Russia blocked El Al and demands ‘Aeroflot’: why does Israel still pretend that everything is fine with Russian aviation

On September 3, 2026, it was reported in Russia about the preparation of a direct El Al flight from Tel Aviv to St. Petersburg instead of the one stopped due to the threat of Ukrainian drones in Moscow. A few hours later, completely different information came from Israel: Russian authorities did not give the route the green light, and sources in the Israeli aviation system linked this to the demand to return Aeroflot to Ben Gurion.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

The story began on September 3, 2026 as a quite ordinary aviation news. Russian media reported that Israeli El Al was preparing to open direct flights between Tel Aviv and St. Petersburg. The head of the Israeli Ministry of Tourism’s representation in Russia, Ksenia Vorontsova, said that almost everything was ready on the carrier’s side. Even technical details were mentioned: about 5 hours 15 minutes in transit, presumably a Boeing 737-900. St. Petersburg was supposed to replace Moscow, where El Al stopped flying after another deterioration of the situation around Russian airports.

But in the evening of the same day, the plot turned.

At 17:29, Israel Hayom, citing sources familiar with the negotiations, reported that Russian authorities rejected El Al’s application. Similar information appeared on N12. There it was attributed to sources in the Israeli Ministry of Transport and the Civil Aviation Authority. It was from these reports that the main reason for the conflict became known: in Israel, it is believed that Moscow does not want to give El Al the opportunity to expand its activities in Russia until the Russian state-owned Aeroflot receives permission to return to Ben Gurion. By the morning of September 4, the information about the lack of permission was already confirmed by other Israeli publications.

Care is needed here. Russian authorities have not yet issued an official statement with the words: “El Al will not get St. Petersburg because Israel does not let Aeroflot in.” Moreover, no final public ban on the route has been announced either. Therefore, the fact looks like this: El Al did not receive positive Russian permission, and the connection of the refusal with Aeroflot is described by Israeli sources familiar with the situation. This is more important than the loud word “revenge”: it is a very specific aviation trade.

And only after this does a question arise that goes far beyond the schedule of Pulkovo.

Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for four and a half years, due to this war it received large-scale aviation restrictions, lost normal access to some Western services and spare parts, got into a huge leasing conflict, and re-registered foreign-owned aircraft in its own registry.

Now the state that created all these problems with its own actions wants Israel to help return its main state carrier to normal international life.

Meanwhile, Russian aviation from Israel has not disappeared anywhere.

And here the question is no longer for Moscow.

Why does Israel continue to seek a way to negotiate at all?

St. Petersburg was needed by El Al precisely because of the war that Russia started

El Al suspended flights to Moscow on June 25, 2026. The reason was not an anti-Russian sanction joined by Israel, but the worsening situation in Russian airspace after Ukrainian drone strikes and regular restrictions on the operation of Moscow airports.

Later, the pause was extended at least until October 22.

NANovosti in June already detailed why El Al stopped flying to Moscow and why the route became dependent on the war, air defense work, and sudden airport closures. At that time, St. Petersburg was not yet considered a solution. Now it is clear why it was needed: El Al was trying not to leave Russia completely, but to find a Russian airport less dependent on the regular restrictions of the Moscow aviation hub.

Against the backdrop of these events, Ukraine separately raised the issue of Russian civil aviation in ICAO. On September 2, Kiev called on the international organization to support the refusal to fly through Russian airspace due to the growing risks associated with the war and long-range Ukrainian drones. In response, Moscow stated that it ensures safety, and the Russian Ministry of Transport provided foreign airlines with additional explanations about the current measures. However, the actual restrictions, delays, and cancellations of flights at Moscow airports have not disappeared.

For the Israeli reader, there is an unpleasant causal chain here.

Russia invades Ukraine. After several years of war, Ukraine gains the ability to strike deep into Russian territory. Russian airports periodically close. El Al decides that continuing regular Moscow flights is too inconvenient and risky. The carrier tries to move to St. Petersburg.

And after all this, Moscow effectively says: before you get an alternative route, let’s talk about our Aeroflot.

At NANovosti, just a day before the current story, we separately analyzed why Russian airspace has become an independent factor for air communication between Israel and Russia. The new conflict around St. Petersburg turned out to be almost a continuation of that material.

There is one more detail. El Al could not simply fly to St. Petersburg along the shortest line through Ukraine: Ukrainian airspace has been closed to civil aviation since February 2022.

The actual LY611 Tel Aviv — Moscow route in February 2026 took a large western detour. After Israel, the plane passed through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, and only then entered Russian airspace. For St. Petersburg, there is no final published flight plan — the flight has not been launched — but the western European corridor would be a natural option for it as well.

It turns out to be a remarkable symbol of this whole story: El Al was supposed to bypass the war through European countries, many of which themselves are closed to Russian aviation, to get to Russia — and Russia also decided to set conditions for Israel.

Why doesn’t Aeroflot fly to Israel at all

If you read only the Russian side of the dispute, you might think that Israel chose one Russian company for no reason and decided to punish it.

