Xi is not creating a new alliance with Russia; it is more tactical cooperation than an alliance.

The recent summit in China has spawned many myths that have begun to spread actively in the media. It is worth understanding where these misconceptions come from.

The first myth is that the attitude towards Putin has sharply improved. For example, a year ago, a similar SCO summit was held in Astana, and if you look at the materials from that time, you can see many similarities with the current assessments.

The main difference in this summit is the absence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

However, it is worth noting that the warming of relations between India and Russia began long before the introduction of American sanctions. In July 2024, Modi visited Moscow, where, despite the Terrible shelling of Ukraine, he called for an end to the conflict and even hugged Putin. Overall, the attitude towards the Russian president in the global southern political space has not undergone drastic changes, yet myths continue to arise.

The second myth about the creation of a military-political alliance between China, Russia, Iran, and India can be divided into two parts.

First — there are no alliances between India and China, and the likelihood of their appearance is very small. As for the interaction between Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran, this is not news. However, one cannot speak of a military-political alliance, at least at this stage. Each side does not want, or rather cannot, wage wars on behalf of another. China, for example, will not fight for Russia, and the experience of Russian operations in Syria demonstrates how Moscow resolves its issues.

On the contrary, the world is unstable, and in recent years it has de facto formed as bipolar, although it is still perceived in terms of the Cold War. The main difference in the modern era is the desire of hegemons to stay away from the conflicts of their partners. The maximum one can expect is quick local operations, similar to US actions against Iran, where the “dirty” work is often done by someone else.

Geopolitical fault lines are now drawn not by value recognition but rather by where the weapons come from. Thus, India is capable of acquiring S-400 systems from Russia, but then, like Turkey, it will most likely not be able to use them.

The third myth claims that Azerbaijan and Armenia were not invited due to India’s fault, and the role of the US in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not the least. The fact is that China views the SCO organization as its project, in which Turkey becomes redundant due to its military power. This is especially important since Turkey could become an ally against Russia in the Black Sea region.

The fourth myth concerns the improvement of relations between Beijing and Moscow. Against the backdrop of economic negotiations between Russia and the US, the Chinese side readily concluded an agreement with the Russians, while trade discussions remained at the previous level, and Beijing will continue to act as a buyer for Russia. In the future, arms supplies from China to Russia are unlikely to occur.

China is not interested in Russia’s victory (nor Ukraine’s). Beijing needs a weak Russia. As for Ukraine, a stable independent Ukraine with access to the Black Sea is of interest to China, especially if it joins the EU.

Relations between Russia and China maintain the current state. At the summit in Shanghai, Putin achieved that Xi promised to maintain trade relations, but the continued depletion of the benefits from oil purchases intended for India puts the Russian economy in a difficult position.

The fifth myth concludes with Russia’s statement of readiness to create joint Russian-American-Chinese enterprises for the infrastructural development of the Arctic. Joint partnerships are unlikely, and if anything happens, it borders on separate agreements between Russia and the US or Russia and China. Putin’s goal is to become a link between Washington and Beijing. Globally, this is an unachievable task, but in local trade routes, it is achievable.

In conclusion, China cannot be ignored. It is very likely that the further development of the world, possibly a truce, will depend on negotiations between the US and China. Nevertheless, there is a persistent misconception that China will not appear in this formula and will not become the second pole.

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