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Russian military sources claimed that Ukraine is using satellite terminals from the Israeli company HiSKY to control long-range drones over Russian territory. They showed photos of dismantled equipment and claim to have obtained one of the terminals from a Ukrainian strike drone.

Author: Victoria Katsman, NANews — News of Israel

The story gained wide circulation on November 6, 2026, when it was picked up by Russian Telegram channels. However, the first detailed documented statement during our investigation appeared earlier — on October 29. At that time, the Russian “Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossiya” (KCPN) published a video dedicated to the HiSKY SmartLITE SIRIUS 16×16 satellite terminal.

Ukrainian radio communication specialist Sergey Beskrestnov, known as “Flash,” neither confirmed nor denied this information.

NANews studied Russian publications, Ukrainian technical research, documentation from the Israeli manufacturer, materials from the Israeli press, and the history of HiSKY’s international partnerships.

It was established that this is an existing technology designed for communication with mobile objects. However, there remains a significant gap in evidence between its technical capabilities and the claim of its use by Ukrainian strike drones.

Where did the reports about Israeli terminals come from

On October 29, 2026, the Russian KCPN posted a six-minute video claiming to have received a satellite terminal for research, allegedly removed from a Ukrainian aircraft-type drone.

The authors claimed that the equipment allows maintaining communication through satellite networks available over Russia, and therefore represents an alternative to the American Starlink.

KCPN also linked the alleged use of terminals to strikes on Russian communication facilities in border areas. No independent evidence of this connection was presented.

On November 6, the Telegram channel “Military Informant” published photos of the equipment with a reference to the specialized channel “Payload” (@payloadUAV). The images show a metal case with cooling fins, electronic components, markings, and HiSKY promotional materials.

The equipment was described as SmartLight Sirius 16×16. In other publications, the spelling SmartLITE SIRIUS is found — this is the designation used in the current line of the manufacturer.

There is also an earlier trace. In an available technical summary dated August 29, 2026, the dismantling of the HiSKY terminal is already mentioned. However, it talks about its discovery on “Russian boards,” which contradicts later claims of the equipment’s Ukrainian origin. It is impossible to verify the initial date of the find and the ownership of the device based on this retelling.

Therefore, October 29 remains the most reliably documented date of a specific public statement by KCPN.

The problem with all these reports is the same: the photos allow matching individual elements with the manufacturer’s products, but do not prove on which specific drone the device was located.

A continuous history of the terminal’s discovery has not been published, there is no independent verification of its origin, and there is no confirmation that the device provided an active communication channel during a combat flight.

What they say in Ukraine: “Flash”, Mind.ua, and drone manufacturer Fire Point

On November 6, 2026, Sergey Beskrestnov commented on the spread of Russian reports.

He began his publication with the words:

“I do not confirm or deny this information from the enemy.”

Beskrestnov expressed surprise at the increased attention of Russian media to long-existing satellite communication technologies. According to his explanation, flat electronically controlled antennas are capable of tracking satellites without the usual rotating dish. Similar developments are also available from other companies, such as the American Kymeta.

Speaking about HiSKY, the specialist indicated the terminal’s dimensions of approximately 60 by 30 centimeters, a weight of about six kilograms, and a data transfer rate of up to 2 Mbps. He warned that the large delay when using geostationary satellites limits the possibilities of real-time operation.

This is a technical comment, not a report on the equipment of Ukrainian drones.

On November 2, four days before the new wave of Telegram publications, the Ukrainian publication Mind.ua released a large study on Starlink alternatives.

Journalist Evgenia Podgaina compared European satellite networks Eutelsat OneWeb, SES, and Hisdesat, studied communication terminals for mobile objects, and dedicated a separate section to the Israeli HiSKY.

The conclusion was more cautious than the Russian headlines: the technology is suitable for certain tasks of unmanned aviation, but the study did not provide independent confirmation of its use by Ukrainian long-range drones.

On November 7, the specialized Ukrainian publication DefPulse also analyzed KCPN reports and equipment characteristics.

At the same time, the topic of alternative satellite communication is indeed relevant for Ukraine.

On October 30, 2026, the head of the Ukrainian company Fire Point, Irina Terekh, told Reuters that her enterprise had developed ways to complete tasks without dependence on the Starlink satellite channel.

She emphasized that Fire Point systems are designed to complete flight missions even in the absence of satellite communication. In her assessment, existing alternative solutions provide only 15–20% of the capabilities that would be available with full Starlink operation over Russia.

Terekh did not disclose technical details and did not mention HiSKY.

The chronology of American communication restrictions is also important. After reports of reduced allowable terminal speed in October, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine announced on October 24 the restoration of Starlink and Starshield operation at speeds over 400 km/h.

Thus, the search for alternatives does not mean a complete abandonment of the American system by Ukraine. It is more about reducing dependence on a single supplier and ensuring communication where the usual commercial Starlink is unavailable.

