- July 18, 2026
- 2:57 pm
- Israel, Ukraine
Why do Western states continue to arm Ukraine and defend its right to restore its borders, but increasingly criticize Israel?
Israeli professor of international relations Benny Miller attempted to answer this question in a column,published by the newspaper Haaretz on July 16, 2026.
Its title is formulated very directly: “Why does the world support Ukraine but not Israel? Perhaps because they tell different stories”.
However, it’s not just about the quality of state propaganda or the work of diplomats. Miller examines four ideological frameworks through which different political camps evaluate the wars of Ukraine and Israel: liberal, strategic, Trumpist-isolationist, and postcolonial.
Lindsey Graham as a representative of a disappearing political camp
The starting point for the column was the death of American Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.
He died on July 11, 2026, at the age of 71 — the day after returning from Kyiv. During his last visit, on July 10, Graham met with Volodymyr Zelensky. They discussed strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, diplomatic work, and new sanctions against Russia.
In Kyiv, the senator reported that he and a group of lawmakers managed to agree with the Trump administration on a compromise version of the sanctions bill. The document provided for pressure not only on Russia but also on states that continue to buy Russian energy resources and thereby finance the war.
For Benny Miller, Graham embodied a political position that is gradually disappearing from American politics: simultaneous and almost unconditional support for Ukraine and Israel.
He considered both countries allies of the United States, opposing forces threatening the American and Western order: Ukraine against Putin’s Russia, Israel against Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other radical forces in the Middle East.
But today this coalition is falling apart.
Liberal forces in the West mostly continue to support Ukraine while increasingly distancing themselves from the Israeli government. A significant part of the Trumpist camp, on the contrary, maintains support for Israel but considers aid to Ukraine an expensive and unnecessary foreign war.
Two countries received support after the attack — but then their paths diverged
After the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Western countries sided with Ukraine.
Kyiv received weapons, financial aid, intelligence information, and diplomatic support. Massive sanctions were imposed on Russia, and hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets were frozen.
After the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, Israel also received broad international support. Western leaders recognized the country’s right to protect its citizens, demanded the release of hostages, and condemned the mass killings, kidnappings, and violence committed by the terrorists.
The US has repeatedly participated directly in defending Israel from missile and drone attacks by Iran and its allies.
However, then the attitude towards the two wars began to change.
Support for Ukraine also experienced a significant decline. The Trump administration reduced American involvement and pushed Kyiv to seek an agreement with Moscow. Nevertheless, as Miller emphasizes, the decline in support for Israel turned out to be significantly deeper, broader, and faster.
Even in the fifth year of the war, Europe continues to view aid to Ukraine as one of the main elements of its own security.
At the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8, 2026, allies pledged to provide Ukraine with 70 billion euros in military equipment, training, and other defense assistance within a year. They also stated their intention to maintain no less level of support in 2027.
The European Union separately approved a loan to Ukraine of 90 billion euros for 2026–2027. Approximately 60 billion of this is expected to be directed towards defense needs. The total volume of financial, military, humanitarian aid from the EU, support for refugees, and funds related to frozen Russian assets reached 216.2 billion euros by the summer of 2026.
This does not mean that literally “the whole world” supports Ukraine.
On February 24, 2026, a UN General Assembly resolution in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity was approved by 107 states. 12 voted against, and 51 abstained. Many countries of the Global South condemn the Russian invasion but do not want to join the West’s sanctions war.
Nevertheless, in Europe, Ukraine remains part of the overall security system, whereas the relations of many European states with Israel have changed almost beyond recognition. This is what the author of Haaretz draws attention to.
Liberal view: Ukraine’s sovereignty and Israel’s responsibility
The first framework Miller examines is the liberal one.
For the liberal West, the Russian invasion looks like a classic and almost indisputable case of aggression: a large military power crossed an internationally recognized border and attempted to subjugate a neighboring sovereign state.
Ukraine does not demand Russian territory or control over the Russian population. Its official position is based on restoring its own sovereignty and recognized borders.
With Israel, the situation is perceived differently.
Israel’s right to respond to the October 7 attack was initially almost undisputed by Western governments. But the longer the war continued, the more international attention shifted from Hamas’s crimes to the actions of the Israeli army, the situation of Gaza’s civilians, and the lack of a clear political plan after the military operation.
Miller notes that liberal criticism focuses on the scale of civilian casualties, the humanitarian crisis, and Israel’s constant preference for military force over political solutions.
This is compounded by the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria, statements about possible annexation of territories, and the categorical refusal of a significant part of the Israeli government to discuss the creation of a Palestinian state.
Thus, Ukraine tells a story about defending internationally recognized sovereignty. Israel continues to talk about self-defense after October 7, but many abroad increasingly see not only a country defending its citizens but also a significantly stronger side controlling territory and population without a clear prospect of political settlement.
NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: this does not mean “moral equivalence” between Ukraine and Hamas or between Russia and Israel. It is about how prolonged military actions and government decisions have changed the international perception of Israel.
Trumpist split: Israel is supported, Ukraine is seen as a distant war
In the American right-wing camp, a different logic operates.
For supporters of the America First policy, Ukraine is a distant ally whose defense requires enormous expenses and creates the risk of direct confrontation with Russia.
Hence the demands to stop “endless funding,” force Kyiv to make territorial concessions, and shift the main responsibility for the war onto Europe.
Benny Miller points out that there is a strong isolationist tendency in the Trumpist right-wing movement: according to this position, the US should not finance wars of distant states for years.
