Why the Ukrainian ‘Iron Dome analogue’ will not become a panacea — a Ukrainian general explained what is really needed for sky protection

On April 23, 2026, retired Lieutenant General Igor Romanenko, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and founder of the ‘Close the Sky of Ukraine’ fund, stated that Ukraine’s own air defense system based on the principles of Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ cannot become a universal solution to the war with Russia. His key point is harsh but sober: even a strong and technologically advanced system does not provide absolute protection, and talks of a ‘miracle complex’ that will cover all threats at once do not correspond to reality.

For the Israeli audience, this topic is especially sensitive because the very image of the ‘Iron Dome’ has long become a symbol of the country’s effective defense. But that is precisely why it is important to clarify the details. The Israeli model is built not on a single battery and not on a single name, but on a multi-layered architecture where different means work against different types of threats. And when Ukrainian military refer to the Israeli experience, it is not about direct copying, but about trying to adapt individual principles to a completely different war, a different scale of territory, and a different spectrum of attacks.

Why the ‘Iron Dome’ does not solve everything

According to Romanenko, the Israeli ‘Iron Dome’ was primarily created to intercept short and medium-range missiles and shells, including threats like salvos from rocket systems. He reminded that the system is effective against a certain class of targets but is not an absolute defense in the conditions of a massive and overloaded strike. In other words, even a very strong system begins to experience limits when it is hit by a large number of targets simultaneously.

This is an important remark because in public discussions, Israeli air defense is often perceived almost as a technical miracle without weak points. In practice, both Israel and Ukraine face the same basic problem: there is always the question of saturation in the air. If there are too many attacks, if they come in waves, if different types of means of destruction are used, then even high interception rates do not mean complete invulnerability.

Romanenko also emphasized another point: Israel has not only a powerful air defense but also missile defense, and besides, a relatively small territory. However, even with such a set of conditions, interception rates, according to him, are approximately at the level of about 90%, as in the Ukrainian case in several directions. But a 100% result, he stressed, cannot be guaranteed by any system in the world today.

Why this is especially important for Ukraine

For Ukraine, the problem looks even more difficult. If Israel defends a compact territory under conditions of a very dense defense architecture, then Ukraine is forced to cover a vast space, a large number of infrastructure facilities, cities at a significant distance from each other, and simultaneously respond to combined Russian strikes.

That is why the very idea of ‘making our own Iron Dome and solving the issue’ sounds beautiful only at the slogan level. In reality, it is about a long and expensive construction of a complex system where one solution does not replace another, and each technology covers only its part of the threats.

Which targets remain the most difficult

According to Romanenko, the fight against ballistic missiles remains particularly difficult for Ukraine. He directly named ‘Iskander’, ‘Kinzhal’, and ‘Zircon’ among those threats that create the most severe burden for defense. This is the class of targets where the requirements for reaction speed, accuracy, radar support, and interception cost are especially high.

But the list of problems does not end there. In addition to ballistics, ‘Shaheds’ continue to pose a huge threat, exhausting the defense with their persistence, massiveness, and relatively cheap application. It is this combination — expensive complex missiles plus mass drones — that makes the current air war so difficult for any country.

For the Israeli reader, there is an important practical conclusion here. The Israeli experience is indeed valuable, but it works as part of a whole system, not as a magic formula. Nikk.Agency sees the main meaning in such a plot in another: modern sky defense is no longer a debate about which system is ‘better’, but a question of how to build a layered defense where there is a place for radars, interceptors, aviation, mobile units, electronic warfare means, and a new generation of unmanned solutions.

Small air defense and a new focus on drone interception

Romanenko noted that in Ukraine, the so-called small air defense has already been formed. At the brigade level, regular units operate against enemy drones. This includes mobile groups and interceptor drones, which are becoming an increasingly important part of defense against the backdrop of the growing role of drones in the war.

However, he also outlined the limits of current capabilities. So far, the logic of work looks like ‘one operator — one drone’. The next stage, according to him, should be the transition to a model where one operator can already control a swarm of interceptor drones. This would sharply increase the scalability and effectiveness of such defense, but for now, a significant part of these solutions remains a matter of perspective rather than fully deployed everyday practice.

It is at this point that his comment sounds particularly realistic. He does not promise a quick technological miracle and does not create the illusion that a new development will remove all threats tomorrow. On the contrary, it is about a gradual transition from piece protection to mass protection, where the key factor will be not only the quality of an individual interceptor but also the ability to manage a large number of such means simultaneously.

What is already being implemented and where the war is heading

A separate background for these words was the statement from April 23, 2026, by Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov that Ukraine has implemented remote control technology for interceptor drones. According to him, this allows operators to destroy air targets at distances of hundreds and thousands of kilometers.

This detail well shows the direction in which modern defense is moving. Air warfare is increasingly less about the classic duel of ‘missile against missile’ and more about a complex network where remote control, automation, coordination, cheap mass solutions, and the ability to quickly adapt to new types of attacks are important.

For Israel, there is a double interest in this. On the one hand, the Israeli experience of multi-layered air defense remains one of the most studied in the world. On the other hand, the very nature of threats is changing so quickly that even the most famous defense models can no longer be perceived as a ready-made template that can simply be transferred to another country without adjustment for geography, scale of war, and type of enemy.

This is the main conclusion from Romanenko’s words. Ukraine can take Israeli principles, can build its interception echelons, can increase the drone component and strengthen small air defense. But no own ‘analog of the Iron Dome’ by itself will become a panacea. The war already requires not one loud solution, but a stable, flexible, and multi-layered system that can withstand both ballistics, cruise missiles, mass drones, and attrition attacks. Therefore, it is important to analyze such topics to the end — and to monitor how they develop further.