No.

As of September 2026, Aeroflot remains on the EU Air Safety List — the official list of air carriers banned or restricted from operations in the European Union due to issues related to aviation safety and oversight.

In June 2026, the European Commission updated the list for the 48th time. It still includes 22 airlines certified in Russia. The European Commission directly speaks of serious safety deficiencies. Among the companies on the list is PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY “AEROFLOT — RUSSIAN AIRLINES”.

This should not be confused with ordinary political-economic sanctions.

After the Russian invasion, the EU closed its airspace to Russian carriers. The US and the UK imposed their own restrictions. Boeing and Airbus stopped normal support for Russian operators, and there were restrictions on parts, technical services, insurance, leasing, and many other elements without which modern international aviation cannot exist.

The Air Safety List is a separate issue. It concerns the ability of the aviation system to ensure an internationally recognized level of oversight.

Therefore, the slogan “Why does Israel ban Aeroflot” turns the story upside down.

It is much more accurate to ask: why should Israel make an exception for a carrier that the European aviation system still has officially documented questions about?

Here it is also worth correcting a common formulation. Saying that Russian Boeing and Airbus now “only fly to third-world countries” is incorrect. Aeroflot continues to serve Turkey, the UAE, China, Egypt, and other international destinations.

But this does not make its position normal.

Most of the European space is closed to it. Access to Western aviation infrastructure is limited. And instead of eliminating the causes of this situation, Moscow is trying to expand the list of states that will agree to live by Russian rules.

Requests like “why doesn’t Aeroflot fly to Israel”, “why did Russia ban El Al St. Petersburg” or “can Aeroflot fly to Ben Gurion again” will inevitably lead to the word “sanctions”. But that word alone is not enough. In Russian aviation after 2022, sanctions, international oversight problems, a shortage of official Western components, and a unique story with planes that Russia simply did not want to return to their foreign owners all overlapped at the same time.

The planes were not theirs. The owners demanded their return

Before the war, a huge part of the Russian fleet of Boeing and Airbus was in international leasing. That is, the planes belonged to foreign companies that leased them to Russian carriers for money.

After February 24, 2022, sanctions required the termination of many such contracts. Leasing companies demanded the return of their planes.

And here something happened that in ordinary conversation is quite understandably called theft.

The planes were not returned.

In March 2022, the Russian state created a mechanism that allowed the registration of foreign planes that were with Russian airlines in the Russian registry. Moreover, the owners could not give consent to this.

In ICAO materials dedicated to the violation of Articles 18 and 19 of the Chicago Convention and the problem of double registration, a very specific figure appeared: 515 aircraft with an estimated value of about 10 billion dollars belonged to Irish leasing companies. Russian decree No. 411 allowed the registration in Russia of aircraft leased from owners from countries recognized by Moscow as “unfriendly” without prior confirmation of their removal from foreign registration.

The European Union separately pointed out the registration of a large number of planes without the owners’ consent.

Legally, I would not call every Russian Boeing or Airbus “stolen” today. Over the years, some stories have been resolved: buyouts, insurance payments, and agreements with lessors have taken place.

But the initial sequence does not change because of this.

A foreign company owns the plane. A Russian company leases it. The owner demands the return of the machine. Russia keeps the plane and allows it to be entered into its own registry.

Sometimes you really don’t need to look for more beautiful words.

And after such a story, Moscow demands that Israel treat its main state carrier as if the international aviation system before 2022 never existed.

“Old” is not the main thing. Worse is the conditions in which the Russian aircraft fleet now lives

It can be said more simply: Russian aviation is aging.

This is true, but in itself a weak argument.

The age of an aircraft is not a diagnosis. A well-maintained twenty-year-old Boeing, Airbus, or Tu can be a perfectly normal machine. Civil aviation is built not around the year of manufacture, but around maintenance regulations, component resources, certified parts, control, and responsibility.

But sanctioned Russia found itself in a situation where the maintenance environment itself became worse.

In 2025, Moscow even appealed to ICAO to ease aviation sanctions, arguing that restrictions on the supply of parts and maintenance could create safety risks. Reuters wrote then that the restrictions affect critical components for more than 700 mostly foreign aircraft operated by Russian carriers.

The production of its own replacement also turned out to be far from the initial promises. Reuters in 2025 analyzed the failure of Russian plans to produce civil airliners: instead of rapid import substitution, the industry faced delays, a shortage of components, and the need to maintain the existing fleet longer than expected.

There is an almost anecdotal detail from the current Israeli story.

Red Wings flies from Zhukovsky to Ben Gurion on a Tu-214. One of the aircraft used on the route, RA-64549, was produced in 2008. It is 18 years old. Until September 2025, it was in storage for about ten years, after which it was restored and returned to operation.

And this is not theory.

On September 3, 2026, on the very day when Israel learned about the problems with El Al’s permission for St. Petersburg, RA-64549 performed flight WZ15 Zhukovsky — Tel Aviv, and then WZ16 Tel Aviv — Zhukovsky.