What SmartLITE SIRIUS can do and why it is not a second Starlink

HiSKY develops flat satellite terminals with electronically controlled antennas. Such devices allow maintaining communication with mobile platforms without a bulky mechanism that rotates a conventional satellite dish.

One of the current family models is the SmartLITE SIRIUS 16×16 Ku. The numbers indicate the structure of the antenna array: 16 by 16 elements, a total of 256.

In the official technical documentation of Smartellite Dynamic 16×16, a predecessor version of this family, dimensions of 604×290×30 millimeters, a weight of about six kilograms, and support for satellite systems in different orbits are indicated.

The declared typical speeds are 7–1500 Kbps when communicating through geostationary satellites and 0.5–20 Mbps for low-orbit mode. These are technical documentation indicators, not measurements of the operation of the alleged Ukrainian equipment.

In a press release dated February 21, 2024, the company separately reported the possibility of transmitting up to 2 Mbps through a geostationary network.

For a reader unfamiliar with satellite communication, the difference between orbits is fundamental.

Geostationary satellites are located approximately 35,786 kilometers above the equator. They provide communication with large territories, but the signal takes more time to travel the distance to the device and back.

Low-orbit satellites are significantly closer to Earth. Therefore, delays are usually less, but the satellites constantly move relative to the user, and the equipment must ensure their tracking.

The HiSKY system can work with various satellite infrastructures if technical compatibility and necessary access are provided.

For a drone, the satellite channel does not necessarily have to continuously transmit high-quality video. Sometimes it is necessary to exchange relatively small amounts of data: equipment status, service messages, or individual commands.

At the same time, claiming that such a system is generally incapable of transmitting video would be incorrect. Capabilities depend on the specific network and available speed.

However, HiSKY is not a full-fledged analogue of Starlink.

Starlink relies on its own numerous SpaceX satellite constellation. HiSKY primarily operates as a terminal supplier and service integrator for third-party satellite operators.

The possibility of connection over a specific territory depends not only on the satellite’s location but also on the provided access, coverage, ground infrastructure, and other technical conditions.

Therefore, the Russian claim that the terminal can use any available satellite and is guaranteed to work over all of Russia is not confirmed by the manufacturer’s documentation alone.

Who is behind HiSKY: Rosh HaAyin, international investors, and a former Mossad chief

HiSKY is an Israeli company founded in 2015. Its office is located in Rosh HaAyin, a city in central Israel.

Initially, the company developed satellite communication for industries: agriculture, remote facilities, transportation, energy, and maritime shipping.

On May 16, 2024, the Israeli business publication Globes published an article by Meital Weitzberg about a small company from Rosh HaAyin that began competing for clients with Elon Musk’s solutions.

The publication reported that HiSKY was founded by Shahar Kravitz, Moti Litochevsky, and Yaron Shahar. At the time of publication, the company had attracted about $60 million in investments and had approximately 70 employees.

Among the investors were mentioned Singapore’s ST Engineering, structures of an investment fund from the United Arab Emirates, the Ruben brothers, and the satellite operator Intelsat.

The most notable name for the current story is Tamir Pardo.

Pardo headed the Israeli foreign intelligence service “Mossad” from 2011 to 2016. After leaving the service, he engaged in entrepreneurial projects, including in the field of cybersecurity.

According to Globes on May 16, 2024, Pardo held the position of president of HiSKY. In an interview, he spoke about the company’s development from a small enterprise in Rosh HaAyin to a recognizable participant in the international satellite communications market.

Here it is necessary to correct an error found in Russian publications: the former Mossad chief was not named the CEO of HiSKY in the Globes article.

Moreover, on January 22, 2026, the Israeli publication Chiportal reported on the appointment of Erez Antebi as CEO, replacing co-founder Shahar Kravitz. There is insufficient information in the studied materials to reliably establish Pardo’s current status.

The participation of a former intelligence chief in the leadership of a technology company does not prove that “Mossad” is involved in its commercial deals or military projects.

However, the defense orientation of the business is not a secret.

On the official HiSKY website today, it is directly stated that the company is primarily focused on tactical communication for defense forces. Its solutions are designed for managing various platforms on land, in the air, and at sea.

This significantly differs from the image of an exclusively civilian communication provider for tractors and trucks that emerged from past publications.

Whose satellites does HiSKY use: Italy, USA, Europe, and the old Ella1 project

HiSKY does not manage its own large satellite constellation like Starlink. It provides clients with equipment and services using partner infrastructure.

Among such companies mentioned in open materials are Intelsat, Hispasat, Andesat, and Hughes Network Systems.

In December 2023, HiSKY and Intelsat entered into an investment agreement and agreed on technological cooperation.

Over the years, the structure of the satellite market has also changed: on July 17, 2025, the Luxembourg company SES completed the acquisition of Intelsat.

