Putin could have made the decision for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine as early as 2020, – The Guardian

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine could have been planned much earlier than February 2022. According to The Guardian, some Western analysts believe that Putin could have made the final political decision as early as the first half of 2020 — amid the COVID-19 pandemic, his own isolation, and constitutional amendments that allowed him to remain in power after 2024.

Western intelligence agencies still do not name the exact date when the final choice in favor of war was made. However, the reconstruction of events shows: preparation for it likely began long before the official start.

2020: Isolation, Constitution, and Long-term Horizon

In the spring of 2020, Russia found itself in conditions of strict pandemic isolation. The president effectively reduced his circle of personal contacts to a minimum, increasing dependence on a narrow circle of security officials and bureaucrats. During the same period, a constitutional reform was initiated and carried out, ‘resetting’ presidential terms and opening the possibility of staying in power until 2036.

For analysts, this is an important moment. The constitutional changes removed the factor of uncertainty, and isolation increased the closed nature of the decision-making system. According to a number of sources, it was during this period that a strategic stance on a forceful solution to the Ukrainian issue could have formed.

The Guardian emphasizes: this is not about a specific signed directive on a certain day. Rather — a gradual transition from the concept of pressure to the concept of military implementation.

Intelligence predicted the invasion but erred in forecasts

American and British intelligence agencies — the CIA and MI6 — correctly assessed the invasion scenario itself. In the fall of 2021, Washington and London publicly warned of the impending strike, declassified satellite data on the movement of Russian troops, and insisted on the seriousness of the threat.

However, in assessing the outcome, Western intelligence made a miscalculation. It was assumed that the Ukrainian state could collapse within a few weeks. These calculations did not materialize.

European intelligence services for a long time did not believe in the possibility of a full-scale war in 21st-century Europe. The historical logic of ‘economic interdependence’ seemed stronger than the military scenario.

In November 2021, CIA Director William Burns personally met with Putin and warned of the catastrophic consequences of the invasion. Three and a half months later, Russian troops crossed the border.

Ukrainian caution and fear of panic

A separate point is the position of Kyiv. The Guardian notes that the Ukrainian leadership treated Western warnings with caution until the last moment. The reason was pragmatic: a sharp acknowledgment of the threat could cause financial panic, currency collapse, and mass capital outflow.

Only in the spring-autumn of 2021, when the concentration of Russian troops reached tens of thousands of people at the borders, did the scale of the threat become apparent.

This is one of the key lessons of the war: political leadership is forced to balance between warning society and preventing internal collapse.

Belarus as a strategic factor

A significant element of preparation was the suppression of protests in Belarus in 2020. After mass demonstrations, Alexander Lukashenko found himself completely dependent on the Kremlin. According to the publication, this opened up the possibility for Moscow to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground.

It was from the north — through Belarus — that the offensive on Kyiv began in February 2022. Without control over this direction, the military configuration would have looked different.

The main conclusion: it is dangerous to consider the impossible impossible

The Guardian emphasizes one fundamental conclusion: dismissing ‘irrational’ scenarios is dangerous. A full-scale war in Europe seemed politically and economically absurd. But it became a reality.

From a security analysis perspective, this means revising the criteria for threat assessment. Rationality is not always a determining factor in authoritarian decision-making systems.

In this context, НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency notes: understanding the moment when the decision for war was made is important not only for historians. It is a matter of future strategic forecasts — from Eastern Europe to the Middle East.

If political will is capable of ignoring economic losses and international isolation, then previous risk calculation models require revision.

The history of 2020–2022 shows: sometimes it is precisely those scenarios that seem excessive that become reality.