- May 29, 2026
- 8:44 pm
- Ukraine
Ukrainian society has once again found itself inside an information vortex: some sources speak of a possible end to the hot phase of the war by November, others of preparations for another two to three years of hostilities, and still others warn of a conflict that could stretch over a decade.
For Israel, this topic does not seem distant either. Here, it is well understood that war rarely ends on a single date in the calendar. Sometimes the active phase ends, but missiles, sabotage, cyberattacks, political pressure, societal trauma, and the constant need to maintain defense remain.
That is why the main question now is not only: “when will the war end?”. More importantly: what exactly do different politicians, media, and experts call the “end of the war” — a ceasefire, a frozen front, a negotiation process, a truce, or a real sustainable peace.
Why talks about November emerged
The reason for the new wave of discussions was reports of a closed meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and the “Servant of the People” faction. After it, in the Ukrainian political space, it was said that the president allegedly allowed for the possibility of ending the hot phase of the war by November — provided there are security guarantees.
Before this, a similar thought was voiced by the advisor to the head of the President’s Office, Mykhailo Podolyak. According to his logic, if Russia’s summer offensive does not yield results, there may be a chance in the fall to freeze the front line, stop missile-drone strikes, and transition to a controlled format with intermediaries.
This does not mean a peace treaty.
Rather, it is about a scenario where active hostilities could be stopped along the line of contact. For Ukraine, this could provide a respite but would not remove key threats: occupied territories, border security, Western guarantees, Russia’s military readiness, and the risk of a new strike.
What the deputies said
People’s Deputy Olga Vasylevska-Smahliuk confirmed that the prospect of ending the hot phase of the war was indeed discussed at the meeting. According to her, by November, such an option is considered only if there are security guarantees.
Another deputy, Yuriy Kamelchuk, spoke more cautiously. He did not confirm a specific date but noted that such chances are discussed regularly, and their realism is primarily related to the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the front.
Meanwhile, some politicians were skeptical of the “November scenario.” Yaroslav Zheleznyak reminded that various forecasts had already been voiced at meetings with the president, which then did not coincide with reality. Oleksiy Honcharenko, citing his sources, claims that there were no clear deadlines from Zelensky — rather, there was talk of the possibility of entering a real negotiation process in about six months.
And here begins the main problem: the same closed meeting gave rise to several versions at once. For society, this looks like chaos, but for war, such uncertainty is almost the norm.
Two to three years of war or “old throw-in”?
Almost immediately after talks about November, another line appeared. The Economist, citing Ukrainian government sources, wrote that Zelensky allegedly instructed to prepare for another two to three years of war.
In the British publication’s material, the logic was different: Ukraine can continue to resist while Russia weakens under the pressure of strikes on oil refining infrastructure, economic problems, and elite discontent. In such a picture, the bet is not on a quick peace but on exhausting the enemy.
The President’s Office sharply rejected this information.
Presidential advisor on communications Dmytro Litvin called the publication an “old throw-in” and emphasized that Zelensky at the meeting with the faction spoke about focusing on six months — until November. Sources from Interfax-Ukraine and LIGA.net also conveyed denials from the authorities. And the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the NSDC, Andriy Kovalenko, called Western insights about two to three years of war loud headlines far from reality.
But even these denials do not remove the main question.
If the authorities tell society about November, it may be a political signal, an attempt to maintain morale and show that the diplomatic window is not closed. If Western media write about two to three years, it may reflect military planning in case of the worst scenario. In real war, these two lines do not always contradict each other.
The country can hope for a truce in the fall — and at the same time prepare the army, economy, and partners for the continuation of the war.
For the Israeli reader, such dual logic is well known. The state can negotiate, discuss exchanges, work with intermediaries — and simultaneously prepare for the next round of conflict because the enemy does not disappear with a diplomatic formula.
It is in this context that НАновости — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers Ukrainian forecasts not as a dispute about a beautiful date, but as a dispute about what type of war Russia will continue to wage against Ukraine even after a possible front stop.
Why forecasts differ so much
The reason is not only in politics and not only in the media.
Different people talk about different things. For some, the “end of the war” is the cessation of active fighting. For others, it is the return of territories. For others, it is security guarantees. For the fourth, it is the collapse of Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine again. Therefore, November, two to three years, and even a decade can simultaneously exist in public discourse, although they sound like mutually exclusive versions.
There is another factor: the war has become multilayered.
Even if the front line stops, missiles, drones, cyberattacks, agent networks, information operations, attempts to split society, and pressure on Ukraine’s allies will remain. In this sense, “peace” may turn out to be not the finale, but a pause between forms of war.
The heaviest scenario: conflict for years
The most grim assessments come from those who believe that Russia will not abandon the goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. In this logic, the active phase may end, but the war itself — as a threat, strategy, and pressure — will continue.
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that she hopes for the end of the war within ten years. Such a formulation caused a strong reaction because for Ukrainians, ten years is not a forecast, but almost a sentence for an entire generation to live in a state of defense.
A similar harsh thought was expressed by Maria Berlinska from Victory Drones. She considers the very term “end of the war” dangerous because Russia remains an existential enemy of Ukraine. According to her, what may be possible is not a final peace, but a truce for a certain period.
This assessment sounds painful, but it is important for an adult conversation.
If the war is perceived only as a front, then a ceasefire seems like the end. If the war is understood as a long Russian project against Ukrainian independence, then stopping the front is just one of the stages.
What Trump’s letter and meeting with Poroshenko mean
Amid all these forecasts, Zelensky appealed to US President Donald Trump and Congress with a call to strengthen the protection of Ukrainian skies from ballistic missiles. This shows that Kyiv does not build policy only on the hope for November.
The situation with anti-ballistic defense remains critically important. If Russia continues strikes on cities, energy, and infrastructure, any talks about ending the hot phase depend not only on the front line but also on Ukraine’s ability to protect the rear.
A separate signal is Zelensky’s closed meetings with leaders of parliamentary factions and groups. Particularly notable was a personal meeting with Petro Poroshenko, his long-time political opponent.
This can be interpreted in different ways. Some will see it as an attempt at national consolidation before difficult decisions. Others — a sign of a crisis of the old management model, where decisions were concentrated around the President’s Office and a narrow circle of managers.
But in any case, such meetings show: ahead may be a period when the Ukrainian authorities will need a broader political rear. Not only for war but also for possible negotiations, security guarantees, mobilization decisions, and explaining difficult compromises to society.
Where to look for a realistic scenario
The most honest answer today sounds like this: there is no exact date.
November may be a political goal or a window of opportunity. Two to three years may be an insurance scenario of military planning. A decade — a warning that even after a truce, the threat from Russia will not disappear automatically.
It is more realistic to talk not about the “end of the war,” but about several possible stages.
The first is the cessation of active hostilities.
The second is a control regime, intermediaries, security guarantees, and constant verification of whether Russia complies with agreements.
The third is a long period of Ukraine’s military readiness, economic recovery, strengthening air defense, returning people, and fighting Russian influence in cyberspace, politics, and the information environment.
For Israel, there is a separate lesson in this story. Ukraine, like Israel, lives next to a threat that does not always disappear after signatures and statements. Therefore, the question is not only when the guns will fall silent. The question is whether a system will be created that will not allow Russia to start a big war again in a few months or years.
Until such a system exists, any dates remain not a promise, but working versions.
And the louder the forecasts sound — “November,” “three years,” “a decade” — the more important it is to separate the political signal from military reality. Ukraine may want a short path to a ceasefire, but must prepare for a long struggle for security, sovereignty, and the right not to live under constant Russian blackmail.