- December 3, 2025
- 3:14 pm
- Ukraine
“When I try to assess Ukraine’s losses as a result of the war, I come up with a terrifying figure — 10 million people. This is the ‘demographic abyss’.
Ukraine is experiencing not just a temporary demographic failure, but a structural crisis that is already determining the country’s future for decades to come. The main conclusion of experts is that there will be no baby boom after the war. And this is not “pessimism,” but solid analytics based on numbers, historical parallels, and the everyday experience of generations.
This topic goes far beyond statistics: it lies at the core of economic recovery, security, mobilization resources, and the state’s ability to hold territory. Demography is a strategy for national survival.
“I don’t believe in a baby boom after the war” — why the expert speaks so confidently about this
The director of the Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine named after M.V. Ptukha, Ella Libanova, in an interview (December 3, 2025, Ukr.) with “RBC-Ukraine” said a phrase that seemed too harsh to many:
“I don’t believe in a baby boom after the war. It won’t happen.”
Later, in an interview, she clarified:
“There won’t be such a birth explosion as there was after World War II.”
Her position is based on several key factors:
The family model was different then.
Children were part of the economic system. Families needed working hands. Life was cheaper, standards were lower.Modern society is different.
Families plan children, calculate budgets, assess risks.Women have opportunities that didn’t exist 80 years ago.
Career, education, freedom of choice.Contraception has become the norm.
This sharply reduces the likelihood of unplanned children, which were common in the USSR and Europe in the 1940s-50s.
To explain the scale of the differences, Libanova gave a personal example:
her grandmother, after returning to Kyiv in 1944, lived with two children right in the entrance of a destroyed house.
And this was considered “normal” because people were simply surviving.
Today, Ukrainians live in a different system of values and requirements. A family in 2025 will not have a child “in ruins” because the standards of quality and safety are different.
Numbers show: childbirth has almost stopped
Before the full-scale invasion, in 2021, the birth rate was about 2.1 children per woman. This was already low.
Now, according to Libanova’s calculations, the figure has dropped to 0.7.
What does 0.7 mean?
The level of countries that have experienced devastating wars (Syria, some regions of Afghanistan).
A drop below the level at which a generation can reproduce itself.
A “demographic pit” that creates a gap for three future generations.
Even if the war ends tomorrow, the figure may rise no higher than 1.6.
But natural reproduction requires a minimum of 2.15.
This means: even the best reforms can only slow down the decline, but not stop it completely.
Why money doesn’t work: social benefits are not a stimulus for birth rates
Many politicians propose increasing payments for the birth of a child. Libanova responds unequivocally:
money does not stimulate the desire to have children.
Yes, payments help support a child. But:
they do not create a sense of security,
do not compensate for anxiety,
do not reduce the fear of living in a country constantly attacked by Russia.
People have children if they are confident in the future. Financial assistance is support, but not a motivator.
Losses: Ukraine has lost about 10 million people
According to Libanova’s estimates, Ukraine’s demographic losses due to the war have already reached up to 10 million people.
This figure includes four groups:
The deceased — military and civilians.
Emigration — millions have left.
Those who will not return — a significant part has settled in the EU.
Unborn children — hundreds of thousands who will not be born due to the drop in birth rates.
“As for migration, the situation is roughly as follows: there are Eurostat data, you won’t find others.
According to these data, about 4.3 million Ukrainians emigrated. You can add another 700 thousand who are in Britain, the USA, Canada, Latin America, Georgia, Israel, and Moldova. That is, about 5 million of our military migrants abroad. A third of them are children and teenagers under 18. And only 6% are in the age category of 65 and older.”
That is, the country has lost not only people — it has lost future generations.
This is a blow to:
the economy,
the tax base,
the army,
infrastructure load,
the pension system,
social structures.
What will happen in 10–20 years: demographers’ scenarios
Experts model three possible scenarios for the development of Ukraine’s population by 2040.
1. Optimistic (unlikely)
end of the war,
partial return of migrants,
active family policy.
Population: 33–35 million.
2. Basic (most likely)
moderate repatriation,
birth rate growth to 1.5–1.6,
continued migration to the EU.
