Israel lost the price of normalization: Saudi Arabia gained a path to the F-35 and uranium enrichment

American security guarantees, a civilian nuclear program, and advanced weapons were initially supposed to be the price for establishing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Now Riyadh is receiving a significant part of this package without normalization — and this radically changes the strategic balance in the Middle East.

U.S. President Donald Trump approved a 30-year cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. It opens access for American companies to the multibillion-dollar Saudi nuclear market and simultaneously creates a legal path for possible uranium enrichment on the kingdom’s territory.

The enrichment facility itself has not yet been built, the centrifuges are not operational, and the agreement is yet to be reviewed by Congress. However, the political significance of the decision is already clear: Saudi Arabia has come closer to obtaining one of the most sensitive technologies of the modern world without establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

Previously, Washington also approved future deliveries of F-35 fighters to the Saudis and signed a Strategic Defense Agreement with Riyadh. All of this was discussed a few years ago as part of a grand deal, the main result of which for Israel was supposed to be normalization.

There is no normalization. American concessions remain.

Biden’s Grand Deal

In 2023, the Joe Biden administration attempted to assemble a complex trilateral structure.

Saudi Arabia was supposed to officially recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations with it. In return, the United States offered Riyadh enhanced security guarantees, assistance in creating civilian nuclear energy, and freer access to advanced American weapons.

Israel was expected to take steps on the Palestinian front that would allow the Saudi leadership to present the agreement not as a rejection of the Arab position but as part of a broader regional settlement.

In September 2023, Saudi normalization was the main issue at the meeting between Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu. The negotiations included American security guarantees, nuclear assistance to Riyadh, and Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. Netanyahu then spoke of the possibility of a ‘historic peace’ capable of changing Israel’s relations with the Islamic world.

The deal represented both a huge opportunity and a serious risk for Israel.

Recognition by Saudi Arabia could become the most important diplomatic achievement since the agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Other Muslim states could follow Riyadh. A new regional bloc would be formed, focused on containing Iran, economic cooperation, and integrating Israel into the Middle East.

But the price was high. The Saudis demanded a nuclear program, security guarantees, and weapons that could potentially affect Israel’s qualitative military superiority.

The Israeli leadership was ready to discuss this risk, as it expected to achieve a historic result in return.

October 7 disrupted the old structure

The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip practically halted progress toward normalization.

For Saudi Arabia, establishing relations with Israel became politically much more complicated. Riyadh intensified its demand for an end to the war and the creation of a real path to Palestinian statehood.

Meanwhile, U.S.-Saudi negotiations did not cease.

In May 2024, representatives of the Biden administration reported that agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on defense and the civilian nuclear program were almost complete. However, Washington was still trying to keep them as part of a broader deal with Israel. The American structure assumed that Riyadh would receive a civilian nuclear agreement, security guarantees, and a political process on the Palestinian issue, and in return, normalize relations with Israel.

This was a fundamentally important link.

The U.S. could provide Saudi Arabia with the desired technologies and weapons, but normalization remained a condition without which the entire structure should not have worked.

After Trump’s return to the White House, the logic changed. The Saudi-American track began to develop separately from the Saudi-Israeli one.

First security, then F-35

On November 18, 2025, Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed a Strategic Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

The White House stated that the agreement strengthens the more than 80-year-old defense partnership, enhances regional deterrence, facilitates the work of American defense companies in the kingdom, and confirms the U.S. status as Riyadh’s main strategic partner.

Simultaneously, Trump approved a large arms package, including future deliveries of F-35s to Saudi Arabia and the acquisition of nearly 300 American tanks.

It is important to clarify: the Saudi F-35s have not yet been delivered.

The president’s political approval is not the same as aircraft already in service. The deal requires further procedures, including contract execution, production, and agreement on delivery parameters.

However, the decision itself is of historical significance. Until then, Israel was the only Middle Eastern state operating the F-35. Saudi Arabia requested up to 48 such fighters, and in November 2025, Trump publicly confirmed the intention to sell them.

Israel may demand that the Saudi version be limited compared to the Israeli F-35I, and Washington is obliged to consider Israel’s qualitative military superiority. But the fundamental political boundary has already been crossed.

The Strategic Defense Agreement should also not be called a full analogue of NATO’s Article 5.

According to Reuters, Riyadh initially wanted a binding treaty ratified by Congress. Ultimately, the parties signed a more limited agreement that does not contain an automatic U.S. obligation to enter a war in the event of an attack on the kingdom. Nevertheless, it became an important step toward deeper military integration.

Thus, Saudi Arabia did not get everything it demanded, but it received significantly more than before — without recognizing Israel.

The nuclear agreement was the second blow

The next stage was Trump’s approval of the peaceful nuclear agreement.

The document is designed for 30 years and should allow the U.S. government and American companies to participate in the creation of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear industry. It involves projects worth tens of billions of dollars.

For Washington, this is not only a matter of energy and security.

American companies compete for the Saudi market with Russia, China, and South Korea. If the U.S. refuses to cooperate, Riyadh may turn to alternative suppliers, and Washington will lose both commercial contracts and the ability to influence the program’s development.

Saudi Arabia explains its nuclear plans with the economic program Vision 2030. The kingdom seeks to diversify energy, reduce domestic oil consumption, and free up more raw materials for export.

However, the main dispute is not about nuclear power plants but about the nuclear fuel cycle.

The agreement does not contain the so-called ‘gold standard,’ which would prohibit Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. It creates a legal possibility for future cooperation in these areas, although it does not yet oblige the U.S. to transfer the relevant technologies to the Saudis.