Many representatives of the same camp perceive Israel completely differently — as part of the Judeo-Christian world, leading the fight against Iran and radical Islamism.
Here, strategic interests converge, support from American evangelicals, rejection of Iran, and the belief that Israel is on the front line of a larger civilizational war.
Lindsey Graham combined these two approaches. He considered it necessary to simultaneously oppose Russia, Iran, and terrorist organizations.
After his death, it becomes especially noticeable how rare such a position has become.
American society is no longer unequivocally pro-Israel
Israel’s problem is that support is declining not only among left-wing activists.
According to Gallup, in February 2026, 41% of Americans said they sympathize more with Palestinians, and 36% with Israelis. The difference was within the margin of error, but for the first time in a quarter-century, Israel lost a clear advantage. Just a year earlier, the ratio was 46% to 33% in favor of Israelis.
The political divide remains huge.
Among Republicans, 70% still sympathize more with Israelis. Among Democrats, 65% express more sympathy for Palestinians.
But particularly troubling for Israel is the generational shift. Among Americans aged 18 to 34, 53% support the Palestinian side, and only 23% support the Israeli side. Even among young Republicans, the attitude towards Israel has become noticeably more negative.
A Pew Research Center study conducted in the spring of 2026 showed that 60% of Americans have a negative attitude towards Israel, while 37% expressed a positive attitude. In 2022, 42% of respondents had a negative attitude towards Israel.
This is no longer a temporary reaction to a separate military operation but a structural change in the attitude towards the country.
Postcolonial view: Ukraine is a victim of empire, Israel is the stronger side
The third important framework is postcolonial.
In this perception, Russia is an imperial power trying to deprive Ukrainians of their own statehood, language, and national identity. Therefore, Ukraine looks like a people resisting colonial capture.
Israel, within the same model, is often portrayed as a state of “settler colonialism,” and Palestinians as “indigenous people” being displaced by a stronger military and political system.
Miller notes that it is through this lens that a significant part of the Global South and the Western left camp view the two wars. Many states condemned Russia’s invasion but refused to participate in the sanctions campaign while taking a significantly harsher stance towards Israel.
But the author also points out the shortcomings of such an explanation.
A simple colonial scheme does not take into account the millennia-long connection of Jews with the Land of Israel, the history of persecution and expulsions, the Holocaust, the mass flight of Jews from Arab countries, and the fact that Israeli society cannot be reduced to descendants of European settlers sent to the region by any colonial metropolis.
Nevertheless, settlement policies, statements about annexation, and the lack of a political perspective for Palestinians constantly reinforce precisely the interpretation that Israel considers historically false and unjust.
Israel faces not only criticism but also real isolation
The decline in international support is already reflected in specific diplomatic decisions.
In September 2025, the State of Palestine was officially recognized by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, Portugal, and several other countries. The British government directly linked its decision to the war in Gaza, the expansion of settlements, and the need to preserve the possibility of creating two states.
This did not lead to an immediate change in the situation on the ground but demonstrated how deeply the attitude of Western allies towards Israeli policy has changed.
In the spring of 2026, Pew Research Center surveyed residents of 36 countries. The median negative attitude towards Israel was 67%, and the positive attitude was only 25%.
In all the European countries studied, negative assessments prevailed. Compared to 2025, the attitude towards Israel worsened in 13 out of 24 countries for which comparable data were available. In Germany, the negative attitude reached 73%, in the UK — 69%, in Poland — 70%, in Italy — 75%.
Attributing this entire process solely to anti-Semitism would be convenient but insufficient.
Anti-Semitism indeed influences the international discussion, especially on social media, in universities, and radical political movements. However, it does not explain why the attitude towards Israel has deteriorated so quickly among moderate voters, young Americans, European centrists, and even part of the Jewish audience.
The main problem is not only in history but also in politics
The formulation that Ukraine and Israel “tell different stories” should not create the impression that the problem can be solved with a more successful advertising clip or a new campaign by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
State stories are perceived convincingly only when they correspond to its actions.
Ukraine can talk about defending freedom and sovereignty because the Russian army crossed its border, occupied territories, and continues to strike Ukrainian cities.
Israel has the right to remind the world of the massacre on October 7, hostages, the threat from Iran, and the right of every state to protect its citizens.
But at the same time, its government must explain what the ultimate goals of the war are, what should happen with Gaza, whether there is a political perspective for Palestinians, and why the expansion of settlements continues.
Without answers to these questions, the international audience increasingly perceives statements about self-defense not as a complete explanation of policy but as an attempt to justify the indefinite use of force.
NAnews — Israel News believes that the main conclusion from the discussion initiated by Benny Miller is not the need to compare the suffering of Ukrainians and Israelis.
Ukraine and Israel face different opponents, fight different wars, and are in completely different historical circumstances.
But international support is not an indefinite credit.
Ukraine retains it because the defense of the Ukrainian state still aligns with the main principles of European security: the inviolability of borders, resistance to aggression, and the inadmissibility of changing the map by force.
Israel loses it not because the world has forgotten October 7, but because after the initial right to respond, the world demanded to see a political goal, limitations of force, and a plan for the future.
Lindsey Graham belonged to a generation of American politicians for whom support for Ukraine and Israel was part of a single strategy of defending allies.
His last trip to Kyiv and death immediately after returning became a symbolic end to an era in which such a position was considered natural.
Today, Ukraine has to prove that its defeat will pose a threat to all of Europe.
Israel, on the other hand, has to prove that its victory does not mean endless war, permanent occupation, and the rejection of any political solution.