Ukraine has determined with whom it will allow multiple citizenships: details – and why the issue with Israel remains open

Ukraine is entering a new phase of its national policy. On October 8, 2025, the Government of Ukraine approved a resolution developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which establishes criteria for selecting foreign states with which a simplified procedure for obtaining Ukrainian citizenship will be introduced.

This is not just about the right to have two passports. It is an attempt to rethink the very concept of citizenship: as a legal, cultural, and geopolitical affiliation simultaneously. But the new law, like most Ukrainian reforms, leaves more questions than answers. One of them is Israel.

Law No. 11469: A Step Towards Unification or a New System of Filters

Adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on June 18 and signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 15, 2025, Law No. 11469 will come into force on January 16, 2026. It opens the possibility of multiple citizenships — but only with states recognized as “allied and friendly.”

Before the adoption of this law, Ukraine officially prohibited multiple citizenships. Article 4 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly states: “In Ukraine, there is a single citizenship.” This means that the state does not recognize the possession of a second passport, even if a person obtained it in another country. Legally, a citizen of Ukraine who became a citizen of Israel, Germany, or Canada continues to remain a citizen of Ukraine until they renounce citizenship through a presidential decree.

Law No. 11469 does not abolish this principle but introduces an exception: the possibility of dual citizenship only with countries recognized by the government as allied or friendly. Article 6 of the new law explicitly states:

“Multiple citizenship can be introduced only with states determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as allied or friendly, taking into account the criteria established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.”

For all other states not included in this list, a strict prohibition remains. Moreover, the new law adds a clause:

“Acquisition by a citizen of Ukraine of citizenship of a state not recognized as allied or friendly is grounds for the loss of Ukrainian citizenship.”

In other words, after the law comes into force, Ukrainian citizens who obtain passports from countries not recognized as allied or friendly may automatically lose Ukrainian citizenship.

This means that the provisions of the law do not apply to countries against which Ukraine has imposed sanctions or which are recognized as aggressors and their allies. These statuses are enshrined in decisions of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) and presidential decrees — in particular, regarding Russia (Law No. 2198-IX), Belarus (NSDC decision No. 726/2022), and Iran (NSDC decision No. 757/2022).

In other words, Ukrainian citizens who obtain passports from these countries will not be able to retain Ukrainian citizenship, as such states cannot legally be recognized as allied or friendly.

Thus, the reform does not abolish the previous prohibition but turns it into a selective admission system: Ukraine creates a list of trusted countries with which multiple citizenships are allowed, maintaining full control over who can be its citizen by right and who only by origin.

Allies by Criteria, Not Sympathy

At the first stage, the government (President Zelensky named on August 26, 2025) names five countries: Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, the USA, and Canada.

In the text of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution from October 8, 2025, which approved the criteria for selecting countries, it is explicitly stated:

“The list of specific foreign states will be determined separately by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.”

That is — no deadlines are set.

What This Means Legally

• The government has only approved the criteria by which countries will be evaluated.
• The list of allied and friendly states must be approved by a separate decision of the Cabinet, after consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Law No. 11469 comes into force on January 16, 2026, so it is logical to expect that the Cabinet will publish this list by the end of 2025 so that the law can be effectively applied.

And this has already sparked lively discussion — after all, hundreds of thousands of people of Ukrainian origin live in Israel, who have formally retained Ukrainian citizenship for many years. Can they fall under the law — or will Israel be left out of the list of “allies or friendly”?

It’s Not About Passports, It’s About Trust

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, presenting the document at a government meeting, noted:

“Potentially, this is about increasing the number of Ukrainian citizens — after all, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants will be able to restore their legal connection with the Motherland. But the main thing remains the state interest.”

According to Sybiha, the law is not an emotional but a strategic step: a tool of foreign policy, where the scale of the diaspora is not as important as the degree of trust between countries.

“We have clearly defined a single list of criteria. This is not a gesture of gratitude, but a matter of national security and a systematic approach,” emphasized the Foreign Minister.

Criteria by Which Ukraine Will Choose Allies

The Cabinet of Ministers resolution from October 8, 2025, defines 9 criteria for countries with which Ukraine can introduce the institution of multiple citizenships.

Criteria to be considered:

1. membership in the Group of Seven (G7);
2. membership in the European Union (EU);
3. imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation for aggression against Ukraine;
4. support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
5. position during voting in international organizations;
6. presence of strategic or other types of partnership relations;
7. level and prospects of development of bilateral relations;
8. financial support for Ukraine;
9. other criteria that may have a significant impact on ensuring Ukraine’s national interests in foreign and domestic policy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized: the list of countries is formed separately, and no country automatically receives allied status. This is a diplomatic assessment, not a demographic gesture.

Israel and Ukraine: A Shared History Without a Formal Alliance

Israel and Ukraine have maintained diplomatic relations since 1992. During this time, dozens of agreements have been signed: in agriculture, medicine, cybersecurity, and science. In 2024, trade between the countries exceeded $1.3 billion, and Israel’s humanitarian aid to Ukraine reached 25 million shekels.

According to the Embassy of Ukraine in Israel, about 595,000 people of Ukrainian origin live in Israel. This is the largest Ukrainian diaspora outside Europe.

