The Gulf countries make a sharp anti-Iranian turn, and Zelensky turns it into an opportunity for Ukraine

Vladimir Zelensky’s Middle East tour at the end of March 2026 did not look like a diplomatic excursion through wealthy capitals, but rather a very pragmatic operation at the intersection of war, money, and security. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan — in each of these directions, Kyiv promotes the same idea: Ukraine has been fighting against the same Iranian drones for several years, which are now hitting the region, and this experience can quickly be turned into real defense systems.

For Ukraine itself, the moment is also critical. The war with Russia has entered its fifth year, Washington is increasingly distracted by the conflict around Iran, and the US has already discussed the possibility of redirecting some of the weapons initially intended for Kyiv to the Middle East. Meanwhile, Reuters separately noted: deliveries via NATO continue, but the nervousness in Kyiv is understandable — relying solely on the American shoulder is dangerous now.

Why Gulf countries suddenly turned to Ukrainian experience

The reason is simple and very down-to-earth. Iranian attacks on the region have shown that even wealthy states with expensive air defense systems do not always have a cheap and massive response to a wave of drones. Ukraine sought such a response not in headquarters presentations, but under strikes on Odessa, Kyiv, energy, and the rear. That is why Kyiv sent more than 220 experts to the Middle East to share practices of interception, electronic warfare, and building multi-layered defense.

After the trip, Zelensky spoke about this almost without diplomatic packaging: for Ukraine, it is not only about prestige but about quite specific export of defense systems, military skills, and state knowledge. This is an important formula. Kyiv sells not only hardware. Kyiv sells survival, tested by war.

This is no longer symbolism, but a security market

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan have already been mentioned as countries Ukraine helps with anti-drone protection. And after returning to Kyiv, Zelensky announced that “historic” security agreements had been reached with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, work is underway with Jordan and Kuwait, and Bahrain and Oman have also shown interest.

And here begins the most interesting part for the Israeli audience. Iran has long built a regional model of pressure through missiles, drones, and proxies. Now countries that recently looked at the Ukrainian front rather from the sidelines have begun to take from Kyiv exactly the experience that hits the Iranian strategy in its most vulnerable spot — massive, cheap, exhausting aerial terror.

What Zelensky wants in return

There is no romance here. Kyiv offers anti-drone expertise and in return asks for money, technology, investments, energy support, and closer defense partnership. Reuters reported that on March 27, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia signed a defense cooperation agreement, and on March 28, Kyiv announced a similar 10-year partnership with Qatar; a similar framework was also discussed with the UAE. The topic of diesel supplies, critical for Ukraine’s army and agricultural sector, was raised separately.

So Zelensky in the Gulf is solving several tasks at once. The first is to integrate Ukraine into the new architecture of Middle Eastern security. The second is to obtain resources that will help survive the protracted war with Russia. The third is to open an export corridor for the Ukrainian defense industry, which in the future may become part of post-war economic recovery. Reuters directly wrote that Ukrainian drone and interceptor manufacturers see the current crisis as a chance to turn frontline solutions into a large international market.

It is here that the phrase NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sounds not like an editorial cliché, but as a point where two wars converge. Because for Israel in this story, not only Zelensky himself and not only his tour are important. More important is that Gulf countries have begun to look at the Ukrainian war as a source of practical answers against Iran, and this already changes the regional logic.

The American factor has not disappeared, but has become less reliable

Another layer of this trip is US politics. Zelensky directly told Reuters that Washington’s focus on Iran affects the Ukrainian track and increases pressure on Kyiv. And on March 26, Reuters recounted a Washington Post publication that the Pentagon is considering redirecting some interceptor missiles from the Ukrainian direction to the Middle East, although NATO emphasizes: already paid deliveries continue. Translated from diplomatic language, this means one thing: Ukraine is in a hurry to insure its risks.

What all this means for Israel

For Israel, this story is not about the external background, but about practice. The region is beginning to integrate Ukrainian military experience into its own defense system against the Iranian threat. This means that the front between Kyiv and Tehran can no longer be considered as a separate plot “somewhere in Europe.” It is increasingly connecting with Middle Eastern reality — through drones, intelligence, air defense, infrastructure, and even through the arms market.

There is also another stroke, unpleasant but important. In an interview with Axios, Zelensky said that after the start of the war with Iran, other countries in the region asked for Ukrainian help, but Israel did not. He also noted that he has not spoken with the Israeli prime minister for two years. For the Israeli reader, this is a signal that is hard to ignore: Kyiv has already become a supplier of in-demand anti-drone expertise for part of the Middle East, but the Ukrainian-Israeli channel in this topic is still far from full capacity.

In the dry residue, the picture is this. Zelensky is not just traveling around the Gulf countries and not just asking for help against the backdrop of the war with Russia. He is trying to integrate Ukraine into a new regional balance, where the Iranian threat makes Ukrainian frontline experience a valuable asset. And if this scheme works, Kyiv will receive not only money and agreements but also new political weight — no longer as a petitioner, but as a security supplier. For Israel, this should be read very carefully.