Jerusalem Patriarch Theophilos III has become an instrument of Kremlin influence – The Times of Israel

The Times of Israel article from April 22, 2026, raises a topic that has long ceased to be purely ecclesiastical for the Israeli audience. It concerns not only religious diplomacy but also how Russian influence in Jerusalem may affect Israel’s security, Ukraine’s interests, and the very architecture of influence in the region. At the center of attention is Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, whose contacts with Moscow, according to the author, have transformed over the years from complex relations into a dangerous dependency.

The essence of the publication is that Russia operates not only with missiles, the army, and propaganda. The Kremlin knows how to enter through church structures, symbolic objects, property disputes, pilgrimage, diplomatic contacts, and financial ties. This is why the story around the Jerusalem Patriarchate is no longer an internal dispute of the Orthodox world but a matter with direct geopolitical dimensions.

How Theophilos III’s stance changed

From criticizing Russia to close contacts

Theophilos III has held the post of Patriarch of Jerusalem since 2005. As recently as 2008, he allowed himself anti-Russian statements and publicly spoke negatively about the motives of Russian activity in Jerusalem over the previous century and a half. But within a few years, the trajectory noticeably changed.

In 2013, he received awards from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

In 2019, he visited Moscow, where he met with both Putin and Patriarch Kirill. Immediately after this visit, he was awarded the Order of the Bethlehem Star by the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, one of the key Russian structures present in Jerusalem. This set of episodes in the article is presented not as a random diplomatic courtesy but as a sign of increasingly close ties with the Russian church-state system.

Amman, ROC, and the Ukrainian question

The author considers the meeting in Amman in February 2020, organized with Russian support under the slogan of “preserving unity,” particularly indicative. A limited circle of church leaders attended, while Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew explicitly warned that such an initiative was aimed at undermining the established norms of the Orthodox Church. This is important because it was not a spiritual discussion in a vacuum but an attempt by Moscow to shift the church balance in its favor.

After the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, Theophilos III, as emphasized in the text, repeatedly spoke in defense of the status of the ROC in Ukraine and beyond. In 2022, he met with the Russian ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov, and in 2025 with Kirill in Astana. In the fall of the same year, contacts with the Russian diplomat in Israel continued at events in Lod, where familiar Kremlin theses about the alleged “persecution” of the canonical church in Ukraine were voiced.

Essentially, Theophilos III is presented in the article as a consistent opponent of Ukrainian church independence from Moscow.

Why this is a risk not only for the church

The Russian network in Jerusalem and the figure of Vassian

A separate place in the publication is occupied by Archimandrite Vassian Zmeev, who headed the Russian church mission in Jerusalem in 2023.

According to the author, he became the main intermediary between the ROC and the Jerusalem Patriarchate. His biography itself looks like an alarming marker: the authorities of North Macedonia banned his entry while expelling Russian diplomats due to subversive activities, and Bulgaria previously demanded his departure, citing actions against national security and in the interests of Russian geopolitics. After this, he ended up in Jerusalem.

Such a route is hard to consider a church coincidence. For the Israeli reader, this is especially sensitive because it concerns not just a clergyman but a figure around whom accusations related to political influence and interference have already been voiced. When such an intermediary strengthens ties between the Russian church infrastructure and the most important religious center of Jerusalem, the issue automatically goes beyond canonical protocol.

It is here that the topic becomes broader and clearer in the context in which Nikk.Agency operates — Israel News | Nikk.Agency: Russian penetration into sensitive Middle Eastern institutions can no longer be assessed separately from the war against Ukraine, Russian-Iranian rapprochement, and the struggle for influence in Israel itself. In this case, the church shell does not negate the political content but, on the contrary, makes it more convenient for promotion.

Alexander’s Courtyard as the next front

The key threat pointed out in the material is related to the Alexander Complex in the Old City of Jerusalem.

The author writes that Russia traditionally begins expansion not with weapons but with “restoring property rights” to the property of the former Russian Empire. In this case, the Kremlin seeks to legalize rights to a strategically and symbolically important object, and the Jerusalem Patriarchate, led by Theophilos III, may become its useful ally.

If Moscow manages to secure such an object, the consequences will go far beyond a property dispute. For Ukraine, it will look like symbolic legitimization of Russia amid ongoing aggression. For the Middle East, it will be an increase in Russian influence through a religious-historical asset of the highest sensitivity. For international diplomacy, it will be an additional propaganda resource for the Kremlin, which knows how to turn any compromise into proof of its own “historical correctness.”

What this means for Israel

Security, diplomacy, and the Iran factor

For Israel, the risks described in the article are no less serious. Firstly, strengthening the Russian position in the Old City may create additional tension in relations with European partners. Secondly, given Russia’s cooperation with Iran, any additional foothold for Moscow in such a sensitive place inevitably acquires a security dimension. It concerns potential opportunities for indirect influence, political maneuvers, and the use of religious space contrary to the interests of the Jewish state.

It is important not to oversimplify here. A church contact in itself is not equal to a spy operation.

But when it comes to a structure closely associated with the Russian state, which is simultaneously waging war against Ukraine and helping Iran — Israel’s main external enemy — naivety becomes not pacifism but a strategic mistake.

The author separately emphasizes the financial aspect. The Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society attracts many pilgrims to Israel, bringing significant income to the Jerusalem Patriarchate. Moreover, Russia, according to Theophilos III himself, has repeatedly funded his projects. And where there is a stable material dependency, political influence usually ceases to be an abstraction.

This is the main conclusion for the Israeli audience: the story of Theophilos III is not a plot about who met whom in a cassock. It is a question of how deeply Moscow has managed to integrate into the religious and symbolic nodes of Jerusalem, and what this could mean for a country that already lives under constant external pressure.

For Ukraine, this is yet another example of how Russia uses the church, property, diplomacy, and ideology as tools of the same war.

For Israel, it is a reminder that Russian influence in the Holy City is never purely religious.