NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News

New threat at the northern border: cheap drone versus expensive defense

The kamikaze drone strike on the Israeli Iron Dome battery became one of those images that instantly turn into a symbol. In the video distributed by Hezbollah, a small device hits an element of the air defense system into which Israel has invested billions of shekels and years of technological development.

The authenticity of the footage has not yet been fully confirmed, but military experts consider it plausible. And even if there are questions surrounding the specific episode, the problem itself is no longer theoretical: pro-Iranian Hezbollah is increasingly copying the tactics that Russia uses against Ukraine.

For Israel, this is a painful signal. The country is accustomed to relying on precision systems, powerful intelligence, aviation, air defense, and technological superiority. But the drone war changes the logic of the battlefield: a device costing a few hundred dollars can pose a threat to an object whose protection costs incomparably more.

Hezbollah, recognized as a terrorist organization in the US, Germany, and several Arab Sunni states, presented the published footage as a propaganda success. For the Israeli army, it looks different: it is about a new level of vulnerability in the northern direction, where Lebanon, Iran, and proxy structures have long been working against Israel’s security.

Fiber-optic drones: what exactly has been transferred from the Ukrainian front

Since March, Hezbollah has increasingly used FPV drones — devices that transmit an image of the target to the operator in real-time. Such drones have already led to the deaths of Israeli soldiers and injuries among other fighters.

But the main challenge is not only in the FPV format. Increasing concern is caused by drones that are controlled not by radio channel, but through a thin fiber-optic cable. It unwinds from a reel during flight, and the signal is transmitted to the operator via a physical communication line.

This sharply complicates the fight against such devices. Classic electronic warfare means work poorly against a drone that does not depend on a regular radio signal. It is harder to detect, harder to jam, and the time for units to react is getting shorter.

On the front in Ukraine, fiber-optic drones have been used en masse since 2024 — by both the Ukrainian army and Russian troops. They have long understood there: there is no universal solution against such a threat yet. Nets, mechanical barriers, shotguns, attempts to cut the cable, visual observation, and constant improvisation at the unit level are used.

Why Ukrainian experience is important for Israel

That is why the issue of Ukrainian experience becomes especially sensitive. Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevgeny Korniychuk, has already expressed surprise that the Israeli leadership, according to him, does not show sufficient interest in Ukrainian developments in this area.

For Israel, this is not an abstract discussion about someone else’s war. Ukraine has been living for several years under the conditions of a daily drone war against Russia, which is an ally of Iran and actively uses Iranian technologies, including Shaheds. This experience is directly related to the threats Israel faces — from Lebanon to Yemen and the Iranian direction.

In the Israeli army, in response to a DW request, they said they are carefully studying the challenges in different theaters of operations and are ‘at the forefront’ of developing measures against this threat. But the reality on the ground shows: the enemy learns quickly, and the adaptation of large armies often goes slower than the battlefield changes.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context, it is important to emphasize: for the Israeli audience, the Ukrainian experience is no longer a matter of diplomatic sympathy. It is a practical security resource because structures acting against Israel increasingly use technologies and approaches tested in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Netanyahu demands a project against drones, but there is almost no time

The topic is already pressing on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli media reported that he ordered the creation of a special project to combat the drone threat. At the same time, Netanyahu himself warned: do not expect quick miracles, the development of solutions will take time.

But the problem is that the army and border communities have little time. Northern Israel lives under the constant threat of attacks from Lebanon, and Hezbollah is not just launching drones — it is learning, adjusting tactics, and looking for weak points in Israeli defense.

The discussed solutions are different: early visual detection, acoustic sensors, thermal imaging systems, microwave weapons, lasers, the use of artificial intelligence to analyze data from cameras. All this can become part of future protection. But the army faces a simpler and tougher task: to find measures that can be applied right now.

Cheap threats require cheap responses

Israeli drone expert Neri Zin, head of the defense startup Axon Vision, speaks precisely about this: armies cannot wait years for perfect systems to be developed. Simple, quick, and inexpensive solutions are needed for small units, equipment, and forward positions.

His company is working on systems that use visual and thermal cameras. The data is immediately analyzed using artificial intelligence, after which information about the target can be transmitted to weapon systems. At the same time, according to Zin, a person remains involved in decision-making, although in particularly dangerous environments, pre-set autonomous scenarios are possible.

The main lesson here is economic. You cannot endlessly shoot down cheap drones with expensive interceptor missiles. If a device costs $400, and the response to it costs millions, the enemy is already imposing a favorable model of war for itself.

Zin gave a telling example: a general from the UAE spoke about the costs of repelling Iranian attacks when interceptor missiles costing about eight million dollars per unit were used against Shaheds. For Israel, which faces threats from several directions at once, such arithmetic is especially dangerous.

What this changes for Israel

Fiber-optic drones show that even a technologically strong army can face a threat that does not fit into familiar defense schemes. The Iron Dome, aviation, and classic electronic warfare remain important, but they do not cover the entire picture of modern warfare.

Ukraine went through this path earlier not because it wanted to become a laboratory of drone warfare, but because Russia imposed such a reality on it. Now part of this reality is coming to Israel through Hezbollah, Iran, and other hostile structures.

The question is no longer whether Israel will learn from the Ukrainian front. The question is how quickly it can do so — and whether it will manage to adapt the experience before cheap fiber-optic drones become a mass threat to the northern border, bases, armored vehicles, and air defense systems.