions were made, and the discussion itself was mainly reduced to diplomatic and economic measures of pressure on Tehran. The next stage is only a meeting of military planners next week, where options for demining and a possible “calming” mission for commercial shipping after a ceasefire will be discussed.
This does not look like a ready coalition that will go to war with Iran tomorrow. Rather, the opposite: the world is trying to buy time without paying for it with direct military confrontation.
Against this backdrop, the gap between Washington’s tone and the real sentiments of partners is especially noticeable. European countries, according to Reuters, initially refused to comply with Trump’s demand to send their fleets to the strait area for fear of being drawn into the conflict. That is, the US has political support, but this is still far from a readiness to bear losses and undertake a long naval campaign off the coast of Iran.
What exactly Ukraine is proposing and why this experience was heard
Kyiv does not promise a miracle but offers a model that has already worked in the Black Sea
In this situation, Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal looks not like an impressive gesture, but as an attempt to transfer to Hormuz a logic of actions that has already been tested. Reuters confirmed that on April 2, Zelensky offered the countries discussing the opening of the strait Ukrainian expertise in protecting and restoring freedom of navigation.
He directly reminded that Ukraine has relevant experience in maritime routes, defense, and traffic restoration, as well as technological solutions created during the war, including maritime drones.
This proposal did not arise out of nowhere. After Russia withdrew from the grain deal, Ukraine managed to create its own maritime corridor, which gradually restored exports through the Odessa hub. Reuters wrote back in January 2024 that the Ukrainian route allowed the return of food exports to levels not seen since pre-war times, and the key factor was strikes on the Russian fleet and its expulsion from part of the water area. Already in February 2026, Reuters separately noted that about 90% of Ukrainian exports go through the Odessa hub, and the corridor itself continues to operate despite Russian strikes.
The story of this breakthrough is well known. On August 4, 2023, a large landing ship “Olenegorsky Gornyak” was damaged in Novorossiysk after an attack by a Ukrainian maritime drone. In September 2023, a strike on Sevastopol caused heavy damage to the BDK “Minsk” and the submarine “Rostov-on-Don.”
For Moscow, this became a signal: the Black Sea is no longer a safe internal water area for the Russian fleet. It was after this series of strikes that the Ukrainian model of war at sea ceased to be defensive and began to form a new space for export.
It’s not about a “big fleet,” but about technological exhaustion of the enemy
In more detailed Ukrainian retellings of Zelensky’s position, practical elements of this model are already sounding: parallel negotiations and forceful pressure, convoys for escorting ships, interceptors, an integrated electronic warfare network, and other tools that can ensure unilateral control over the route without a classic large-scale naval operation.
Even if the specific parameters of such a scenario have not yet been publicly approved at the international level, the logic itself is well-read: Ukraine offers not a frontal assault on Iran, but a multi-level drone and electronic war for the safety of passage.
This is where the topic becomes especially important for the Israeli audience. Israel has long lived in a reality where a cheap drone can change the strategy of an entire army, and precise technological adaptation often turns out to be more important than classic superiority in tonnage and number of platforms. Therefore, the Ukrainian experience in the Black Sea for the region sounds not like an exotic, but as one of the few truly modern responses to Iran’s asymmetric tactics. In this sense, NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency sees in Kyiv’s words not just another diplomatic episode, but a proposal for a new security architecture for the Middle East, where not only aircraft carriers and destroyers play a decisive role, but also networked, cheap, mass drone solutions.
What this means for Israel, the US, and the entire war for Hormuz
Ukraine offers the West what it currently lacks
The paradox of the current crisis is that the US has colossal military power but lacks a convincing and cheap scheme to quickly restore shipping in Hormuz without being drawn into a long campaign. Ukraine, on the other hand, does not have a global fleet but has practical experience in methodically making the sea too dangerous for the enemy and sufficiently manageable for a trade corridor.
That is why Zelensky is now offering not a political declaration, but competence.
For Israel, this is also a question of the strategic choice of the West.
If Washington continues to speak the language of brute force, and allies respond only with vague diplomacy, Iran will retain its main trump card—the ability to keep the world in fear of another price jump and a new supply disruption. However, if the Ukrainian experience of the Black Sea is indeed integrated into the matter, it could change the very nature of the conflict: instead of a war for the coastline, a war for sensors, communication channels, drone swarms, and constant technological exhaustion of the enemy will begin.
However, for now, reality remains harsh. Trump speaks the language of maximalism, allies discuss measures without a clear commitment to fight, and Kyiv offers knowledge that no one has yet officially used. Therefore, the main conclusion for April 3, 2026, looks like this: the Strait of Hormuz has become not only an Iranian challenge to the West but also a test of the ability of the US, Europe, Israel, and partners to understand what modern war for maritime corridors looks like. And if this test is failed, the consequences will be felt not only in Washington and Tehran but also in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ashdod, and across the Middle Eastern energy map.