And yet, despite cultural and human closeness, there is no official strategic partnership between Kyiv and Jerusalem. Israel has not joined sanctions against Russia, maintaining a neutral position on military aid issues.

Historical Roots of the Legal Paradox

When Ukrainians moved to Israel in the 1990s, they went through the procedure of leaving “for permanent residence” through OVIR, which required surrendering their internal passport and signing a statement of renunciation of citizenship.

However, Ukrainian citizenship is terminated only after a presidential decree — and such decrees were not issued in most cases.

In practice, to arrange aliyah through the Jewish Agency “Sokhnut” and the Israeli Embassy in Kyiv, a package of documents was required, including a certificate of permission to leave for permanent residence from Ukraine. This certificate was issued by OVIR only after surrendering the internal passport and submitting a statement of renunciation of citizenship. Without it, the Israeli embassy generally did not accept documents for repatriation. Thus, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Israeli and Ukrainian sides effectively coordinated the process of renouncing citizenship, although legally these were independent procedures.

Israeli structures played a key role in this process — primarily the “Sokhnut” (Jewish Agency for Israel), which provided organizational support and verification of Jewish origin.

The situation began to change after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. After 2014, the Israeli embassy began accepting documents without requiring a certificate of renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship, especially from refugees and displaced persons. At that time, “Sokhnut” for the first time arranged aliyah exclusively under the Israeli Law of Return, without requiring Ukrainian confirmation of renunciation of citizenship.

In fact, this became a humanitarian compromise between the two states: Israel proceeded from the principle of protecting its compatriots, and Ukraine — from the impossibility of physically controlling migration flows in wartime conditions.

The Overwhelming Majority of Repatriates Have Not Legally Lost Ukrainian Citizenship

According to the “Sokhnut” agency and the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel (CBS), from 1990 to 2005, between 400,000 and 500,000 Ukrainian citizens moved to Israel.

Reports from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine show much smaller figures for loss of citizenship — only a few tens of thousands over the entire period of independence.

In other words, the overwhelming majority of repatriates have not legally lost Ukrainian citizenship, even if they submitted a statement of renunciation. This uncertainty persists to this day: many Ukrainians in Israel, lacking Ukrainian passports, continue to be listed as Ukrainian citizens in registers.

According to the COI Report on Citizenship and Immigration Legislation in Ukraine (Government of Netherlands, 2024), the procedure for renouncing Ukrainian citizenship remains one of the longest in Europe — up to three years even with a complete set of documents.

Where Israel Does Not Fit the Criteria of an Ally

If we consider the nine criteria approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for determining allied and friendly states, the situation with Israel remains ambiguous.

Israel is not part of the G7 and is not a member of the European Union, although it actively cooperates with the EU in scientific, medical, and technological programs. It also has not officially joined international sanctions against Russia, limiting itself to controlling the export of sensitive technologies and dual-use equipment.

Israel’s position in international organizations fluctuates: in the early years of the war, it abstained from several votes in the UN General Assembly, citing the need to maintain neutrality on issues related to Syria and Iran. However, the latest UN resolution — A/RES/ES-11/7 of February 24, 2025, concerning peace and Ukraine’s territorial integrity, — showed even greater distance: Israel was among the countries that voted against the document.

At the same time, Israel supports Ukraine in the humanitarian sphere, provides medical and technical assistance, and develops cooperation in digital technologies. Memorandums of cooperation exist between the countries, but there is no formal agreement on strategic partnership or alliance. Trade turnover exceeds $1.3 billion a year, especially in the fields of medicine and IT, but the military component is absent.

Israel’s financial support for Ukraine is limited to humanitarian aid without military involvement. In matters of security, Israel adheres to a cautious line, avoiding open military coordination with Kyiv. This directly concerns the last criterion designated by the Cabinet — ensuring Ukraine’s national interests. Israel’s restrained position in the field of defense interaction and the absence of an official alliance agreement reduce the likelihood of the country being included in the first list of states where the institution of multiple citizenships will be implemented.

Thus, out of the nine criteria by which Ukraine determines allied states, Israel fully meets three, partially meets four, and does not meet two key ones: participation in international alliances and sanction policy against Russia.

Caution Instead of Euphoria

Ukraine is moving towards selective openness. Law No. 11469 is designed not for everyone, but for those who supported the country in its most difficult years. Israel helped Ukraine humanitarianly, accepted refugees, and created the “Kohav Magen David” field hospital in the Lviv region. But it has not joined the sanctions regime and maintains strategic restraint in relations with Moscow.

This makes it a human ally, but not a formal partner. For Kyiv, Israel remains a special case — important, close, but politically balanced.

Conclusion: Alliance on Pause

Multiple citizenship is not a gift to the diaspora, but a tool of national policy. And while Ukraine seeks a balance between loyalty and security, Israel may remain outside the list of allied countries — at least until foreign policy priorities are revised.

Whether Israel will be recognized by Ukraine as “allied and friendly” is a matter of diplomacy, not law. Meanwhile, thousands of Ukrainians in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Ashdod remain de facto Ukrainian citizens, but not de jure. And the new law may either restore this status to them or finally put an end to the history of dual affiliation.