According to the Associated Press, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are to conduct a joint study. If it shows that domestic nuclear fuel production is feasible, an enrichment facility may be built in the kingdom.

The American ‘black box’ model is being discussed: sensitive equipment is controlled by U.S. specialists, and the Saudi side does not receive full access to the technology.

But even such a scheme means that dual-use nuclear infrastructure will appear directly in Saudi Arabia.

Why uranium enrichment causes concern

Enrichment does not automatically mean the appearance of a nuclear bomb.

Low-enriched fuel is used in civilian reactors. Creating weapons requires a significantly higher level, as well as the development of a warhead and means of delivery.

But the technological basis remains the same.

A state with centrifuges, trained specialists, uranium reserves, and developed infrastructure can transition much faster from a civilian program to a military one if it makes the corresponding political decision.

This is why Israel and the U.S. have considered Iran’s uranium enrichment as a strategic threat for decades.

Now Washington allows a legal path for similar technology to appear in Saudi Arabia.

Particular concern is caused by the absence of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the agreement. This document provides international inspectors with expanded verification capabilities, including access to undeclared sites and more sudden inspections.

According to Reuters and AP, the obligation to adopt such a protocol is not included in the Saudi-American document. There is also no full ban on enrichment and reprocessing, as in the U.S. agreement with the United Arab Emirates.

The situation is made even more sensitive by the position of Mohammed bin Salman. The Crown Prince has repeatedly stated that Saudi Arabia does not seek a nuclear bomb but will be forced to obtain one if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.

For Israel, this means the risk of a new regional nuclear chain.

If Saudi Arabia gains the right to enrichment, similar capabilities may be demanded by Turkey, Egypt, and other states. The line between peaceful nuclear energy and a potential military reserve will become significantly thinner.

What Saudi Arabia received

The difference between the initial American structure and the current situation is extremely clear:

It is this transition that NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers the main strategic change.

Israel discussed the readiness to take serious risks for normalization. As a result, the risks remained, and the expected diplomatic compensation disappeared.

Why this is a defeat for Israeli diplomacy

Israel cannot prohibit the United States from concluding agreements with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is also an independent state that acts in its own interests.

But the task of Israeli diplomacy was not to completely block U.S.-Saudi rapprochement.

The task was to maintain the link between American concessions and the recognition of Israel.

This link was lost.

Saudi Arabia received a defense agreement, approval of future F-35 deliveries, and access to the American nuclear program. At the same time, Riyadh did not abandon its demands for the creation of a Palestinian state and did not announce readiness to open an embassy in Israel.

Therefore, the problem for Netanyahu is not only that normalization did not take place.

The problem is that its price has already been partially paid by the other side.

Previously, Israel could expect Saudi Arabia to agree to recognition in exchange for strategic guarantees and technologies. Now the Saudis can continue negotiations, already having a significant part of the desired package.

Israel’s negotiating leverage has weakened, and the potential price of future normalization is higher.

Did Israel remain silent

The assertion that Israel did not react at all would be an oversimplification.

The Israeli leadership sought assurances that the sale of F-35s would not destroy the qualitative military superiority of the IDF. Washington can limit the characteristics of Saudi aircraft, weapons, software, and access to the most sensitive systems.

Congress is also still able to influence both arms deals and the nuclear agreement.

The U.S.-Saudi document on peaceful nuclear energy must undergo the legally required review. Congress will have about 90 days of continuous session to oppose it. However, blocking the agreement will be difficult, as supporters of the ban may need a majority sufficient to overcome a possible presidential veto.

But the Israeli reaction mainly concerns limiting the consequences of already made decisions.

It did not return the main condition — mandatory normalization.

Normalization is still possible, but the conditions have changed

To say that Saudi Arabia has completely abandoned relations with Israel is not yet possible.

Riyadh is interested in American investments, technologies, and security. Normalization with Israel can still provide the kingdom with additional opportunities — from trade and high technology to regional infrastructure and cooperation against common threats.

But now Saudi Arabia is able to negotiate from a stronger position.

It has already received a separate defense track. It has come closer to the F-35. It has received an agreement opening the way for American companies to create a nuclear industry. It retained the ability to discuss its own enrichment.

At the same time, Israel did not receive diplomatic relations, open air routes, embassies, economic agreements, and public Saudi recognition.

For Netanyahu’s government, which for years presented peace with Saudi Arabia as a possible historic achievement, such a result is difficult to call anything other than a serious strategic failure.

The main outcome

The U.S. acts primarily in its own interests.

Washington seeks to keep Saudi Arabia within the American sphere of influence, prevent its excessive rapprochement with China and Russia, secure orders for the American defense and nuclear industries, and maintain control over the most sensitive technologies.

Saudi Arabia also consistently defends its own interests. It uses the competition of great powers, security demands, and the significance of its market to obtain increasingly favorable conditions.

Only Israel in this construct has not yet received the expected reward.

NAnews — Israel News notes: the strategic failure does not lie in the very existence of American-Saudi relations. They have been developing for decades and will continue to develop regardless of Jerusalem’s desires.

The failure lies elsewhere.

American guarantees, nuclear technologies, and modern weapons were supposed to be the price for Saudi recognition of Israel. Now a significant part of this price is being paid without recognition.

F-35s are not yet stationed at Saudi airfields. There is no uranium enrichment plant yet. The nuclear agreement has not yet passed all American procedures.

But the previous negotiation formula is already broken.

Saudi Arabia has gained access to almost everything it sought. Israel, however, remains without normalization and with new risks to its military and strategic superiority.