Iran, USA, and Israel: why the war increasingly resembles a war of attrition – opinion

For the Israeli audience, this topic is especially important not only because of the constant Iranian threat but also because it concerns the future balance of power in the entire Middle East. When Iran, the USA, Israel, Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz, and possible negotiations are at the center of the discussion, the issue is no longer limited to exchanging blows. It concerns who will ultimately retain political subjectivity, who will dictate the terms of a new deal, and whose interests will be fixed in the post-war configuration.

At the core of this material is an article by Igor Semivolos, published on April 13, 2026, on Glavcom.ua, which examines the paradox of the current war and the logic of Iran’s negotiating position. The author’s initial thesis is that in a regional conflict, the winner is not always the one with more power, but the one whose minimal goals are closer to reality.

This is where the main paradox arises. Iran has suffered significant losses, is under pressure, and continues to live under constant threat, yet increasingly appears not as the losing side but as a player who managed to withstand the blow and turn the very fact of its survival into a political resource. For Israel, this is a worrying signal because such logic makes the opponent no less dangerous and sometimes even more resilient.

Subjectivity is more important than loud statements

In a regional war, the winner is not only the one who can strike. It is equally important to maintain one’s role in the game, not to be pushed out of the negotiation process, and not to allow others to decide your fate without your participation.

The USA remains the main external center of power in the region. Their military, political, and diplomatic weight has not disappeared. But Washington’s problem is that during the conflict, it increasingly has to tailor explanations to the actual result. When goals change after the campaign has begun, it usually means that the initial plan did not have the expected effect.

Iran, on the other hand, acts extremely pragmatically. It does not necessarily need to demonstrate a classic victory with triumph and public capitulation of opponents. For Tehran, it is enough to maintain the regime, retain the most important elements of nuclear and military infrastructure, not lose control over key levers of pressure, and reach negotiations as a party that must still be reckoned with. This is the model described in the original material.

In this scheme, Israel appears particularly vulnerable politically. On the battlefield, it remains a tough and decisive player, but the risk lies elsewhere: one can maintain military initiative and simultaneously face the fact that the final conditions will be discussed in a format where Israeli influence is limited. For a country living under a real threat from Iran and its proxies, this is no longer a theoretical debate but a matter of national security.

Why Iran’s minimal goals work better

One of the reasons for Tehran’s relative resilience is that its goals are extremely specific. Iran does not need to take over the entire region at once. It needs to withstand, maintain strategic capabilities, retain channels of influence, and prevent a scenario of its own political nullification.

Its opponents have much broader and heavier tasks. If the goal is to break the system, deprive Iran of its military tools, nullify its nuclear potential, and simultaneously weaken the proxy network, then any incomplete execution is already perceived as a problem. The higher the stated goals, the more noticeable the gap between expectation and actual result.

This is why the conflict begins to resemble a war of attrition. In such a game, one side may lose more materially but still find itself in a stronger negotiating position if it has retained the main thing. For Iran, this is the chance to present the current stage as a strategic achievement.

What this means for Israel and Lebanon

For Israel, the most sensitive part of the entire structure remains the Lebanese direction. Around it converge the interests of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Israeli security system. Any new framework for Lebanon automatically becomes part of a broader deal on regional influence.

If Iran insists on including Lebanon in a broader configuration of negotiations, it is not out of abstract solidarity. It is a way to maintain its depth of influence and legitimize part of the pressure architecture that Tehran has been building for years. For Israel, such a scenario is extremely disadvantageous because it can solidify the threat not as a temporary crisis but as a permanent element of the future order.

Here arises another unpleasant moment for Jerusalem. Israel has military subjectivity, but diplomatic subjectivity in certain formats may be incomplete. And if the USA and Iran seek a resolution convenient primarily for themselves, Israeli key interests risk becoming a bargaining chip rather than the foundation of a future solution.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency in this context notes an important thing: the modern conflict between Israel and the Iranian axis can no longer be read only through the number of strikes, missiles, and eliminations. It is equally important to understand who can withstand pressure, who controls the pace of escalation, and who approaches negotiations not as a supplicant but as a player who believes they have already achieved their minimal result.

Negotiations as a continuation of war by other means

Special attention in the original article is given to possible negotiations and the role of mediators. The negotiation format itself does not mean peace in the usual sense. Rather, it is an attempt to legally and diplomatically fix the balance of power that has formed after a series of strikes, threats, and mutual pressure.

From Iran’s perspective, the task looks like this: reach negotiations not as a weakened supplicant but as a party that has already proven its resilience. In this case, diplomacy becomes not a concession but a way to legitimize the achieved deterrence.

For the USA, this is more complicated. Washington falls into a trap of commitments: retreating sharply is dangerous for reputation, and continuing a too costly campaign without a clear end is also risky. For Israel, the situation is even more sensitive because any compromise that does not truly remove the Iranian threat will be perceived as a temporary reprieve rather than a solution to the problem.

Why the main paradox of war works in Tehran’s favor

The main idea of this plot sounds harsh but sober. Strategically, the one whose minimal goals coincide with what can actually be retained moves forward. If the opponent sets maximalist tasks and does not achieve them, while you simply survived, retained the system, and did not allow yourself to be ousted, it is you who gains the political advantage.

This is the danger of the current stage for Israel. Iran may appear weakened externally, but within the strategic logic, it tries to sell the world a completely different picture: not defeat, but resilience; not isolation, but the right to be a mandatory party to any regional solution; not weakness, but the ability to withstand pressure from the strongest.

For the Middle East, this means a protracted and tense period in which even local de-escalation does not guarantee a real resolution. And for Israel, the main conclusion is crystal clear: the opponent is dangerous not only when advancing but also when able to withstand, maintain influence, and turn the very fact of its survival into a new form of strength.