Population: 28–30 million.
3. Pessimistic
continuation of the war or prolonged freezing,
low birth rate,
increased emigration.
Population: 24–26 million.
This means that Ukraine will become a country with a population level of the Czech Republic or Australia — but with a territory several times larger.
Why this topic is so critical right now
Demography is not only about birth rates. It’s about:
the country’s mobilization resource;
economic stability;
the ability to hold territories;
the future of the pension system;
infrastructure restoration;
security;
Ukraine’s place in world politics.
If systematic work does not begin now, in 20 years the country will face a personnel collapse, a shortage of doctors, teachers, engineers, and workers.
This is why Libanova speaks so harshly about unpleasant things: it is an attempt to warn the country in advance.
Fatigue does not mean we are ready to give up. How Ukrainians have changed since 2022
The full-scale war has changed Ukraine more deeply than any political or social reform. These changes are not always visible from the outside, but they are felt by everyone who survived February 24 and everything that happened after. And demographer Ella Libanova in her interviews describes these processes much more accurately than most political scientists.
We have become much more united
According to Libanova, such a level of unity in Ukraine has never existed. Not even in 2014, not even during the Maidan.
Since 2022, Ukrainians have acted as a community, not as separate groups.
The formation of a political Ukrainian nation has accelerated many times over. This process began back in 2004, after the Orange Revolution, then intensified in 2014, but only the full-scale war brought it to a stage where ethnic origin ceased to play a significant role.
We are less and less dividing ourselves into “east,” “west,” “Russian-speaking,” “Ukrainian-speaking.”
We are more often responding: “we are Ukrainians.”
From distrust of the state — to the realization of a common goal
Before the war, Ukrainians traditionally assessed the country and themselves differently.
They said about the state: “catastrophe, can’t live, the government is not right,” and about themselves — “nothing, we manage.”
Now the picture is different.
Despite the decline in living standards, despite fatigue,
trust in the government has grown.
And this trust is based not on abstract slogans, but on concrete actions.
The president stayed in the country.
His family stayed in the country.
The local government proved effective thanks to decentralization.
The territorial defense was able to work precisely because decentralization gave it tools.
Libanova directly says:
if there had been no deepening of decentralization in 2015–2020, territorial defense would not have taken place. And that means the defense of Kyiv in 2022 could have failed.
Disappointment and fatigue — they exist. But they are not equal to defeat
Libanova emphasizes the main point:
Ukrainians are tired, but this does not mean a desire to stop or surrender.
And this is a key point that external observers often misunderstand.
How can there not be fatigue if:
the night passes under sirens,
in the morning you need to go to work,
there is no light at home,
children study in shelters,
loved ones are at the front,
every day brings losses?
Fatigue is part of life in a warring country.
But it does not destroy the will to resist.
According to Libanova:
“The lion’s share of Ukrainians understands that we have nowhere to retreat. If we lose this war, there will be no Ukraine and no Ukrainian nation.”
This understanding keeps society whole.
Not propaganda, not fear, and not political slogans — but understanding the real scale of the threat.
A common sense of destiny — the main resource the enemy does not have
In two years of war, Ukrainians have become more mature, tougher, more cautious, but at the same time more conscious.
A society that often argued about secondary things before 2022 now understands the main thing:
it depends on us whether the state will exist;
no one will come “to do it for us”;
survival is a common project, not a task for the government or the army separately.
This internal transformation is one of the most powerful factors of resistance.
While Russia builds war on coercion, Ukraine holds on to the conscious choice of millions of people.
Conclusion: there will be no baby boom, but there is time to build a new strategy
Ukraine is entering a long period of demographic contraction. A baby boom is impossible — neither from a psychological point of view, nor from an economic point of view, nor from the point of view of modern lifestyle.
But this is not a sentence.
The country can build a new model:
support for young families,
childhood infrastructure,
repatriation programs,
incentives for the return of specialists,
cultural policy focused on the family.
The main thing is to recognize the problem and start acting.
The editorial team of NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers the topic of demography one of the most important for understanding the future of Ukraine and its recovery after victory.