On the night of April 13 to 14, it marked four years (2022) since one of the most humiliating and symbolic defeats of the Russian fleet during the full-scale war against Ukraine. The flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the missile cruiser ‘Moskva’, was hit in April 2022 and then sank, which was even confirmed by the Russian military department, although initially, it tried to explain the disaster only by fire and ammunition detonation. Ukraine stated from the beginning that the strike was carried out by Neptune missiles.
For the Israeli audience, the story of ‘Moskva’ is important not only as a military episode of the Ukrainian-Russian war. The Black Sea is directly linked to the security of grain routes, exports, regional balance, logistics of Eastern Europe, and the general question of whether an aggressor can unpunishedly control the coast, blackmail ports, and redraw the map by force. That is why the death of the main ship of the Black Sea Fleet became not just a beautiful symbol of Ukrainian resistance but a turning point in the entire campaign in the south.
Why the strike on ‘Moskva’ became historic
From Snake Island to the bottom of the Black Sea
It was the cruiser ‘Moskva’ that approached Snake Island in the early days of the invasion, after which the phrase of the Ukrainian defenders about the ‘Russian warship’ became one of the most recognizable lines of the entire war. Already a month and a half later, this same ship itself became a symbol of the failure of the Russian invasion.
Reuters reported that ‘Moskva’ sank on April 14, 2022, after being seriously damaged. Moscow claimed that a fire and ammunition explosion occurred on board, and the ship went to the bottom during towing in a storm. Kyiv, in turn, stated that the cause was a strike by Ukrainian missiles. However the Russian side formulated it, the outcome was unequivocal: the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet went to the bottom.
The significance of this strike went far beyond an ordinary combat loss. Reuters then noted that if the Ukrainian version with the missile hit is true, it is one of the most notable naval attacks of the 21st century. For Russia, it was not just minus one ship. It was a blow to prestige, to the myth of invulnerability, and to all the propaganda that tried to sell the invasion as an easy and almost bloodless campaign.
Why the Russian lie about the ‘fire’ was remembered for a long time
A separate part of the story was the behavior of the Russian Ministry of Defense. At first, they denied the very fact of a successful Ukrainian strike and talked about a local fire. Then they had to admit the loss of the ship. This scheme — first deny, then soften the wording, and then present the defeat as a technical incident — later became almost a standard model of Russian military propaganda.
From this moment, it became especially clear how the language of the Russian war works. Retreats turn into ‘regroupings’, failures into ‘planned decisions’, and destroyed objects into supposedly insignificant losses. The story of ‘Moskva’ was one of the first major points where this mechanism manifested itself to the whole world.
How the loss of the flagship changed the war in southern Ukraine
The cruiser went to the bottom, and with it — the plan to capture the entire coast
In the spring of 2022, the Russian command had much broader plans than just putting pressure on Odessa. In the logic of the first months of the invasion, Moscow planned to establish full control over the Ukrainian south, cut the country off from the sea, move towards Transnistria, and lock the entire coastal belt under its military and political pressure.
After the death of ‘Moskva’ and subsequent Ukrainian strikes on the Black Sea Fleet, this scenario became much less realistic. The loss of a key ship undermined Russia’s ability to cover its operations in the western part of the Black Sea and became an important psychological milestone. And when at the end of 2022 the Russian army was forced to leave Kherson, it became finally clear: the initial plan to capture all the coastal territories of Ukraine was thwarted.
For Israel, this is also an important lesson. In a region where sea routes are critical for imports, security, and energy, the story of ‘Moskva’ reminds us: even a large fleet does not guarantee a strategic result if it faces a motivated and technologically inventive opponent.
Why the Black Sea Fleet had to be hidden further from Crimea
After a series of Ukrainian strikes, the Russian fleet began gradually moving its most valuable units further away from occupied Crimea. Reuters repeatedly wrote that Russian warships and infrastructure in Novorossiysk remain targets for Ukrainian attacks, and the base itself became one of the new centers of risk after Crimea ceased to be a completely safe zone for the fleet.
The unofficial new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet was often called the frigate ‘Admiral Makarov’. But it no longer looks like an unconditionally protected asset. Last week, Reuters reported a statement from the Ukrainian side that ‘Admiral Makarov’ was hit in the port of Novorossiysk. There was no independent confirmation of the extent of the damage at that time, but the very fact that Ukraine continues to reach key ships of the Black Sea Fleet already in Novorossiysk says a lot about the degradation of Russian naval positions in the region.
Here, Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main military-political outcome of the ‘Moskva’ story: Ukraine not only sank one high-profile ship. It gradually deprived the Russian Black Sea Fleet of the feeling of being the master of the sea, forced it to retreat, hide, and live under the constant threat of new strikes. For the aggressor, who was going to dictate its terms to the entire northern Black Sea region, this defeat turned out to be much deeper than it seemed in April 2022.
Why ‘Moskva’ is remembered even four years later
This is no longer just a ship, but a symbol of the failure of the imperial project
The cruiser ‘Moskva’ was in service since 1983, initially under the name ‘Slava’, and later became one of the most recognizable ships of the Russian fleet. Reuters reminded that it participated in the Russian operation in Syria and in the events around the annexation of Crimea in 2014. So it was not a random combat board, but one of the symbols of Moscow’s military projection of power throughout the post-Soviet and Middle Eastern space.
That is why its demise is still perceived as historic. Not only did the missile cruiser go to the bottom. A part of Russia’s image as an allegedly unchallenged force in the Black Sea went to the bottom. For Ukraine, it became proof that even with incomparable starting resources, it is possible to break the plans of a larger opponent if you strike accurately, persistently, and systematically.
In the Israeli context, this date is also read as a reminder of the price of the aggressor’s overconfidence. Wars are won not by formidable ship names and not by television bravado, but by real resilience, truth about losses, and the ability to adapt. Russia, as first shown by ‘Moskva’, and then by a long series of strikes on the fleet and port infrastructure, turned out to be very bad at this.
Four years later, the story of ‘Moskva’ looks even clearer than it did then. It was not an episodic strike and not a beautiful legend for military reports. It was a moment when it became clear: Ukrainian resistance is capable of changing the strategy of the entire war, and the Russian military machine is breaking down where it considered itself particularly formidable.
