- May 4, 2026
- 11:01 am
- World News
Europe views the next two years as a dangerous corridor
In Europe, there is increasing discussion of a scenario that seemed almost impossible to many just a few years ago: Russia might try to test NATO and the European security system not sometime in the distant future, but in the next year or two. The reason was a publication by Politico, which was recounted by Ukrainian media on May 4, 2026: the article suggests that the Kremlin might see the current period as a ‘window of opportunity’ while Donald Trump is in the White House and the European Union has not yet fully increased its military potential.
It is not necessarily about a classic tank offensive across the border.
This is precisely the main danger. European politicians and experts increasingly talk about a hybrid scenario: drones, sabotage, cyberattacks, provocations in the Baltic Sea, pressure on the Arctic, attacks on infrastructure, testing NATO’s reaction to ‘gray’ incidents. This format allows Moscow to raise the stakes while simultaneously pretending that there is no direct war with Europe.
Finnish Member of the European Parliament Mika Aaltola, quoted by Politico, speaks directly about a moment of vulnerability: the US is gradually distancing itself from Europe, transatlantic relations are in a difficult state, and the EU is not yet ready to fully take responsibility for its own security. According to him, Russia is tempted to use this period to pressure Ukraine’s allies.
For Israel, this logic is also understandable. When an adversary sees a political pause, weak coordination, or a dispute among allies, they often test the limits of what is permissible not with a full-scale war immediately, but with a chain of strikes, provocations, and ‘accidental’ incidents.
What exactly might Russia do
The most alarming conclusion of European assessments is that the threat may not come in the form of one large attack, but as several different crises simultaneously. For example, a drone strike on an infrastructure facility, sabotage on a cable or pipeline, a provocation at the border of a NATO country, a cyberattack against government structures, and an informational operation explaining all this as ‘internal problems of Europe.’
This is convenient for the Kremlin.
If Russian troops do not cross the border clearly and massively, the US has room for a political excuse: this is not the case where it is necessary to immediately engage in a large conflict. This is the logic described by European interlocutors of Politico: Moscow might try to pressure Ukraine’s allies in such a way as to avoid a direct American reaction.
Aaltola separately points out that the Kremlin is unlikely to start with an obvious strike where NATO is strongest, for example, in the Polish direction. Scenarios that are harder to immediately call a full-scale invasion are much more likely: a drone attack, activity in the Baltic Sea, pressure on northern regions, hybrid operations, and attempts to sow doubts within NATO itself. This is also written about in the retelling of the Politico material by Ukrainian and European publications.
At the same time, it is important not to turn the forecast into hysteria. A Russian attack on Europe is not an inevitable event with a precise date on the calendar. But European intelligence, military, and politicians increasingly talk not about a theoretical threat, but about practical planning: what to do if Moscow decides to test the allies’ resilience.
Why ‘2027–2029’ is increasingly mentioned
Western assessments mention different timelines. Some talk about the next year or two as a political ‘window of opportunity’ for Putin. Others warn of a broader horizon — roughly until 2029–2030, when Russia might restore some forces, increase arms production, and prepare for a more serious confrontation.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned back in 2025 that Russia might be ready to use military force against the Alliance within five years if Europe does not accelerate rearmament. His speeches conveyed a simple idea: even if the war against Ukraine is frozen or stopped, Russia will not automatically become a peaceful country because its economy and military industry are already restructured for a long confrontation.
Danish military intelligence also warned that under certain conditions, Russia might be ready for a major war in Europe roughly within five years after the end or freezing of the war against Ukraine. In Germany, there were assessments that Moscow might gain the opportunity to attack a NATO country by 2029, and some German military allowed for more limited provocations before this date.
In other words, it is not about one forecast or one publication. This is already a common nerve of European security: time works against those who delay.
Why Moscow’s denials do not reassure anyone
Putin and Russian officials traditionally call talks about a possible attack on Europe ‘nonsense’ and accuse Western governments of creating an image of an enemy. Sergey Lavrov also claims that Russia allegedly does not intend to attack Europe.
The problem is that Europe has already heard such denials.
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Moscow also denied plans for a big war, spoke of ‘exercises,’ accused the West of panic, and demanded ‘security guarantees.’ Then Russian missiles struck Ukrainian cities, and tank columns moved on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and southern Ukraine.
Therefore, today European capitals look not at the Kremlin’s statements, but at missile production, mobilization capabilities, sabotage activity, cyberattacks, intelligence operations, drones, and the real actions of the Russian army.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic not as a distant European concern, but as part of the overall security picture, important for Israel as well. In a world where the Iranian regime, Russia, and other anti-Western forces learn from each other, the weakness of allies quickly becomes an invitation to new pressure.
Ukraine remains the main barrier
The main factor currently restraining Russia is Ukraine. The Russian army, four years after the full-scale invasion, continues to lose people, equipment, resources, and time on the Ukrainian front. If Ukraine stands firm, the Kremlin will have fewer opportunities for a new adventure against Europe.
If the West tires, reduces aid to Kyiv, and tries to buy peace at the expense of Ukrainian territories, Putin might draw the opposite conclusion: pressure works.
That is why the conversation about a possible Russian attack on Europe is not just a conversation about NATO. It is a conversation about how seriously the West takes its own warnings.
Europe is already increasing defense budgets. Germany is preparing a sharp increase in military spending, NATO demands more ammunition production, the Baltic and Northern European countries are strengthening defense, and Britain is developing joint naval formats with European allies. But money does not turn into missiles, tanks, air defense systems, and trained reserves in one month.
And this is precisely the interval that the Kremlin might see.
The main conclusion for Europe and Israel
In this story, the danger is not only that Russia might attack. The danger is that it might decide: Europe is arguing, the US is occupied with other crises, Ukraine is tiring, and the time for risk has come.
Such decisions are rarely made rationally. The war against Ukraine has already shown that the Kremlin is capable of starting a catastrophic adventure if it considers the opponent weak, divided, or too slow.
Therefore, the question today is not: ‘Will Russia attack Europe tomorrow morning?’
The right question is different: will Europe do everything so that Putin does not get the feeling that he can try tomorrow morning.
For Israel, this is also a familiar logic. Weakness does not appease the aggressor. A pause does not always reduce risk. And if the enemy is used to testing the limits of what is permissible, the only working response is readiness, allies, clear red lines, and the ability to quickly respond to the threat.
Europe can still close this ‘window of opportunity.’
But for this, it will have to recognize: a big war does not start on the day of the first shot. It starts earlier — when the aggressor sees that others are arguing for too long about how exactly to prevent him from shooting.