Once again: the age of this Tu-214 in itself proves nothing about its safety.

But the political picture is excellent.

The Israeli carrier cannot get St. Petersburg because Russia is seeking privileges for Aeroflot.

The Russian Tu-214 at the same time calmly stands at the Ben Gurion terminal.

Israel did not arrange any blockade of Russian planes

This detail cannot be lost because it almost completely destroys the Russian logic.

Israel did not ban Russian civil aviation as a class.

Red Wings officially resumed Zhukovsky — Tel Aviv flights on April 17, 2026. The company itself reported that the Tu-214 is used on the Moscow route. On routes from Sochi and Mineralnye Vody to Israel — Sukhoi Superjet 100. In the summer season, the company planned to fly to Tel Aviv from three Russian cities.

In addition, air communication is supported by Azimuth, whose fleet is built around the Superjet.

So there is no “Israel banned Russian planes”.

Tupolevs fly.

Superjets fly.

Russian airlines fly.

Passengers from Russia can fly to Israel directly.

The problem arose specifically around Aeroflot.

That is why Moscow’s current behavior is especially indicative. Russia is not defending the right of its citizens to reach Israel — this right is practically already ensured by other carriers. It is trying to achieve the admission of a specific state airline and uses El Al as leverage.

NANovosti — News of Israel has already encountered similar logic in a completely different area. In June, we analyzed how Russian official structures included the Haifa company Elsight in the list of enterprises allegedly connected, according to Moscow, with the Ukrainian drone program, and then rhetoric about “potential targets” was heard from Russia.

This is important not because Elsight and aviation are directly connected.

They are connected by the behavior of the Russian state towards Israel.

Moscow wants to maintain the most comfortable political and economic relations with Israel while simultaneously reserving the right to pressure, threaten, work with Iran, wage war against Ukraine, and now also use permissions for El Al as a bargaining tool.

We also wrote in detail about how the war in Ukraine became a platform for the development of Russian-Iranian military technologies and why this already concerns the security of Israel itself.

Against this background, the question “how to persuade Russia to open St. Petersburg” seems surprisingly small.

And why on earth does Israel continue to meet Moscow halfway after all this

There is an obvious argument in favor of maintaining air communication.

A huge number of people live in Israel who have relatives, parents, friends, property, work, and family matters in Russia. Closing transport links means hitting not only the Russian state but also Israeli citizens.

There is no point in arguing with this.

But between “people need to be able to fly” and “Israel must return the state Aeroflot to Ben Gurion” there is no equality sign.

People already fly with Red Wings and Azimuth. You can fly through third countries. Israel did not arrange a transport blockade of Russia.

Therefore, the question of Aeroflot can be considered exclusively from Israel’s position: does the specific carrier meet our requirements for safety, insurance, technical control, and legal risks? If it does, the relevant authorities make a decision. If not, it does not fly.

The fact that Moscow blocks El Al in response should not be a reason to lower the bar.

On the contrary.

When a state turns a flight permit into a means of pressure, it is a good moment to check whether too many concessions have been made to it so far.

European and American airlines mostly left Russian airspace after 2022. The reasons vary: somewhere there are direct bans, somewhere sanctions, somewhere commercial risk assessments. Carriers from China, Turkey, the Gulf countries, and several other states continue to fly. Israel has effectively chosen the second camp.

But now Russia itself demonstrates the price of this softness.

El Al did not join the political boycott of Moscow. The company continued to fly there for four years of war. It stopped flights only when the consequences of the war directly reached the normal operation of airports.

Then El Al tried not to leave Russia altogether, but to move to another city.

And even for this, Moscow decided to demand a price.

For me, after this, the question looks completely different.

Not “when will El Al get permission for St. Petersburg?”.

Not “will Israel and Russia agree on ‘Aeroflot’?”.

But why should Israel even negotiate on Russian terms?

Russia is an aggressor state that has driven its own civil aviation under sanctions. Its carriers have lost accustomed access to a large part of the Western market. Western manufacturers have limited support. Hundreds of foreign planes, after owners’ demands for return, remained in Russia and were re-registered. Moscow itself complains to ICAO that restrictions on spare parts create risks. Its own plans for rapid import substitution of the aircraft fleet have failed.

And yet Russian planes still continue to fly to Israel.

Not enough?

Now is ‘Aeroflot’ also absolutely necessary?

If Russia decided that permission for Petersburg is a commodity for political exchange, Israel has a simple answer: do not buy.

There is no need to prohibit people from flying. There is no need to stage demonstrative actions against passengers. There is no need to even fully copy European sanction policies.

It is enough to stop behaving as if Israel owes someone something here.

Petersburg became necessary for El Al due to the consequences of the war started by Russia. Sanctions appeared after the war started by Russia. The leasing crisis appeared after the war started by Russia. The problem of parts, maintenance, and international aviation oversight is also part of this chain.

Israel has kept the door open all this time.

And in response, received a demand to open it even wider.

Perhaps now is the time not to seek a new concession to Moscow, but simply to say: enough.