Therefore, describing Intelsat as a completely independent operator without mentioning SES is already incomplete today.

HiSKY also has a confirmed production footprint in Italy.

On July 6, 2023, the company officially announced cooperation with Jabil Italy for the serial production of the Smartellite 8×8 family. Italian production facilities are also mentioned in Israeli industry export materials.

This confirms the reality of production cooperation but does not allow establishing the exact origin of the specific terminal from the Russian photos.

Another element of the story is the logos of the European Space Agency (ESA), the British Space Agency (UKSA), and the American Spire Global on HiSKY promotional images.

On August 31, 2021, HiSKY announced a project to demonstrate satellite communication using the Ella1 nanosatellite with the participation of ESA, UKSA, and Spire.

On November 11, 2023, Ella1 was launched into space on a Falcon 9 rocket. This was reported by the Israel Space Agency on November 14.

Thus, the logos on the photos relate to real international technological cooperation that began long before the current reports.

They are not evidence that European space organizations participated in the supply of equipment for Ukrainian strike drones.

A separate issue is Israeli export control.

In Israel, there is a Defense Export Control Agency (DECA), created under the Ministry of Defense. Its powers are defined by the 2007 Defense Export Law.

Not all satellite equipment automatically falls under prohibited or licensable military goods: the classification of the product, the nature of the services, and the conditions of the specific deal are important.

No documents confirming the issuance of a permit for the supply of the terminals in question to Ukraine were found in open sources. But the absence of such documents in the public domain does not prove that the permits did not exist.

Israeli technologies in the war against Ukraine: what is established and what questions remain open

The plot with HiSKY did not arise in a vacuum. NANews has repeatedly investigated how technologies of Israeli origin appear in the Ukrainian military context and why the official policy of Jerusalem does not always explain the full picture of commercial and international supplies.

In April 2026, we talked about the Haifa company Elsight and its communication technologies for drones. The reason was the inclusion of the Israeli enterprise in the Russian list of foreign companies allegedly associated with Ukrainian drone production.

In that material, NANews studied open information about Elsight’s products, international partners, and supplies. It was not about HiSKY, but about a very close technological problem — stable communication with unmanned platforms.

On September 2, 2026, our study was published on how Israeli radar stations RADA RPS-42 are used to protect Ukrainian skies. The story shows another side of technology exchange: not communication for long-range strikes, but threat detection and protection from drones.

On September 7, NANews published material on Israeli armored vehicles Gaia Thunder and AMIR on the Ukrainian front. There, the central question was also the origin of the equipment and the possible route through third countries.

And on September 12, analyzing the words of Israel Aerospace Industries head Boaz Levy, we wrote about why Israel was too late in making the fight against the mass drone threat a national priority.

Levy then urged to look simultaneously at the experience of Ukraine and Israel. Both countries faced opponents using relatively inexpensive drones for strikes far beyond the immediate line of confrontation.

These publications show that the exchange of technologies and military experience between the two countries has long ceased to be exclusively a diplomatic topic.

At the same time, it is important not to mix state supplies, licensed commercial sales, the activities of international intermediaries, and the independent use of equipment by end users.

For the HiSKY story, this distinction remains decisive.

As of November 7, 2026, the existence of the Israeli company, its defense specialization, the technical capabilities of the terminals, international partnerships, and historical corporate connection with Tamir Pardo are confirmed.

It is also documented that Russian military sources reported allegedly discovered equipment, and Ukrainian specialists publicly commented on these reports.

But it is still unknown whether HiSKY terminals were actually used in specific Ukrainian strikes, who purchased them, through which country they might have been delivered, which satellite operator provided communication, and whether the leadership of the Israeli company was aware of the alleged military use.

There is also no basis to claim that the possible supply was backed by the Israeli government or intelligence structures.

Meanwhile, Russia itself is developing its own satellite military communications. On November 6, Reuters reported with reference to Ukrainian military intelligence about the use of the Russian “Rassvet” constellation for communication over Ukraine. According to the GUR, the system does not yet provide continuous coverage.

This underscores that satellite communications are becoming a separate area of technological competition in the war, not an exclusive feature of one army.

Это подчёркивает, что спутниковые коммуникации становятся отдельным направлением технологического соперничества в войне, а не исключительной особенностью одной армии.

For Israel, the story of HiSKY is especially important because it shows how far modern dual-use technology can be from the original manufacturer.

The equipment developed in Rosh HaAyin can pass through international production and commercial chains, use the infrastructure of foreign operators, and attract the attention of military departments of other countries.

But it is impossible to determine the end user by the place of development.

The main question of the investigation remains the same: if Israeli terminals are indeed installed on Ukrainian long-range drones, how did they get there and who ensured their connection?

As long as there is no answer, the story of HiSKY remains an important technological plot with an unconfirmed combat component, rather than a proven case of Israel’s involvement in Ukrainian strikes on Russia.

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