Protests in Iran: Is escalation to war in the Middle East possible?

Anti-government protests in Iran, the largest since 2022, have been ongoing for several days and go beyond the usual surges of discontent. Donald Trump publicly stated the possibility of US intervention in case of force being used against demonstrators. In response, the entourage of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warns of the risk of large-scale destabilization of the entire region.

This rhetoric emphasizes that it is not only about internal unrest but also about the intersection of internal crisis with external pressure.

Economy as a Trigger

The main reason for the protests is the sharp decline in living standards. The collapse of the rial has deprived income and savings from those segments of the population that were recently considered the social support of the regime. This is a qualitative change: not only traditional groups of discontent are protesting, but also people who were previously oriented towards stability at any cost.

At the same time, expectations of a quick collapse of power have not been met. Instead of a revolutionary explosion, a different dynamic has emerged — a slow, heavy realization of systemic defeat. The protests are not so much radicalizing as they are expanding and deepening in their social base.

Who Iranians Blame

Within Iranian society, there is no single explanation for what is happening. Some place responsibility on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, accusing it of militarizing the economy and foreign policy adventures. Others blame moderate politicians — including President Masoud Pezeshkian — for their inability to change course.

There are also those who directly point to Ali Khamenei or the very model of Islamic governance as the source of the crisis. The range of opinions is extremely wide, and this becomes a problem: society criticizes but does not formulate a single alternative project.

The key question remains unanswered — if not an Islamic state, then what instead?

Weakness of the Opposition and Limits of Dialogue

The Iranian opposition remains fragmented and institutionally weak. Attempts to create a united front regularly fail, reducing the likelihood of a quick political breakthrough. Against this backdrop, Pezeshkian tries to engage in dialogue with society, which noticeably distinguishes him from his predecessors.

However, this approach balances on the edge. For part of the population, it looks like a chance for evolutionary changes. For conservative elites, it appears as a manifestation of weakness that could undermine the foundations of the system.

“Velayat-e Faqih” as a Systemic Node

The principle of “velayat-e faqih” is a key pillar of the Iranian political model. The Supreme Religious Leader controls not only the spiritual sphere but also foreign policy, the army, intelligence services, and strategic state decisions. This principle was enshrined in the Constitution after the 1979 revolution and remains the foundation of the theocracy.

The scenario of significant changes is directly related to the figure of Khamenei. In the event of his departure, a revision of the very structure of power is possible if the elites conclude that “velayat-e faqih” has become a hindrance to the regime’s survival. This is not inevitable, but it is not fantasy either.

External Pressure and the Israel Factor

The situation is exacerbated by the external context. Israel consistently conducts informational, cyber, and psychological operations against Iran, and the threat of direct military escalation remains real — especially in the first half of 2026.

For Benjamin Netanyahu, the domestic political calendar is also important: the election factor can influence the harshness of decisions. In this sense, the Iranian crisis ceases to be solely Tehran’s internal affair.

Trump and the Risk of Backfire

Donald Trump’s statements about possible US intervention can play a dual role. On one hand, it is a signal of support to the protesters. On the other hand, in Iran, such threats are often perceived as a humiliation of national dignity, which can consolidate part of society around the regime.

Pezeshkian tries to avoid this scenario by betting on internal dialogue and reducing the degree of confrontation. But this approach may provoke a harsh reaction from radical conservatives.

Window of Uncertainty

Iran today is in a state of rare convergence of internal and external pressure factors. Economic crisis, loss of a sense of security, regional threats, and the erosion of the legitimacy of power increase the likelihood of change.

However, Iranian society remains heterogeneous, and the development scenarios are extremely risky. There are no quick solutions, and any abrupt movement may lead not to reforms but to a new phase of instability.

Context of Expertise

The author’s analysis is based on the assessments of Orientalist and political scientist Igor Semivolos — Executive Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, a specialist in the history and cultural anthropology of the region.

It is in such a complex intertwining of internal crises and regional politics that the situation in Iran is being considered today — and its development is closely monitored by NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency.